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‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful 
tone, ‘it means just what I use it to mean—neither more nor 
less.’ 
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass. 
 
 
Is it true that when we utter a word, our interlocutor will interpret the same meaning 
that we were willing to attribute to that word? You are probably thinking that, no, this is not 
always the case. Sometimes, indeed, you may have heard the sayings ‘what you don't say 
speaks volumes’ or ‘you should read between the lines’. Furthermore, rhetoricians recognized 
how minus dicimus et plus significamus (Hoffmann, 1987, p. 21). The idea that the unsaid 
matters as much as spoken words may sound like a commonplace but it has been originally 
pointed out by the British philosopher John Stuart Mill, who wrote:  
 
“If I say to any one, “I saw some of your children to-day”, he might be justified in 
inferring that I did not see them all, not because the words mean it, but because, if I had 
seen them all, it is most likely that I should have said so: though even this cannot be 
presumed unless it is presupposed that I must have known whether the children I saw 
were all or not” (1867, p. 501). 
 
A century later, in 1967, Herbert Paul Grice − in his famous William James Lectures 
delivered at Harvard University – developed and formalized those ideas into what is known 
today as one of the most influential theories regarding the logic behind a conversation, 





Logic and Conversation (1978) and Studies in the Way of Words (1989).1 Grice (1975), for 
the first time, described the phenomenon of implicature. 
An “IMPLICATURE is a component of speaker meaning that constitutes an aspect of what 
is meant in a speaker’s utterance without being part of what is said” (Horn & Ward, 2006, p. 
3). We must then distinguish the semantic meaning of a word or of a sentence from the 
speaker’s meaning. Such interpretation of the meaning of a sentence based on extra linguistic 
aspects is part of what we can define Pragmatics. A clear example of the divergence between 
Semantics and Pragmatics can be found in Orwell’s Down and Out in Paris and London: 
 
“Words used as insults seem to be governed by the same paradox as swear words. A word 
becomes an insult, one would suppose, because it means something bad; but in practice 
its insult-value has little to do with its actual meaning. For example, the most bitter insult 
one can offer to a Londoner is ‘bastard’—which, taken for what it means, is hardly an 
insult at all. And the worst insult to a woman, either in London or Paris, is ‘cow’; a name 
which might even be a compliment, for cows are among the most likeable of animals. 
Evidently a word is an insult simply because it is meant as an insult, without reference to 
its dictionary meaning; words, especially swear words, being what public opinion chooses 
to make them. In this connexion it is interesting to see how a swear word can change 
character by crossing a frontier” (1933, p. 179). 
  
Some swear words can be analyzed in pragmatic terms. Taking Orwell’s example, if I say that 
a woman is a ‘cow’, I’m literally saying something false, or – in Gricean terms – I’m not 
adhering to a Cooperative Principle:  
 
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, 
by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. 
(Grice, 1975, p. 45). 
																																																								
1	It is worth mentioning that some theorists (see Reboul, 2005) consider John Austin as the father of the field of 
Pragmatics, particularly with his William James Lectures given at Harvard (1955) and the related publication 







In particular, in affirming that a person is an animal, I’m not respecting (cfr. 
flouting) what Grice defined the first Maxim of Quality: “Do not say what you believe 
to be false”. Thus, the listener who moves from the basic assumption that I’m 
cooperative will enrich the literal meaning of ‘cow’ with the metaphorical meaning of 
‘an unpleasant woman’. Grice (1975, pp. 45-46) did not described just this maxim, but a 
series of maxims and sub maxims that we must obey in order to be cooperative:  
 
“Quantity 
1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the 
exchange). 
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.  
Quality (Supermaxim - Try to make your contribution one that is true): 
1. Do not say what you believe to be false. 
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.  
Relation: Be relevant. 
Manner: (Supermaxim - Be perspicuous): 
1. Avoid obscurity of expression. 
2. Avoid ambiguity. 
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).  
4. Be orderly.” 
 
The specific type of implicature that is mainly addressed in this thesis is the results of the 
violation of the first Maxim of Quantity and it is the so-called “Scalar Implicature”. First and 






1. Conversational Implicatures: a Definition  
Scalar implicatures are part of what Grice defined CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURES 
(specifically, GENERALIZED CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURES), as opposed to another type of 
implicatures, the CONVENTIONAL IMPLICATURES. These latter implicatures are defined 
‘conventional’ because they are not computable through the adherence to the conversational 
maxims but they always arise when a specific term is used. An example of a Conventional 
Implicature is given in (1).  
 
(1) a. She is a linguist and she is even funny. 
b. IMPL: Linguists are not generally funny. 
 
When presented with a sentence like in (1a) we always implicate the meaning in (1b), because 
it is the adverb even – with its conventional meaning – that automatically triggers the 
implicature. And this is the case for other terms such as therefore or but (for a better 
description of the phenomenon see Potts, 2005).  
 Scalar implicatures are generated thanks to the use of specific lexical items as well, 
but their computation is not automatic. According to Horn (1972), scalar implicatures are 
generated because those specific lexical items are considered to be part of a scale in which 
they are ordered from the less informative (Li) to the more informative (Mi). Thus, given the 
lexical scale <Li, Mi>, when the speaker decides to use the Li item, s/he automatically 
implicates the negation of the Mi item, since Mi ⊆ Li (Mi logically entails Li). In other words, 
according to Horn, the use of one element of the scale implicates the negation of the terms at 
its rights in the same scale. For example, considering the quantifiers some (2a) and all (2b), 
they can be seen as part of a scale <some, all>. Thus, there are two possible interpretations of 





interpretation, like in (3c). According to Grice, in listening (3a) we take into consideration the 
existence of the more informative statement in (3d), but since the speaker should be 
cooperative and did not utter (3d), we implicated the negation of the stronger alternative and 
got the meaning in (3c). 
 
 (2) a.  𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒 =  λP. λQ.𝑃 𝑄 ≠ ∅  
       b.  𝑎𝑙𝑙 =  λP. λQ.𝑃 ⊆ 𝑄 
 
(3) a. Some children got a biscuit. 
b. Some and possibily all children got a biscuit. 
c. Some but not all children got a biscuit. 
d. All children got a biscuit. 
 
This kind of Gricean reasoning can be summarized as follows: 
i. S said “Some Xs are Ys” 
ii. I know that exist a more informative statement that is ‘All Xs are Ys’ (‘All Xs are Ys’ 
⊆ “Some Xs are Ys”) 
iii. S should obey at the Conversational Maxims or at least at the Cooperative Principle  
iv. If S would have known that ‘All Xs are Ys’ he would have said so, to obey the 
Cooperative Principle and the first Maxim of Quantity 
v. Since S said “Some Xs are Ys” it means that either S knows that it is not the case that 
‘All Xs are Ys’ or that he does not know whether ‘All Xs are Ys’ 
 
Apart from quantifiers scale, there are other lexical terms that can be seen as part of a scale 





two, three, …>, verbs <to begin, to finish>, adverbs <sometimes, often, always>, modals 
<may, should, must>, adjectives <warm, hot> and so on (Horn, 1972; Levinson, 1983, p. 
134).  
Grice (1975, pp. 57-58) also stated specific properties for conversational implicatures. 
According to the cancellability property, an implicature can be cancelled explicitly asserting 
that it is not the case for such implicature (e.g., Some children got a biscuit, indeed all of them 
did) or if the context makes clear that the speaker is not adhering to the Cooperative Principle. 
Moreover, a proposition – even if paraphrased – containing the implicature will always tend 
to convey such implicature (non-detachability property) and the hearer must follow an 
inferential path to calculate it (calculability property).  
 In this thesis, we will study also a different type of CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURES, 
namely PARTICULARIZED CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURES or Ad-hoc implicatures. Contrary 
to scalar implicatures, ad-hoc implicatures arise from contextual features, rather than lexical 
ones. In other words, ad-hoc implicatures need a specific context in order to be computed. Let 
us consider the example in (4). If I say (4b) in a general conversation (i.e., outside the specific 
contextual features in (4)), I’m simply asserting that you have a sister, that your sister went 
out and that she was elegant. On the other hand, if I say (4b) in a context in which it is an 
answer for (4a), you will probably infer that your sister used the missing dress.  
 
(4) a. I cannot find my new dress.  
b. Your sister was pretty elegant when she left home. 
 
The kind of reasoning for ad-hoc implicatures computation might be seen as similar to the one 
for SIs. Since (4b) is a blatant violation of the maxim of Relevance, the listener will find a 





(1983, p. 127) outlined, “all implicatures that arise from observing the maxim of Relevance 
are particularized, since utterances are relevant only with respect to the particular topic or 
issue at hand”. Also, there are ad-hoc implicatures that might arise from observing – like for 
SIs – the first maxim of Quantity and these are the ones that we are dealing with our works in 
this thesis (Chapter 1 and 2).  
 
(5) a. My child is the one with glasses.  
 b. My child is the one with glasses and a hat. 
 c. My child is the one with (only) glasses. 
 
In a playground where there is a child with only a hat, a child with only glasses, a child with a 
hat and glasses and a child with no hat nor glasses, upon uttering (5a) the hearer will probably 
derive the implicature in (5c) considering that an alternative sentence, like the one in (5b), 
might have been uttered. Indeed, we might think of a scale <no hat/glasses, only hat/glasses, 
both hat/glasses> that is created contextually, instead of lexically (Stiller, Goodman, & Frank, 
2015). Similar to scalar implicatures, ad-hoc implicatures are cancellable: indeed, considering 
the example in (5a) ‘My child is the one with glasses’, I can continue saying ‘My child is the 
one with glasses, indeed he has glasses and a hat’. To sum up: 
 
“ a. An implicature i from utterance U is particularized iff U implicates i only by virtue 
of specific contextual assumptions that would not invariably or even normally obtain 
 
b. An implicature i is generalized iff U implicates i unless there are unusual specific 








2. The Computation of Conversational Implicatures: a Theoretical Framework 
Since Grice (1975), the debate on the computation of conversational implicatures, and 
particularly of scalar implicatures, has been broadly fostered with an important contribution 
of the new field of Experimental Pragmatics (Noveck, 2001; Noveck & Sperber, 2004). The 
two main areas of interest are related to how implicatures are generated (i.e., linguistically or 
pragmatically) and if such processing is demanding in terms of cognitive resources. As we 
will partially find out trough this thesis, experimental investigation considered different 
populations with various techniques in order to shed light on how specific implicatures are 
computed.  
 When considering how scalar implicatures are generated, we may consider three 
principal theoretical accounts: the Neo-Gricean approaches, Relevance-Theoretic approaches 
and Grammar-driven approaches (Foppolo, 2012). In this section we shall hint – with no 
claim of completeness – at the major points of the different approaches. Particularly, we will 
focus on aspects that we will run across during this thesis, that are: 
- distinction between generalized and particularized implicatures 
- global vs. local interpretation of scalar alternatives 
- default vs. non-default computation of implicatures 
- diverse mechanisms of computation (linguistic vs. extra-linguistic) 
 
2.1. The Neo-Gricean Approaches and the ‘Strong defaultism’ 
According to Neo-Gricean approaches (particularly, Levinson, 2000), upper-bound 
interpretations are the default interpretation when a sentence containing an underinformative 
term is encountered. Contextual factors might sometime lead to a lower-bound interpretation. 
The prediction is that a generalized conversational implicature is a “default inference, one that 





is computed costless, automatically, and its cancellation can be obtained with a cost, as a 
second step. Levinson, argued that: 
 
“According to the standard line (more often presupposed than justified), there are just 
two levels to a theory of communication: a level of sentence-meaning (to be explicated 
by the theory of grammar in the large sense) and a level of speaker-meaning (to be 
explicated by a theory of pragmatics, perhaps centrally employing Grice's notion of 
meaningNN). […] This view, although parsimonious, is surely inadequate, indeed 
potentially pernicious, because it underestimates the regularity, recurrence, and 
systematicity of many kinds of pragmatic inferences. What it omits is a third layer, what 
we may call the level of statement- or utterance-meaning […] or, as I will prefer below, 
utterance-type-meaning. This third layer is a level of systematic pragmatic inference 
based not on direct computations about speaker-intentions but rather on general 
expectations about how language is normally used. These expectations give rise to 
presumptions, default inferences, about both content and force; and it is at this level (if 
at all) that we can sensibly talk about speech acts, presuppositions, conventional 
implicatures, felicity conditions, conversational presequences, preference organization, 
and so on and of special concern to us, generalized conversational implicatures” (2000, 
pp. 22-23). 
 
In his work, Levinson also reformulated the Gricean maxims in what he defined heuristics; if, 
for example, for Grice scalar implicatures derive from the adherence to the first Maxim of 
Quantity, for Levinson scalar implicatures are generated trough the following of the Q-
heuristic, that is formulated as “What isn't said, isn't” (2000, p. 31). Levinson proposed also 
the I Heuristic and the M Heuristic: the former asserts that “What is simply described is 
stereotypically exemplified” (2000, p. 32), a statement in line with the Gricean second Maxim 
of Quantity (“Do not make your contribution more informative than is required”); the latter 
asserts “What's said in an abnormal way, isn't normal; or Marked message indicates marked 
situation” (2000, p. 33) and it is in line with Gricean Maxims of Manner (“avoid obscurity of 





are computed costless and automatically) seems elegant and intuitive, experimental research, 
as we will see in this thesis, goes to the opposite direction.  
 
2.2. The Relevance-Theoretic Approaches 
“The central claim of relevance theory is that the expectations of relevance raised by an 
utterance are precise and predictable enough to guide the hearer toward the speaker’s 
meaning” (Wilson & Sperber, 2002, p. 607). Accordingly to the Relevance-Theoretic 
approaches, firstly set out by Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson (1986; 1995), our 
communication is not governed by the adherence to a Cooperative Principle or to specific 
maxims but it is oriented toward the Cognitive Principle of Relevance: “Human cognition 
tends to be geared to the maximization of relevance” (2002, p. 609). And what is relevant? 
According to Wilson and Sperber (2002, p. 610), an input is relevant to us when it gives 
positive cognitive effects and is presented and processed in a specific context, that is when it 
brings something useful for our world representation. Thus, according to the authors, positive 
cognitive effects and processing efforts are related to relevance in a way that we can affirm 
that something is relevant to an individual under the following conditions: 
 
“ a. Other things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects achieved by 
processing an input, the greater the relevance of the input to the individual at that time.  
b. Other things being equal, the greater the processing effort expended, the lower the 
relevance of the input to the individual at that time” (2002, p. 609). 
 
Not only did Wilson and Sperber outline the Cognitive Principle of Relevance, but they also 
enunciated the Communicative Principle of Relevance, according to which “every ostensive 
stimulus conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance” (2002, p. 612). In an ostensive-





willingness to communicate something, ostensive stimuli are oriented to capture the attention 
of the hearer on our desire to convey a specific message. Such stimuli should be relevant 
enough to capture the listener's attention and to convey the idea that the effort to process the 
input will be worth it (i.e., there is a presumption of optimal relevance). How can this 
reasoning be applied to implicatures? First of all, Wilson and Sperber distinguished between 
explicatures and implicatures, as follows: 
 
“ (I) An assumption communicated by an utterance U is explicit [hence an “explicature”] 
if and only if it is a development of a logical form encoded by U. 
[Note: in cases of ambiguity, a surface form encodes more than one logical form, hence 
the use of the indefinite here, “a logical form encoded by U.”] 
 
(II) An assumption communicated by U which is not explicit is implicit [hence an 
“implicature”]” (2002, p. 635). 
 
Accordingly, there are no distinctions between particularized and generalized conversational 
implicatures; indeed we could say that: 
 
“all the implicatures that are called “generalized” […] are assimilated in Relevance 
Theory to explicatures and derived from the linguistically encoded logical form by 
pragmatical enrichment […] i.e. as content considered being explicitly communicated and 
not simply inferred” (Foppolo, 2012, p. 24). 
 
Apart from these descriptive aspects, these theories make specific predictions regarding the 
defaultness of interpreting underinformative items in a scale. According to Relevance-
Theoretic approaches, scalar inferences are pragmatic in nature and are governed by speaker’s 
expectations on the hearer willingness to draw an interpretation based on relevance. How far 
the hearer may go is all about the balance between ‘gain’ (positive cognitive effect) and ‘pain’ 





minimum effort. A logical interpretation of a scalar term “could very well lead to a satisfying 
interpretation of this term in an utterance” (Bott & Noveck, 2004, p. 439). The further 
enriching step might be done but with a cost. Indeed, Wilson and Sperber’s Relevance-
Theoretic comprehension procedure is described as follow: 
 
“a. Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: Test interpretive 
hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc.) in order of 
accessibility. 
b. Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied (or abandoned)” (2002, p. 613). 
 
It is worth noting that, according to Chemla and Singh (2014, p. 376), Relevance-
Theoretic approaches do “not offer a theory of scalar implicatures”; rather, they provide “a 
general framework and terminology to draw and describe expectations about how theories of 
scalar implicatures and almost just any other phenomena can lead to processing predictions” 
and that they are “not at all a competitor of the Gricean and grammatical theories”. We won’t 
analyze the assumptions of Relevance-Theoretic approaches in depth because what has been 
said is enough for the purpose of this thesis.  
 
2.3. The Grammar-driven Approaches and the ‘Weak defaultism’ 
From what we have discussed so far, we can make some specific predictions. First, 
scalar implicatures should be computed when a sentence containing the less informative term 
in a scale is uttered in a context in which the more informative alternative in the scale is 
relevant; indeed the hearer compares what have been said with what could have been said but 
had not. Second, scalar implicatures are computed globally and post-compositionally, i.e. 
after the computation of the semantic and of the truth-conditional content of the sentence 





We will now consider different approaches according to which scalar implicatures are 
not pragmatically driven but linguistically driven (i.e., grammatically) and, thus, according to 
which scalar implicatures are computed locally (e.g., Chierchia, 2006; 2013; Chierchia et al. 
2008; Fox, 2007). Chierchia (2013) proposed the Extended Standard Gricean Theory 
according to which scalar implicatures are computed by means of a covert counterpart of 
only, called exhaustivity operator (O). This ‘exhaustification process’ will occur just when it 
is advantageous (i.e., relevant) in a particular context, that is only when “lexically […] 
activated alternatives are relevant to the conversational goals” (Chierchia, 2013, p. 123). 
Indeed, lexical alternatives are always accessible but the exhaustification process is optional.  
Let us see how this exhaustification process works. For example, considering the scale 
<or, and>, a sentence like (6a) can be logically interpreted as (6b), formally represented in 
(7b) where Bs stands for “the speaker believes that”, or pragmatically as (6c), formally 
represented in (7a). If we apply the silent operator (6d) the result of the operation is the 
strengthened meaning, formally represented in (7c) (Chierchia, Fox, & Spector, 2008, p. 4). 
 
(6)  a. Mary or John will come. 
b. Mary will come and John will come. 
c. Only [Mary or John will come]. 
c. O [Mary or John will come]. 
 
(7) a. Bs (come(m) ∨ come(j)) 
b. Bs (come(m) ∧ come(j)) 







In (7c) we bumped into OALT, that is when the silent operator is applied to scalar alternatives.  
Indeed, according to Chierchia’s proposal, for an implicature to be derived, “it is not 
sufficient to activate the representation of the basic meaning; it is also necessary to have and 
retrieve the scale component” (Foppolo, 2012, p. 195). In other words, any expression ||α|| has 
plain semantic value and a strong value ||α||S assigned by the grammar and that is the negation 
of the stronger alternative in the scale of α: 
 
“Such a scalar value is computed by exploiting the stronger alternatives to the plain value, 
which constitute ||α||S-ALT, i.e. the set of the stronger alternatives that are lexically 
determined given the scalar lexical entry” (Foppolo, 2012, p. 30). 
 
Considering the quantificational scale, we might now consider that the quantifier some 
has: 
 
- a plain value: ||some|| = λPλQ ∃x[P(x) ∧ Q(x)] 
- a set of alternatives: ||some||S-ALT
 
= {some < many < most < all} 
- a scalar value: ||some||S
 
= λPλQ ∃x[P(x) ∧ Q(x)] ∧ ¬∀x [P(x) → Q(x)]  
(Foppolo, 2012, p. 30) 
 
Building on the idea that the exhaustification process is syntactic in nature, the natural 
consequence is to think that it might apply to embedded clauses. Indeed, Chierchia also 
proposed that a globalist view of implicature computation cannot account for examples like in 
(8). Considering a sentence like (8a), the alternative sentence should be (8b) and the 
computed implicature (8c). However, (8c) is too weak to express the meaning conveyed by 
(8a), indeed the meaning of (8a) seems more compatible with (8d) (Foppolo, 2012, p. 28). 
 





b. Daniel believes that all students like semantics. 
c. Daniel does not believe that all students like semantics. 
d. Daniel believes that not all students like semantics. 
 
To sum up, according to Grammar-driven approaches, scalar implicatures are computed 
through linguistic mechanisms that work on lexical alternatives. Implicatures are computed 
locally. Particularized and generalized implicatures are assumed to be computed differently. 
Regarding the processing cost associated with the derivation of the implicature, it is less clear 
whether this approach predicts it or not. As Bart Geurts (2010, p. 94) suggested, if on the one 
side we have Levinson and his ‘strong defaultism’ claims, on the other side grammatical 
approaches can be seen as proponent of a ‘weak defaultism’ in which they make “no claims 
about processing”, indeed they merely assert “that upper-bounding inferences are the norm”. 
We will not examine further those proposals, since it is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
3. The Experimental Turn and This Thesis’ Proposal 
 In the previous paragraphs, we have seen that different theoretical accounts on the 
computation of implicatures make different predictions. We have “Gricean accounts” 
according to which we must consider the speaker’s intentions when we derive scalar 
implicatures, considering both linguistic and extra-linguistic information. Specifically, we 
have to consider the semantic meaning of a proposition, the speaker’s willingness to respect 
the purposes of a cooperative exchange (i.e., for scalar implicatures, we must consider some 





certain acquaintance with the involved topic of the exchange. This seems to predict a role of 
Theory of Mind (ToM), that is the cognitive capacity to attribute mental states to us and to 
others and to recognize that those mental states can differ one from the others (Premack & 
Woodruff, 1978); ToM plays an important role when we have to interpret other people’s 
behaviour and act accordingly. Furthermore, Relevance-Theoretic accounts (e.g., Sperber, & 
Wilson, 1986) and Grammatical accounts (e.g., Chierchia, 2006; 2013) may assume a certain 
role of both the interlocutor’s epistemic state and of the context but they predict different 
computational mechanisms (i.e., either based on relevance and a series of inferential 
processes or grammatically driven by a silent operator O). One of the strikingly different 
accounts, mainly theorized by Levinson (2000), proposed that implicatures are computed as a 
default regardless of context, as soon as they are encountered, and subsequently cancelled if 
required by the context. In Levinson’s view (2000, p. 4) we usually interpret them “without 
too much calculation of such matters as speakers’ intentions, encyclopedic knowledge of the 
domain being talked about, or calculations of others’ mental processes.”  
Insomuch as the predictions made by the different accounts might be seen as easily 
testable (e.g., cost vs non-cost, a role for ToM vs. no role for ToM, ecc.), groundbreaking 
works of Noveck (2001) for children’s processing and Bott and Noveck (2004) for adults’ 
processing have inspired a series of experiments which tried to better our understanding of the 
process of implicature computation.  
 
3.1 The Experimental Turn: Children’s Processing 
Noveck’s (2001) aforementioned essay brought new research interest on the acquisition 
of scalar implicatures in children. However, his work moved from three previous studies that 
showed how children tend to interpret logically weak scalable lexical items: Smith (1980), 





Smith (1980) assessed 60 children (4- to 7-year-olds) on their knowledge and 
interpretation of quantifiers. Although children showed a good general comprehension of the 
quantifiers, they tended to accept more than adults sentences such as “Do some birds have 
wings?”.  Braine and Rumain (1981) in four tasks tested children (5- to 10- year-olds) as well 
as adults with the comprehension of the disjunction ‘or’. Again, children accepted more than 
adults an inclusive interpretation of ‘or’ (with both the two disjunctions true) instead of an 
exclusive pragmatic interpretation (with just one element true). Similar results had been 
obtained in Paris (1973). 
Through three experiments, Noveck’s work (2001) had the goal to developmentally 
assess whether children initially interpret logically – instead of pragmatically – a weak term in 
a scale. In the first experiments he tested 68 children (5- to 9- year-olds) and 20 adults –
English-speakers – with modals. Participants had to judge an underinformative sentence like 
‘There might be a parrot in the box’ in a context in which it must be a parrot in the box. 
Results showed that children give logical answers significantly more than adults and they 
begin to reason pragmatically with age. In the second experiment, 35 children (5- to 7- year-
olds) and 16 adults – speakers of English – had been tested with the same task of the first 
experiment but with after pre-training. Results showed an effect of training (i.e., more logical 
answers) just for adults. In the third experiment, 61 children (8- to 10- year-olds) and 15 
adults – speakers of French – had been assessed with the existential quantifier certains. 
Participants had to evaluate underinformative sentences such as ‘Some giraffes have long 
necks’. Children did not reject such sentences like adults.  
After Noveck (2001), many other studies found that children tend to answer logically 
more often than adults and many hypotheses have been formulated to explain this pattern of 






3.1.1 The Lexicalist Account 
 According to the lexicalist account, the fact that children tend to interpret scalar 
implicatures logically is due to problems in retrieving the scalar alternatives or to a non-
mature lexicalization of the scale. Considering the quantificational scale, it might be that they 
know the meaning of some and all: indeed, when tested they never show difficulties in the 
control sentences, but they might not know that some and all are part of a scale (<some, all>), 
or they are probably building the links amongst quantifiers belonging to the scale. According 
to Barner, Brook and Bale:  
 
“A failure to represent lexical items as members of psychological scales could explain 
numerous results in the literature, and also the apparent discrepancy between children’s 
difficulty with implicatures and their relatively sophisticated use of pragmatic cues 
elsewhere in language acquisition” (2011, pp. 86-87). 
 
They tested 60 4-year-old native speakers of English with both sentences with some (and only 
some) in which scale members are context-independently specified and with sentences in 
which scale members are context-dependently specified. For example, they presented a card 
in which there were a cow, a dog and a cat, all sleeping. Then they asked questions like “Are 
(only) some of the animals sleeping?” (context-independent) or ‘‘Are (only) the cat and the 
cow sleeping?” (context-dependent). The only was never prosodically emphasized. First of 
all, the use of only had a significant effect just for sentences with context-dependent 
alternatives, with higher pragmatic interpretations when only was used. In the case of 
sentences with context-independent alternatives (e.g., some/all), children gave more logical 
interpretations in both sentences with only and without only. According to authors, “Since 
only forces strengthening grammatically (and clearly did so for contextual alternatives), no 





interpretations for some is consistent with a hypothesized failure to generate relevant scalar 
alternatives” (2011, pp. 90-91). Furthermore, they proposed that children, in order to compute 
implicatures, must both acquire the “core meanings” and the “syntactic properties” of scale-
items and also “perform additional learning in order to rapidly and automatically access 
lexical items as scalar alternatives” (2011, p. 91). 
 Similar conclusions are reached in Foppolo, Guasti and Chierchia (2012) who suggest 
that a factor that might play a role in children’s computation of scalar implicatures is “the 
maturation of the lexicon that, in the case of scalar items, involves two layers of lexical 
representation, the basic meaning and the scale: the link between these two needs to be 
acquired and automatized” (p. 391). They reached this conclusion through 6 experiments in 
which they manipulated different factors:  
- In Experiment 1 they tested 63 Italian children of different age (4- to 7- year-olds) and 
12 adults with a Truth Value Judgment Task in order to analyze the developmental 
effect of scalar-implicatures computation. They found out that 6 is the critical age: 
afterwards children behave like adults, whereas they split beforehand (i.e., half of 
them answer pragmatically and half of them logically). 
-  In Experiment 2 authors manipulated the Italian quantifier used. In Experiment 1 they 
used ‘qualche’ (some) while in Experiment 2 they used ‘alcuni dei’ (some of); the goal 
was to assess whether the use of the partitive might help children with the 
computation. Twenty-four children of 5-year-olds and 12 adults had been tested with a 
Truth Value Judgment Task similar to Experiment 1’s one. Results showed that the 
use of the partitive did not help children. 
- Experiment 3 had the goal of priming the scale presenting a correct all-statement before 
a some-statement. Results of 12 5-year-olds children showed no facilitation-effects. 





Conversational Violation Test to check whether children that do not compute 
implicatures are generally non-mature in terms of pragmatic skills. This was not the 
case since children could detect violations of the conversational norms tested. 
- In Experiment 5, 17 children that previously failed to compute implicatures in other 
Truth Value Judgment Task experiments had been assessed again with a Felicity 
Judgment Task. They had to select the most appropriate sentence between an all-
sentence and a some-sentence when describing a picture in which the use of all is 
more informative. Children performed incredibly well (95% of correct answers) 
showing that they are able to distinguish the more informative element in the scale. 
- In Experiment 6, 47 5-year-olds and 40 adults had been tested with a Truth Value 
Judgment Task similar to the ones used for the other experiments. The only difference 
was that both a correct and an incorrect use of all were presented to participants before 
the some-underinformative sentence. Whilst presenting just the correct use of all 
before the evaluation of the undeinformative sentence did not change the rate of 
pragmatic answers (Experiment 4), in this case the percentage of pragmatic answers 
rose from 40% to 72.5%. 
 
Foppolo et al. explained the increase of pragmatic answers in the last experiment asserting 
that: 
“we can think of an under- informative statement as ambiguous between a basic and a 
strengthened meaning; we know that children are not automatically aware of ambiguities, 
but they are able to shift their perspectives when informed of the alternatives. We think 
that it is exactly this information that they got in our Experiment 6, which helped them to 
recognize the two layers of the meaning of some and retrieve the scale (provided that this 
is already available in the lexicon) so that they could choose the most appropriate, 
strengthened meaning and reject the underinformative sentence” (2012, p. 389). 
 





the pragmatic interpretation might be scale-specific and that in order to compute pragmatic 
interpretations children (a) need a certain command of the lexical items, (b) they need to 
know that those lexical items are part of a scale and (c) they need scale-items retrieval 
abilities. 
3.1.2 The Processing Account 
The processing account considers children’s difficulty with scalar implicatures as 
related with the processing cost of the computation. Pouscoulous, Noveck, Politzer and 
Bastide (2007) might be seen as the credited authors of the processing account. In their first 
experiment they tested 23 children (9- to 10-year-olds) and 19 adults with a Truth Value 
Judgment Task based on an artificial scenario, instead of encyclopedic knowledge. 
Participants saw four cardboard boxes and a variety of plastic animals that could be inside or 
outside the boxes. For example, subjects had to evaluate a sentence like “Some turtles are in 
the boxes” when actually all turtles were. Authors tested also for negative sentences with 
some. Results showed that children were more likely than adults to answer logically to 
underinformative sentences, as was expected. Higher percentages of logical answers have 
been found for negative sentences like “Some elephants are not in the boxes” in a case in 
which there were no elephants inside the boxes and two elephants outside the boxes. 
Experiment 2 had the goal of manipulating the task in order to give more spare 
cognitive resources to children and thus make them more able to compute implicatures. First, 
they asked questions on items inside the box only, to make the task easier. Second, instead of 
asking to evaluate a sentence, participants had to actively act to answer at a puppet’s request. 
For example, if the puppet said “I would like some boxes to contain a token” when there were 
five boxes with a token inside each box, participants might act pragmatically removing at 
least one token or they might act logically leaving the scenario as it was. Third, they used the 





for children. Again, negative sentences were presented, such as “I would like some boxes to 
not contain a token”. Sixty-six children from a nursery class, 30 kindergarten-children, 54 
second-graders children and 21 adults participated at the experiment. Results showed an 
increase in pragmatic answers compared to Experiment 1, thus the task turned out to be 
easier, and rates of pragmatic answers significantly increased with age. Again, negative 
sentences appeared to be more difficult compared to positive sentences.  
Experiment 3 was similar to Experiment 2 but participants had been divided in 2 
groups, one group had been tested with the French word quelques and the other with the 
French word certains. Twenty-five children (9- to 10-year-olds) and 28 adults had been 
tested. If for adults the quantifier term did not have an effect on results, children derived more 
implicatures when quelques was used. 
In conclusion, Pouscoulous et al. (2007) demonstrated that young children can produce 
implicatures (more than what was previoulsy asserted) but they are not at adults’ level; 
children reach an adult performance after the age of seven. Moreover, the fact that the use of 
an indefinite expression (i.e., quelques vs certains) led to more implicatures derived in 
children but not in adults represents a demonstration – in the authors’ view – of the role of 
lexical complexity. Indeed, they state that “children clearly understand the meaning of both 
expressions, but the added processing cost of certains makes the task harder, thus reducing 
children’s rate of implicature production” (2007, p. 371). The view that children’s problems 
with scalar implicatures may be related with the processing costs required to compute them 









3.1.3 The Pragmatic Account 
Children difficulties with scalar implicatures have also been explained considering 
their pragmatic system. For example, Katsos and Bishop (2011) consider children as more 
tolerant of pragmatic violations than adults. In their paper, together with a classical binary 
judgment task in which they replicated previous results with 5- to 6-year-old children (i.e., 
children rejected less underinformative sentences compared to adults), they had a ternary 
judgment tasks. In this latter task participants (18 5- to 6-year-old children and 10 adults) 
could evaluate how much a sentence was correct assigning a ‘small strawberry’ (false), a ‘big 
strawberry’ (underinformative) or a ‘huge strawberry’ (optimal), instead of answering ‘right’ 
or ‘wrong’. With such design children showed certain sensitivity to underinformative 
sentences, with a preference to assign the midsize strawberries. With a third experiment they 
also assessed 15 5-year-old children and 10 adults with a sentence-to-picture matching 
paradigm, finding a performance similar to that of adults. As previously mentioned, authors 
consider the findings as consistent with the idea that children are able to compute 
implicatures, but they are simply more tolerant than adults in binary judgment tasks. They did 
not exclude that the factors described by other accounts (e.g., processing costs, task 
complexities, informativeness) might be involved in children’s behavior but the authors’ view 
is that their role is linked with what is defined as ‘pragmatic tolerance’. An alternative 
explanation that authors considered is that children have less meta-linguistic skills than adults 
and they tend to accept underinformative sentences in order to avoid explaining why the 
sentence is wrong. Indeed authors wrote: “Children may not be as competent as adults in 
expressing complex judgments such as a ‘yes, but. . .’ or ‘half right, half wrong’ as opposed 






Another recent proposal has been pointed out by Skordos and Papafragou (2016): 
authors focused on the role of conversational relevance and considered children’s problem 
with the computation of scalar implicatures as related with their difficulties in considering 
alternative scalar items as relevant in particular contexts. In their first experiment they 
assessed 90 5-year-old children and 36 adults with a classical Acceptability Judgment Task. 
They manipulated it with the stronger scale member (i.e. all) presented before or after the 
weaker alternative (i.e., some) in order to assess whether the presence of the more informative 
item could enhance the relevance of the alternative, thus leading to more scalar implicatures 
derived. This is what they found. In Experiment 2, they tested 50 5-year-old children and 24 
adults again with an Acceptability Judgment Task to check whether the simple presence of the 
all-alternative before the some-alternative helps the computation of the implicature or the 
alternative in the context must be relevant in order to be useful. Results showed that “even in 
contexts where the stronger scalar term (all) was explicitly mentioned, children did not 
benefit from its presence unless the scalar term was seen as a relevant stronger alternative. 
Thus, the accessibility of the stronger scalar term is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for the generation of SIs in children” (2016, p. 13). Finally, in their third and last experiment, 
60 5-year-old children and 24 adults have been assessed to demonstrate that even with the 
presence of another relevant quantifier (none) children could generate scalar implicatures like 
adults. In conclusion, Skordos and Papafragou suggested that their results seem to support 
neither Noveck’s (2001) proposal nor Katsos and Bishop’s (2011) one and that it is just the 









3.2 The Experimental Turn: Adult’s Processing 
 If studies on children help on what concerns the acquisition and development of 
pragmatic interpretation of scalar items, studies on adults focus on the cost of such process. It 
is again Noveck (with Bott) who carried out a pioneering work in 2004, described and 
replicated in Chapter 5. In their work, Bott & Noveck showed with four experiments that 
pragmatic interpretations are computed with more effort, concluding that their data can be 
explained by a Relevance-Theory and not by a Neo-Gricean account. This result has been 
confirmed “with various methodologies, such as the truth-value judgment task (Bott and 
Noveck 2004; Degen and Tanenhaus 2011), self-paced reading (Breheny et al. 2006; Chemla 
et al. 2013), and eye-tracking studies (Huang and Snedeker 2009a; Storto and Tanenhaus 
2005)” (Chemla & Singh, 2014b, pp. 387-388). The debate has now turned into an analysis of 
the cost and three main models are often discussed in the experimental literature: Default 
model, Literal-first model and Constraint-Based model.  
 
3.2.1. The Default Model 
The Default model’ assumption moves from the Neo-Gricean theoretical approaches 
(see Chapter 2.1) and it considers the pragmatic interpretation of scalar terms as a default 
interpretation: this is due to a principle of communicative efficiency. Specifically,  
 
Rapid, effortless inference processes for deriving GCIs are proposed as a solution to the 
problem of the articulatory bottleneck: while humans can only produce a highly limited 
number of phonemes per second, communication nevertheless proceeds remarkably 
quickly. The inferences that allow listeners to derive context-dependent interpretations, 
such as those presumably involved in computing particularized implicatures, are assumed 
to be slow and resource-intensive, in the sense of classic two-process models of attention 
that distinguish between automatic processes, which are fast, require few resources and 
arise independent of context and controlled processes, which are slow, strategic and 
resource demanding […]. In contrast, a scale containing a small set of lexical alternatives 
– like <all, some> - could be pre-compiled and thus automatically accessed, regardless of 








Thus, according to this view, every time a weak scalar term is encountered it is automatically 
interpreted with its upper-bound meaning (i.e., the pragmatic meaning). However, there are 
no studies that clearly go in this direction, even when the goal was precisely to assess this 
model (Bezuidenhout & Morris, 2004), and this is why we are going to focus more on the 
other models. 
 
3.2.2. The Literal-First Model 
 The Literal-First model (Huang & Snedeker, 2009) considers a two-step 
processing of scalar implicatures: every time a weak scalar term is encountered, the semantic 
interpretation is always accessed before the pragmatic one. Huang and Snedeker (2009) 
reached this conclusion after three experiments on online implicatures comprehension with 
the use of eye-tracking technologies. They created stories in which there were four different 
characters (two boys and two girls) in 4 different areas of the screen; characters received two 
types of objects (e.g., socks and soccer balls). After looking the objects divided between the 
characters on a display, participants heard instructions of the form “Point to the girl that has 
[QUANTIFIER] of the socks” and eye movements were recorded. The first two experiments 
were similar and only the objects’ distribution was manipulated for control sentences. 
“During the Quantifier phase” they “found increased fixations to the Target for the two, three, 
and all trials suggesting that listeners were able to quickly use the lexical semantics of the 
number words and the strong scalar quantifier to disambiguate the referent” and “a delayed 
disambiguation for the some trials, suggesting that initial processing was limited to the lower-
bounded lexical semantics of this weak quantifier” (Huang & Snedeker, 2009, p. 395).  
The third experiment was similar but the number of distributed objects was equated 
(e.g., one girl with 3 objects X, one boy with 3 objects X, the second girl with 6 objects Y and 





referents are compatible with the semantics interpretation of some) with a ‘‘1-referent trials” 
(i.e., where just one referent is compatible with the semantic interpretation of some because 
the other one has no objects). In Experiment 3, they saw again “delays in looks to the Target 
for critical trials that contrasted some with a total set (2-referent trials). However, similar 
delays were not seen in trials that contrasted some with an empty set (1-referent trials). […] 
These results suggest that resolution of the Target is quicker via semantic analysis than 
pragmatic inference” (Huang & Snedeker, 2009, p. 403). In conclusion, Huang and 
Snedeker’s result goes in the direction of other offline studies in which a cost for pragmatic 
interpretation has been found.  
Contradictory results have been found by Grodner, Klein, Carbary and Tanenhaus, 
(2010), in which a similar Picture Selection Task showed no delayed looking times for 
pragmatic interpretations of some. However, differently from Huang and Snedeker, they had 
no numerical quantifiers in the filler items. Thus, the cost found in Huang and Snedeker’s 
work might be related to the difficulty difference between the filler items with two and three 
and the undefined quantity of the sentences with some (Tomlinson, Bailey, & Bott, 2013, p. 
21). 
 
3.2.3. The Constraint-Based Model 
Constraint-Based model is part of the more general Context-Driven framework in 
which the role of context is central to determine whether there is a cost in computing an 
implicature.  
 
For example, Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1995), like the Literal-First 
hypothesis, assumes that the semantic interpretation is basic. In Relevance Theory the 
upper-bound meaning is only computed if required to reach a certain threshold of 
relevance in context. In contrast to the Literal-First hypothesis, however, Relevance 
Theory does not necessarily assume a processing cost for the pragmatic inference. If the 
context provides sufficient support for the upper-bound interpretation, it may well be 





be incurred if the upper-bound interpretation is relevant but the context provides less 
support (Degen & Tanenhaus, 2015, p. 671). 
 
 
The Constraint-Based model moves from three considerations (Degen & Tanenhaus, 2015, p. 
671): 
a) Utterance comprehension is probabilistic and constraint-based; 
b) Listeners generate expectations of multiple types about the future (e.g., phonetic and 
syntactic properties of utterances, the domain of reference, the meaning conveyed by 
the speaker); 
c) Interlocutors can rapidly adapt their expectations to different speakers, situations, etc. 
 
Based on these assumptions, Degen and Tanenhaus’ (2015) have taken the view that 
implicatures are computed without particular effort in any circumstance in which there is a 
“support from multiple cues”; however, if those cues are not present implicatures might be 
derived with more effort and they will not be as strong. Under this view, the goal of their  
2015 study was to determine such cues. Specifically, the cues under investigation were the 
use of the partitive of (some vs. some of) and the listener’s assumption on the scalar 
alternatives available to the speaker. Authors developed a gumball paradigm “in order to 
investigate whether listeners are sensitive to the partitive and to the naturalness and 
availability of number descriptions as lexical alternatives to some in scalar implicature 
processing using a range of different set sizes” (Degen & Tanenhaus, 2015, p. 678). In the 
experimental set there is a gumball machine formed by an upper chamber (where there are all 
the gumballs at the beginning) and a lower chamber (where the gumballs drop); through three 
experiments, participants, after listening to a sentence like ‘You got [QUANTIFIER] gumballs’, 





also been colleted (Experiment 3). Main results showed that a) the naturalness of some was 
lesser for small sets (1 – 3) and for unpartitioned set (all gumballs) compared to the 
intermediate ones (6–8); b) some of was less natural than some ; c) some was less natural 
compared to exact numbers when the two are intermixed, particularly for the smallest set 
sizes; d) all was more natural than some for unpartitioned set; e) naturalness scores predict 
response times. All in all, results led authors to conclude that “the speed and robustness of an 
implicature is determined by the probabilistic support it receives from multiple cues available 
in the linguistic and discourse context, including the task/goal relevant information” (Degen 
& Tanenhaus, 2015, p. 702), in line with Constraint-Based models’ prediction. In the authors’ 
view the distinction between scalar and ad-hoc implicatures does not exist. 
3.3. This Thesis’ Outline 
 This thesis will take a closer look at the experimental side of the topic under debate 
and a series of data collected in the last three years will be presented: the aim was to add some 
pieces to the complex puzzle just introduced on the mechanism behind the comprehension of 
conversational implicatures. To do so, in a series of experiment we manipulated both the type 
of implicatures (scalar vs. ad-hoc) and the population under investigation (typical vs. atypical; 
children vs. adults). Some of the papers presented herewith are submitted to scientific 
journals, others are in preparation. 
 In the first chapter of this dissertation I will present a work on ad-hoc and scalar-
implicatures computation in typically developing children. Since several studies in the past 
years documented children’s failure in deriving scalar implicatures but not in deriving ad-hoc 
implicatures, looking at children’s acquisition can help shed light on the theoretical 
frameworks that better account for the derivation of these strengthened meanings. The debate 
on children’s acquisition of implicatures is focused on the reason behind their difficulties 





computation of scalar implicatures to their not yet fully developed pragmatic abilities: 
children have been considered either as more tolerant of pragmatic violations than adults 
('tolerance account', Katsos & Bishop, 2011) or as unable to recognize what is 
conversationally relevant ('relevance account', Skordos & Papafragou, 2016). Other authors 
suggested that the problem in deriving scalar implicatures might be due not to a lack of 
general pragmatic reasoning, but to their immature knowledge of lexical scales ('lexicalist 
account', Barner, Brooks, & Bale, 2011; Foppolo, Guasti, & Chierchia, 2012; Tieu, Romoli, 
Zhou, & Crain, 2015). In one experiment, we compared children’s derivation of both scalar 
and ad-hoc implicatures in order to identify the role of general pragmatic reasoning and of 
their knowledge of lexical scales. To obtain a direct comparison between these two types of 
implicatures, we used the same Picture Selection Task for both of them. We also assessed 
children’s IQ, morpho-syntatictic abilities and ToM abilities. In another experiment, we also 
compared the results of a Picture Selection Task and of a Truth-Value Judgment Task for 
scalar implicatures only, in order to evaluate the role of visual alternatives in their 
computation. In this latter experiment, children’s performance with the scalar item ‘some’ did 
not improve in the Picture Selection Task compared to the classical Truth-Value Judgment 
Task. In the ad-hoc- scalar comparison, we confirmed that children have more difficulties 
with scalar- than ad-hoc implicatures, suggesting that children’s problem in the computation 
does not lie in a general lack of pragmatic comprehension. The fact that children correctly 
selected the target for ad-hoc implicatures indicates that children are able to take salient 
alternatives into consideration. The roles of mentalizing and linguistic skills are discussed. 
In the second chapter, we will once again focus on the distinction between scalar and 
ad-hoc implicatures but testing children with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD). Pragmatic 
abilities of people with ASD are generally considered impaired but previous studies on scalar 





they have ToM deficits. These studies, however, focused just on scalar implicatures, while we 
aim to extend such research to different types of implicatures. Since previous studies found a 
correlation in the ASD groups between verbal abilities and scalar-implicature computation, 
we decided to assess also ad-hoc implicatures, which arise on the basis of contextual instead 
of linguistic features. Moreover we tested younger population (from 4 to 9 y.o.), at an age in 
which also typically-developing children begin to compute implicatures. In this way, we 
aimed at checking whether there is a delay in ASD children compared to typically-developing 
children in the ability to derive pragmatic meanings. Furthermore, we decided to look more at 
possible correlations between general intelligence, ToM and linguistic skills and implicatures 
computation. We used the same Picture Selection Task of the study presented in Chapter 1. 
Results showed that, again, scalar implicatures are more difficult than ad-hoc implicatures in 
the group of control children. However, unlike what was found in previous studies, ASD 
children displayed greater difficulties than typically developing children of the same age for 
both type of implicatures. 
Overall, these two first studies on typically developing children and on children with 
ASD had the goal to better disentangle the debate around differences between generalized and 
particularized implicatures, with both the use of a same methodology (Picture Selection Task) 
and searching for possible roles of cognitive, mentalizing and linguistic skills. We confirmed 
that scalar implicatures are more difficult to compute than adhoc implicatures and that ToM 
skills might play a role for scalar implicatures.  
 From the third chapter on, we moved to adult population. In Chapter 3, we decided to 
assess the association between autistic traits in the broader phenotype and performance in 
tasks requiring the computation of scalar implicatures. We specifically selected a population 
that was previously shown to possess, overall, higher autistic traits: students of scientific 





might be related with less pragmatic answers in the task. In two experiments we checked the 
degree of acceptance of underinformative scalar items in students enrolled either in a 
scientific or in a humanistic curriculum, assessing their autistic traits using the Autism-
Spectrum Quotient questionnaire. We found that students enrolled in Science curricula 
provided less pragmatic answers compared to students enrolled in Humanities curricula. 
Moreover, autistic traits, and specifically ToM skills, were negatively associated with the 
number of pragmatic answers.  
 In the fourth chapter, we will assess the effect of a second language on the oral 
processing of scalar implicatures: the goal was to check whether the cognitive effort caused 
by the processing of a language different from the mother tongue one, might interfere with 
their derivation. We asked bilingual students whose second language was either English or 
Spanish to perform a Sentence Evaluation Task. We also included a group of bilinguals that 
performed the same task in their first language. We found more pragmatic answers in the 
first-language condition than in the second-language condition, suggesting that deriving a 
scalar implicature is effortful. In our analysis, this study provides data against the default 
models of scalar-implicatures computation.  
 After finding strong evidence against the default hypothesis, the fifth chapter attempts 
to focus on the debate regarding the cost of scalar-implicatures computation with the use of 
different experimental techniques. First of all, in one experiment we offered a replication of 
the first study that did investigate such cost, increasing the interest on this topic: Bott & 
Noveck (2004). Specifically, we decided to replicate their third experiment that was a 
Sentence Evaluation Task with the use of categorical sentences, in which they found that 
more time is needed to answer pragmatically than logically in underinformative sentences. 
Similarly, we found longer reaction times (RTs) when participants answered pragmatically to 





Evaluation Task) we excluded the possibility that the cost of the implicature computation may 
be due to an experimental artefact, i.e. that it is easier for participants to move down in the 
conceptual hierarchy than to move up. We used categorical sentences with artificial categories 
(using pseudo-words): there were two different sets of images, one that validated and one that 
did not validate the sentence. We tested two groups, one group saw the validating condition, 
and one group saw the other one. Results confirmed again a cost when participants gave 
pragmatic answers compared to logical answers. Finally, through a third experiment we 
measured not only RTs but also reading times and eye-movements. With the use of a variety 
of images (with two characters and three areas of interest) and objects, we asked participants 
to run a self-paced reading and evaluate underinformative sentences, as well as control 
sentences. Surprisingly, we did not find differences in reading times between pragmatic and 
logical answers in the infelicitous condition. Our results suggest that having a visual context 
reduced the effort. Eye-tracker data did not bring significant evidence in the expected 
direction, probably due to the fact that participants could look at the picture before reading the 
sentences; however, we propose some future development of our study.  
To conclude, this thesis’ goal is to bring new data into the complex and diverse field 
of study of implicature computations, testing different population with different techniques. 






































PART 1 – 
 
 
TYPICAL DEVELOPMENT:  
 












Scalar- and Ad-hoc-Implicature Processing  













This chapter is based on the following original proceedings:  
Foppolo F., Mazzaggio G., Panzeri F. and Surian L. (2018). What’s behind 
some (but not all) implicatures. Front. Psychol. Conference Abstract: XPRAG.it 
2018 -Second Experimental Pragmatics in Italy Conference. doi: 
10.3389/conf.fpsyg.2018.73.00041 













Children’s ability to cope with conversational inferences has been the matter of a lively 
debate both in the linguistic and the psychological literature of the past decade. Several 
studies in the past years showed difficulties in preschoolers when computing the scalar 
implicature associated to the quantifier some, which typically gives rise to the some but not 
all inference, while better performance has been documented with ad-hoc implicatures, i.e. 
pragmatic inferences that ensue from context-driven scales. Children’s behavior has been 
accounted for in terms of pragmatic failure (i.e., tolerance of pragmatic violations, detection 
of conversational relevance), processing costs and delay in the lexicalization of the scale for 
scalar quantifiers. In Experiment 1 (N = 58) we make a methodological contribution, showing 
that the Truth Value Judgment Task, traditionally employed to investigate children’s 
pragmatic ability and recently criticized, prompts a rate of pragmatic responses comparable to 
the Picture Selection Task in which alternatives are presented visually and no metalinguistic 
judgment is provided. In Experiment 2 (N =141) we charted the developmental trajectory of 
scalar and ad-hoc implicatures, and we found that preschoolers performed better with ad-hoc 
pragmatic inferences than with scalar implicatures. We further contributed by linking 
children’s performances on implicatures with cognitive and linguistic measurements. A role 
of morphosyntactic competence has been found for both kinds of implicatures, while 
performance on Theory of Mind tasks was more positively associated with success on the 















Children’s ability to cope with conversational inferences has been the matter of a lively 
debate both in the linguistic and the psychological literature of the past decade. A new trend 
of experimental investigation emerged from pioneering studies by Chierchia, Crain, Guasti, 
Gualmini, and Meroni (2001) on children’s interpretation of disjunction and by Noveck 
(2001) on children’s interpretation of the quantifier some and the modal might. Since then, a 
thriving body of research has been devoted to experimental pragmatics, with a special focus 
on children’s (and adults’) interpretation of the quantifier some (cf. Chemla & Singh, 2014a,b 
and Skordos & Papafragou, 2016 for an overview). 
To introduce the topic of our investigation, imagine a typical situation in which two 
hungry boys are looking for a snack in the kitchen cupboard. If boy A utters sentence (1) to 
boy B after opening the cookie box, then boy B will infer that there are some cookies left in 
the box, i.e. (2). This inference is known as a Scalar Inference (scalar implicature). When the 
strictly literal meaning of (1) is enriched with the scalar implicature in (2), we get the 
strengthened meaning (3). 
 
(1) Mommy ate some of the cookies. 
(2) Mommy did not eat all of the cookies. 
(3) Mommy ate some but not all of the cookies. 
 
The scalar implicature in (2) arises by virtue of the fact that the speaker chose to utter 
(1) instead of a possible - equally plausible - alternative, namely (4), which would be 
compatible with a situation in which the box is empty. 
 






Assuming that the speaker is cooperative, the hearer will thus infer (3) on the basis of 
the speaker’s choice to utter (1) over (4), following a standard Gricean reasoning about the 
maxims of conversations that rule our conversational exchanges (Grice, 1975). In particular, 
the Gricean Maxim of Quantity I urges the speaker to provide as much information as 
required by the goal of the exchange: in the example at hand, the quantity of cookies left in a 
box is relevant to the hearer, and the use of a sentence like (1) in the case Mommy ate all of 
the cookies would be underinformative given that a more informative alternative, i.e. (4), 
could be uttered. 
Pragmatic inferences that ensue from lexical scales like <some, all> are one kind of 
generalized (conversational) implicature and depend on the scalar ordering of items on a scale 
of informativity in which the stronger element in the scale (in this case, all) entails the weaker 
term (some). In such kind of implicatures, alternatives are linguistically determined by their 
position on this scale (Horn, 1972).   
There’s also another kind of conversational implicature, one in which alternatives are 
not linguistically pre-determined but are made available due to special features of the context. 
Sticking to our example above, suppose our hungry kids find two cookie boxes in the 
cupboard, one with a ribbon and one with a ribbon and a flag. Then boy A peeps in the boxes 
and utters (5).  
 
(5) Mommy ate all the cookies in the box with the ribbon!  
 
We bet no one thinks that boy B would be in trouble in choosing the right box in this 
context: in fact, he would probably not even consider picking up the box with the ribbon and 





analogous to the one made before: sentence (5) is one of the possible alternatives that the 
speaker could have used. In particular, he could have uttered (6), which is optimally 
informative in this context; the fact that he didn’t, entitled the hearer to infer that (7) is what 
the speaker meant, which guides him towards the correct choice. 
 
(6) Mommy ate all the cookies in the box with the ribbon and the flag!  
(7) Mommy ate all the cookies in the box with (only) the ribbon!  
 
While the steps beyond the derivation of the pragmatic inferences in (3) and (7) are the 
same, the way alternatives are brought to salience is radically different: while in the case of 
generalized scalar implicatures alternatives are linguistically encoded in a scale, in the case of 
particularized implicatures alternatives are construed ad-hoc in the context of utterance. A 
difference along this dimension makes a crucial difference for some theoretical accounts, but 
not for others, as we will discuss. 
As for children’s performance in the derivation of pragmatic inferences, previous works 
in the acquisition literature show that pre-school aged children have difficulties in deriving 
the scalar implicature associated to some, and that difficulties remain for some of the kids 
even in the most facilitating and ecological settings (cf. Foppolo, Guasti, & Chierchia, 2012 
and Skordos & Papafragou, 2016 for an overview). On the other hand, a recent study by 
Stiller, Goodman and Frank (2015) showed that three and a half year-old children are already 
adult-like in interpreting Ad-hoc (henceforth, ad-hoc implicature) implicatures (see also 
Jackson & Jacobs, 1982 and Surian & Job, 1987 for related findings). 
Different hypotheses have been formulated to account for children’s difficulty with 
scalar implicatures. Under one approach, that we might label the lexicalist approach, 





not lexicalized the scale yet or have problems in retrieving the scalar alternatives to some: 
though knowing the meaning of some and all, they might not know that the two are part of a 
scale, or they might still be in the process of drawing stable links amongst quantifiers 
belonging to the same scale. Under Foppolo et al.’s (2012) proposal, children’s failure with 
the scalar implicature associated to some reflects children’s immaturity at the lexical level, in 
which two layers of meaning should be associated to the quantifier: the existential meaning 
(according to which “some P Q” instantiates the existence of at least one P that Q) - and the 
scalar or enriched meaning (according to which this quantifier is ordered with other 
alternatives on a scale so that “some P Q” leads to the negation of the stronger scalar 
alternatives “most P Q” and “all P Q”). While almost all children aged 6 and 7 are adult-like 
in the derivation of the enriched meaning of some, 5-year-old children split, and only some of 
them derive the scalar implicature, despite the fact that all of them recognize that all is a 
better description than underinformative some (Foppolo et al., 2012: Exp. 1 and Exp. 5). 
Similarly, Barner, Brook and Bale (2011) argued that children have difficulty in accessing the 
relevant scalar alternatives in the lexicon, and showed that such difficulty is not grounded in 
memory limitation, as shown by children succeeding in accessing relevant contextual 
alternatives. Thus, under the lexicalist hypothesis, there is a developmental stage in which 
children have not completed the additional learning step that links scalar quantifiers in a scale 
and consequently fail in rapidly and automatically accessing lexical items as scalar 
alternatives (see also Tieu, Romoli, Zhou, & Crain, 2015. for an explanation along these lines 
for the scalar implicature associated with the scale <or, and>). 
A different approach is what we might label the processing account: within a 
Relevance-Theoretic framework, Pouscoulous, Noveck, Politzer and Bastide (2007) 
hypothesized that children’s problems with scalar implicatures are due to difficulties in the 





and the processing costs required to access it. Their argument is that, in most cases, the non-
enriched interpretation of a scalar term will often suffice as a relevant-enough interpretation 
of the utterance in which it occurs; in the light of a balance between effect and effort, children 
might fail to access the enriched meaning in more complex scenarios and tasks. 
A more general pragmatic approach, however, associates children’s failure with scalar 
inferencing with their yet immature pragmatic system. This general idea is set out differently 
in a variety of accounts. Under Katsos and Bishop’s hypothesis (Katsos & Bishop, 2011), 
children fail to reject underinformative some because they are more tolerant of pragmatic 
anomalies than adults: though recognizing that underinformative some is not optimal, they 
tolerate it, as if they were conforming to non-adult-like pragmatic norms. More recently, 
Skordos and Papafragou (2016) argued in favor of an important role for conversational 
relevance in the derivation of scalar implicatures and proposed that children’s problem with 
scalar implicatures might lie in their failure to recognize that the scalar terms constitute 
relevant alternatives in certain contexts. They tested children’s performance in three different 
experiments. In Experiment 1 and 3, they modulated the availability of scalar alternatives, 
testing whether children may be encouraged to generate a scalar implicature from the use of a 
weak alternative (some) by the mere presence of the stronger lexical member of the quantifier 
scale (all) or another scalar quantifier (none) during the experiment. The hypothesis that the 
relevance of lexical alternatives plays a role in scalar-implicature generation was tested in 
Experiment 2, by manipulating the degree to which the stronger lexical item could be easily 
recognized as a relevant alternative by children in a given context. Their results show that 
children were more prone to reject underinformative uses of some when alternatives were 
made accessible and relevant in the course of the experiment (see also Foppolo et al., 2012: 





With respect to the distinction introduced above between particularized (such as ad-hoc 
implicatures) and generalized implicatures (such as scalar implicatures), these three general 
accounts make different predictions. In principle, no difference should be expected between 
types of implicatures within a pragmatic or a processing account. According to these 
approaches, children’s non-adult-like behavior relies on a principle of pragmatic tolerance or 
on a failure in accessing or recognizing relevant alternatives (because of processing costs, as 
in Pouscolous et al.’s account, or because of low saliency, as in Skordos and Papafragou’s 
account). If this is the case, then these difficulties should affect all kinds of implicatures, 
independently of their status. In fact, under some theoretical accounts, like the Relevance 
Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986; 1995), the derivation of all pragmatic inferences rests on 
the same underlying mechanism, one in which context, together with the evaluation of costs 
and benefits, plays a key role in determining when enrichment is relevant or not.     
Under lexicalist approaches, on the other hand, a difference between ad-hoc and scalar 
implicatures is expected: while in the case of ad-hoc implicatures the alternatives that are 
activated depend solely on context, in all generalized implicatures including scalar 
implicatures, the set of alternatives is a feature of the language relying on the lexical 
representation of the scalar item itself. It is worth noting that also in this approach context 
might intervene in favoring (or suspending) the inference, in obedience to Gricean’s maxims 
of conversations. The crucial difference is in the access to the alternatives, which depends on 
a linguistic representation and a lexical retrieval mechanism in the case of scalar quantifiers, 
while it is purely context-driven in the case of ad-hoc scales. 
As we said, previous results indicate that children as young as 3,5 are successful in 
deriving ad-hoc implicatures (Stiller et al., 2015), while a more complex picture emerges in 





considerably across ages, materials and tasks; in general, not all children at age 5 have 
reached an adult-like stage yet. 
In a recent study, Horowitz, Schneider and Frank (2017) compared ad-hoc and scalar 
implicatures directly by means of a picture selection task modelled after Stiller et al. (2015; 
see also, Jackson & Jacobs, 1982 and Surian & Job, 1987 for a preliminary version of this 
task), in which the child had to select a target (among different pictures) by following oral 
instructions. The authors tested children aged 4 and 5, reporting a better performance with ad-
hoc than scalar implicatures. They also found a correlation between children’s rate of 
interpretation of the scalar quantifier some as some but not all and their performance on the 
negative quantifier none. In order to account for these findings, they suggested that part of 
children’s problems with scalar implicatures may be rooted in some difficulties at the 
semantic rather than at the pragmatic level or in a lack of general processing resources. 
In this paper we aim at contributing to this debate by presenting two experimental 
studies. In a first study (Experiment 1), we tested children’s performance on scalar quantifiers 
and scalar implicatures in two tasks, administered within subjects in different sessions: a 
power point version of the classical Truth Value Judgment Task (similar to the one used by 
Katsos & Bishop, 2011) and a referential Picture Selection Task similar to the one used by 
Horowitz et al. (2017). The aim of this preliminary study was twofold. First, we wanted to 
compare the two tasks directly. In the Picture Selection Task, the child is asked to select a 
picture that corresponds to a sentence. Target sentences, i.e., “Some S are P”, are semantically 
true descriptions of two pictures: one fits the pragmatic interpretation of the sentences, that is 
only some S are P, and the other the logically weaker reading, in which all S are P. If a child 
is computing the pragmatic inference, she will select the picture that corresponds to the 
pragmatic interpretation. But if the child does not derive the implicature, sticking to the 





Truth Value Judgment Task, on the other hand, allows to discriminate pragmatic and logical 
answers: when presented with a context in which all S are P, that is described with the target 
sentence “Some S are P”, if the child accepts the description, she can only have the logical 
reading – at least if the task comprises control items to check whether she knows the correct 
use of all. When the child rejects the description in the underinformative scenario, she must 
provide a justification, and thus those children who argue that the sentence is not acceptable 
because all S are P in the scenario are indisputably deriving the implicature. Administering 
the two tasks at the same group of children enables us to check what are the choices in the 
Picture Selection Task of the “pragmatic” and of the “logical” responders of the Truth Value 
Judgment Task. No study so far compared the rate of pragmatic responses in the same group 
of children tested with a Truth Value Judgment Task and a Picture Selection Task task, 
analyzing Task as a within subject variable. 
The second aim of the preliminary experiment was to validate the novel Picture 
Selection Task for scalar implicatures in Experiment 1 for using it in our second study 
(Experiment 2), in which we compared scalar implicatures and ad-hoc implicatures directly 
by means of the same task. Although Horowitz et al. (2017) carried out this comparison in a 
recent contribution, we independently designed a Picture Selection Task apt to compare ad-
hoc and scalar implicatures. Differently from them, we did not include the negative quantifier 
none in our experiment. Indeed, these authors found an interesting correlation between the 
rate of derivation of the scalar implicature and children’s correct answers on none. However, 
we think that this result deserves further investigation, that goes beyond the purposes of this 
paper. One crucial thing to mention, though, is that none does not belong to the scale <some, 
all>, and its presence might affect children’s computation of scalar inference with some, 
favoring a lower-bound interpretation of this quantifier. Indeed, in a visual world eye-tracking 





after a sentence with none induced slower convergence towards the pragmatic target 
compared to the case in which some followed a sentence with all. For these reasons, we only 
include all as control in our study. In addition, we also correlated the rate of implicatures 
generated by each child with other standardized measures of cognitive and linguistic 
development (such as non-verbal IQ, lexical and grammatical abilities and Theory of Mind). 
No study so far has systematically investigated the correlation between these factors and 
scalar-implicature computation in typically developing monolingual children. These analyses 
had two purposes. From a purely developmental perspective, we aimed at understanding the 
developmental factors beyond children’s general performance in pragmatic tasks. 
Furthermore, our study also aimed at comparing ad-hoc and scalar implicatures with respect 
to these factors: from a theoretical perspective, this analysis can foster the debate about the 
nature (and alleged differences) between types of inferences, and the steps involved in their 
computation.  
Experiment 1 revealed no difference between the Truth Value Judgment Task and the 
Picture Selection Task in the derivation of scalar implicatures, despite the fact that in the 
Picture Selection Task the scalar alternatives to some were also presented as a visual 
alternative with no metalinguistic judgment required to select the target: in both tasks, 
children’s rate of derivation of the scalar implicature was around 55%, and children were 
bimodally distributed (Guasti et al., 2005). Experiment 2 revealed a difference in the rate of 
derivation of pragmatic inferences between ad-hoc and scalar implicatures, with children 
succeeding more with the former than with the latter, in line with what found by Horowitz et 
al. (2017). Correlating children’s performance across types of implicatures with their 
performance in linguistic and other cognitive tasks, we found evidence of a significant 
contribution of morphosyntactic abilities in the derivation of pragmatic inferences, and a 





session of this paper, we will discuss the impact of these findings for theories of acquisition of 
pragmatics, and for theoretical approaches to implicatures. 
 
2. Experiment 1 
This experiment consists of two scalar implicature tasks administered to the same group 
of participants in different experimental sessions, a classical Truth Value Judgment Task and 
a novel Picture Selection Task. It serves two main goals: first of all, we wanted to verify 
whether the pragmatic responders in the Truth Value Judgment Task (who reject 
underinformative some in an all-scenario) will then select the picture in which only some S 
are P in the Picture Selection Task. If this is the case, this sets a baseline for Experiment 2 in 
order to verify the Picture Selection Task as a sensitive task for scalar implicature derivation.  
 
2.1. Participants 
Fifty-eight children aged 4 and 5 were tested (4;2-6;0; M = 63 months). Kids were 
recruited from two kindergarten schools in the North of Italy and were tested after both 
parents signed a consent form for participation. 
 
2.2. Materials and procedure 
With this first experiment our goal was to compare a Truth Value Judgment Task with a 
novel Picture Selection Task for scalar implicature computation. For this reason, we decided 
to maintain similar structural characteristics: both tasks were presented in a ludic fashion and 
were administered through a PPT presentation on a laptop PC computer in a quiet room of the 
kindergarten. All the target sentences were pre-recorded to control for prosody. Children’s 
responses were annotated by the experimenter on an answer sheet. The Ethical Committee of 





and the order of presentation was randomized. In the case in which children were tired or 
distracted, the session was stopped.  
The two tasks are detailed in the following sessions. 
 
2.2.1. Truth Value Judgment Task for Scalar Implicatures 
This task was adapted from Foppolo et al., (2012) and Katsos and Bishop (2011). 
Children were presented with a box and two characters that appeared on the screen: Davide, a 
boy, and Lucy, a foreign girl who is learning to speak Italian. The children’s task is to help 
Lucy to improve her Italian by judging her descriptions of different scenarios. For each trial, 
the scenario consisted of an array of six objects of the same kind (e.g., apples, dolls, hats); by 
means of his magic wand, Davide put either none, some (ie. 4 out of 6) or all of the six 
objects inside the box. The child saw the objects moving from their initial position to the box, 
while hearing a “magic” sound produced by Davide’s wand triggering the movement. At the 
final stage, Lucy described what happened by saying “Davide put some of/all the Xs in the 
box” and children were asked to judge whether Lucy said things “right” or “wrong”, and to 
correct her if she said something wrong. 
To familiarize children with the task, the session started with two warm-ups in which a 
clearly true or a clearly false description of the scene was provided. The test phase comprised 
four target sentences with some used in an underinformative way (UI) to describe a scenario 
in which Davide put all six objects in the box (Figure 1), and eight control items: four with 
the quantifier all (two true and two false), and four with the quantifier some (two true and 








Figure 1. Example of an underinformative item for some for the Truth Value Judgment Task. 
The left panel shows the initial array of object; the right panel shows the final outcome of 
Davide’s action, after he moved the objects from the array to the box by means of his magic 
wand. Lucy’s sentence in this trial was: “Davide put some of the bunnies in the box”. 
 
 
Table 1. Description of the different types of items in the Truth Value Judgement Task. 
 
2.2.2. Picture Selection Task for Scalar Implicatures 
This task is a classical picture selection in which participants had to find the correct 
target − among 4 pictures − by exploiting a sentential clue; this task is modelled after Surian 
and Job (1987) and Stiller et al. (2015). In this task, children were introduced to a boy 
(Daniele) and were told that Daniele wanted to play a game with the children by giving them 




SOME-TRUE Davide put some of 
the X in the box 
4 / 6 Yes 
SOME-FALSE Davide put some of 
the X in the box 
0 / 6 No 
SOME- 
UNDERINFORMATIVE 
Davide put some of 
the X in the box 
6 / 6 No (= scalar 
implicature) 
Yes (= no scalar 
implicature) 
ALL-TRUE Davide put all the X 
in the box 
6 / 6 Yes 
ALL-FALSE Davide put all the X 
in the box 





a clue to find specific objects or individuals on the screen. For example, children saw a 
scenario with 4 birthday cakes (Figure 2) and had to find the one that Daniele is addressing by 
hearing this clue: “Guess which one is my cake, I give you a clue: On my birthday cake, some 
of the candles are burning”. 
All the test sentences were previously pre-recorded to control for prosody. 
After a warm-up trial in which children were corrected in case of no answer or wrong answer, 
the test phase started. In this phase, children were presented with four sentences containing 
some, two sentences containing all and one control sentence with no quantifier. Items were 
shown in a pseudo-randomized order so that the quantifier all always appeared first in the 
sequence. 
The structure of the scenario was kept constant across trials of the same kind. In the all-
scenario, there was a target (for example, a garden with 5/5 red flowers), two competitors (for 
example, a garden with 3/5 red flowers and a garden with 3/5 blue flowers) and one distractor 
(a garden with no flowers). In the some-scenario, there were two types of distractors: for 
example, a cake with no candles and a cake with no burning candles. There were also two 
types of possible targets: a pragmatic target, in which the array of objects was only 
compatible with the pragmatic meaning of some, namely some but not all (i.e. a cake with 3/5 
burning candles) and an underinformative-competitor, in which the array of objects was also 
compatible with the more informative quantifier (all) (i.e. a cake with 5/5 burning candles). 
Note that participants who derived the scalar implicature should converge on the pragmatic 
target (and should do so consistently across trials); participants who stick to the logical 
interpretation (at least some) could opt for the underinformative competitor, but they could in 









Figure 2. Example of a some item in the Picture Selection Task: “Guess which one is 
my cake, I give you a clue: on my birthday cake, some of the candles are burning”. 
 
As discussed in Horowitz et al. (2017), this task is designed to enhance contextual 
relevance of the all-alternative: in fact, this is presented as a visual alternative in the scenario, 
and it is also given as a linguistic alternative during the experiment. Moreover, the task is in 
principle simpler than the Truth Value Judgment Task in that no metalinguistic judgment is 
required, thus lowering the computational resources required to solve the task. As highlighted 
before, on the other hand, when the Picture Selection Task is presented in isolation the results 
are not easily interpretable: if the child selects the underinformative competitor, this means 
that she is assessing the logical meaning of some, without deriving the implicature. In 
contrast, selections of the pragmatic target could be due to the derivation of the implicature 
(pragmatic responders) or, in principle, to the random choice between target and competitor 
for a logical responder. A direct comparison of the two tasks within the same group of 







In the Truth Value Judgment Task, the responses on controls were coded as “correct” if 
the child correctly accepted or rejected the target true and false statements respectively. 
Responses on test statements were coded as “correct” if the child rejected the 
underinformative statement with some and mentioned all in their justification for rejection. In 
the Picture Selection Task, the responses were coded as “correct” if the child selected the 
target picture for all and the pragmatic-target for some.  
The two tasks yielded similar results: while children's accuracy on controls was above 
94% in both tasks (94.8% in the Picture Selection Task and 94.2% in the Truth Value 
Judgment Task), children were not adult-like in deriving the scalar implicatures, regardless of 
the task: they rejected the underinformative-some sentences in the Truth Value Judgment 
Task 55.6% of the times, and they selected the pragmatic target in the Picture Selection Task 
57.6% of the times (Figure 3). Performances in the Picture Selection Task and performances 
in the Truth Value Judgment Task highly correlate (r = .48, t = 4.0496, df = 56, p < 0.001). 
 
  





Note that, as found in other studies (Guasti et al., 2005), children displayed a bimodal 
distribution in the Truth Value Judgment Task, consistently rejecting or accepting the 
underinformative-some sentences. The distribution of children’s responses in the two tasks 
depending on the number of times (out of 4) they selected the pragmatic target in the Picture 
Selection Task or rejected the underinformative-some sentence in the Truth Value Judgment 
Task is plotted in Figure 4. As the graph shows, only 2 (3%) children in the Truth Value 
Judgment Task and 10 (17%) children in the Picture Selection Task did not provide consistent 
responses in the underinformative trials. 
 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of children’s responses with respect to the number of times (up to 
4) they rejected the underinformative-some sentence in the Truth Value Judgment Task 
(left panel) or selected the pragmatic target in the Picture Selection Task (right panel).  
 
By inspecting children’s wrong responses in the Picture Selection Task, we found that 
they selected the underinformative competitor (for example, the cake on which all the candles 





We run a logistic regression analysis considering accuracy as the dependent variable, 
subjects and items as random factors, and Task (Picture Selection Task vs. Truth Value 
Judgment Task), Type (implicature vs. controls) and Age in months as fixed effects. For a 
better fit of the model, all the variables were centered prior to analysis. A significant effect of 
Type (Est = -4.102, SE = .625, z = -6.567, p < .001) and Age (Est = .167, SE = .043, z = 
3.865, p < .001) is revealed: accuracy on implicatures is significantly lower than controls and 
performance is worse for younger kids. A marginal interaction across Task, Type and Age 
(Est = 0.154, SE = .081, z = 1.905, p = .057) is also observed. No significant effect is revealed 
for Task (Est = .000, SE = .611, z = .001, p = .999) instead.   
 
2.4. Discussion 
Children showed excellent knowledge of the semantics of the quantifiers involved in the 
scale: they were at ceiling in the Truth Value Judgment Task in judging sentences with some 
and all in which these quantifiers applied to true and false situations (cf. Foppolo et al., 2012: 
Experiment 6 for a similar result). Nonetheless, children’s performance was less than optimal 
in judging underinformative-some sentences. Also, children displayed a bimodal distribution, 
always consistently accepting or rejecting underinformative-some sentences in the Truth 
Value Judgment Task, or consistently selecting the underinformative or the pragmatic target 
pictures in the Picture Selection Task (Guasti et al., 2005).  
Our study is the first one to compare the Truth Value Judgment Task and the Picture 
Selection Task directly on the same group of children: thus, the lack of a significant 
difference is also revealing from a methodological point of view. Children’s selection of the 
pragmatic target with a some-sentence could in principle due to the computation of the 
implicature or to the random choice of a logical interpretation of the quantifier (at least some). 





same pragmatic ability: the pragmatic kids who rejected the underinformative-some in the 
Truth Value Judgment task were those who selected the pragmatic target in the Picture 
Selection Task; and the logical children who accepted the underinformative-some in the Truth 
Value Judgment Task were those who selected the underinformative-competitor in the Picture 
Selection Task. 
Having confirmed that the “correct answers” of the two tasks identify pragmatic 
children who derive the implicature, the fact that children’s performance on scalar 
implicatures was the same in the two tasks can shed light on the role of alternatives in the 
computation of pragmatic inferences.  Our results show that the Truth Value Judgment Task, 
in which children have to listen to a story and have to provide a metalinguistic (binary) 
judgment, does not prove more difficult than a Picture Selection Task. Crucially, no 
difference was revealed between the Picture Selection Task and the Truth Value Judgment 
Task in the rate of derivation of scalar implicature, despite the fact that in the Picture 
Selection Task the child simply had to select the image that represents the pragmatic 
interpretation of some in a scenario in which the scalar alternative all was provided as a visual 
alternative. Contra Skordos and Papafragou (2016), this factor doesn’t seem to boost scalar-
implicature derivation: we show that, regardless of the task, children’s performance with 
scalar implicatures was far from optimal.  
As set out in the introduction, the main goal of this first experiment was that of 
assessing the validity of using the Picture Selection Task to test scalar implicatures in order to 
compare children’s performance with scalar and ad-hoc implicature within the same group of 
children by means of this task. This has been done in Experiment 2.     
 





The aim of the second experiment was to compare children’s derivation of scalar and 
ad-hoc implicatures using the same Picture Selection Task paradigm and to link children’s 
performances in these pragmatic tasks with other measures of cognitive and linguistic 
development.   
 
3.1. Participants 
One hundred and forty-one children aged 3 to and 9 were tested. Seventy-five kids were 
enrolled in the kindergarten (3;10-6;0, M = 60;9 months), and 66 in the primary school (grade 
1st to 3rd; 6;10-9;2, M=89;7 months). Children were recruited in different kindergartens and 
primary schools in Northern Italy. All children were tested after both parents signed a consent 
form for participation. 
 
3.2. Materials and procedure 
Children were administered two Picture Selection Tasks: one was the same Picture 
Selection Task used for scalar implicatures in Experiment 1. The second was a novel Picture 
Selection Task designed for ad-hoc implicatures, modeled after Surian and Job, 1987 and 
adapted from Stiller et al. (2015).  Like the Picture Selection Task for scalar implicatures, 
children had to point at the correct target − among 4 pictures − by exploiting a sentential clue. 
The story is similar to that for scalar implicatures: participants should follow Daniele’s hint to 
find the correct referent of his expression. For example, Daniele says “Guess which one is my 
bed, I give you a clue”; then the four pictures appear and Daniele says: “On my bed there is a 
teddy bear”. On the basis of this sentence the child has to find the correct target among the 
four (Figure 5). As for scalar implicatures, the scenario displays two distractors (i.e. an empty 
bed and a bed with a penguin on it) and two potential targets: the pragmatic target (i.e. the bed 





penguin). As for scalar implicatures, if the ad-hoc implicature is computed the children should 
select the bed with the teddy bear alone, under the reasoning that, if Daniele wanted them to 
point to the other bed (the one with the teddy bear and the penguin) he should have referred to 
that bed by explicitly mentioning both things. The fact that he didn’t, should entitle the 
listener to derive the inference that the referent of the request is the bed with only the teddy 




Figure 5. Example of an underinformative item in the Picture Selection Task for ad-hoc 
implicatures: “Guess which one is my bed, I give you a clue: on my bed there is a teddy 
bear”. 
 
After a warm-up item, children were presented with four ad-hoc implicatures and a 
control sentence in a pseudo-randomized order. In addition to the two Picture Selection Tasks 
for testing implicatures, we wanted to control for possible factors that could be correlated 
with the ability to derive pragmatic inferences of different kinds. To this purpose, children 
were also tested with a battery of standardized tests: the Raven Coloured Progressive Matrices 
to test for non-verbal IQ (Italian standardization by Belacchi, Scalisi, Cannoni, & Cornoldi, 





from the Batteria di Valutazione del Linguaggio (Marini, Marotta, Bulgheroni, & Fabbro, 
2015) to test for receptive vocabulary and morphosyntactic abilities; a series of Theory of 
Mind tasks adapted in Italian from the first four tasks of Wellman and Liu (2004) to test 1st 
order ToM (Appendix 1, for a description). Our aim was to verify whether cognitive skills (as 
measured by Raven CPM and by ToM tasks) and/or linguistic (lexical and morphosyntactic) 
abilities were correlated with none, only one or both types of implicatures, with the goal of 
identifying possible predictors of pragmatic inferencing on the one hand, and of shading light 
on which underlying mechanisms scalar and ad-hoc implicatures have in common, and in 
which they differ. 
The tasks were administered by an experiment in a quiet room of the kindergarten or of 
the school, after children were familiarized with the experimenter and with the laptop PC 
computer. In the case children were tired, the tasks have been administered in different days. 
This study is part of a more extensive research on pragmatic comprehension in typically and 




As in the previous Picture Selection Task study, the responses were coded as “correct” 
if the child selected the pragmatic target; in the case of some, this corresponded to the picture 
in which only some of the objects were affected (for example, the bottom right picture in 
Figure 2); in the case of ad-hoc implicatures, this corresponded to the picture in which only 
the object mentioned was present (for example, the top right picture in Figure 5). In all the 
other cases, the answer was coded as “incorrect”.  
Children's accuracy on controls was above 95% in both tasks (99% in the Ad-hoc 





rate of derivation of ad-hoc implicatures was higher than scalar implicatures (86% vs. 74% 
respectively; Figure 6, right panel). As observed in the previous study, the overall majority of 
the incorrect responses corresponded to the selection of the underinformative target (around 
90% of the times) and the majority of children provided consistent responses in the 
underinformative trials (87% in the ad-hoc task and 84% in the scalar implicature tasks), 
either always selecting (or always failing to select) the pragmatic target, as shown in Figure 7. 
 
    
Figure 6. Children’s accuracy on controls (left panel) and implicatures (right panel) in 








Figure 7. Distribution of children’s responses with respect to the number of times (up to 
4) they selected the pragmatic target in the ad-hoc (left panel) and the scalar task (right 
panel).  
 
We ran a logistic regression analysis considering accuracy as the dependent variable, 
subjects and items as random factors, and Condition (implicatures vs. controls), Task (scalar 
vs. ad-hoc task), Age (in months), Grammatical comprehension (henceforth, Morphosyntax), 
Lexicon, Raven and 1st order ToM scores, as well as their interactions, as fixed effects. For a 
better fit of the model, all the variables were centered prior to analysis; following a backward 
stepwise model selection-procedure, all the factors and interactions that resulted as non-
significantly improving the model-fit were removed. The model that best fits the data reveals: 
a significant effect of Condition (accuracy on controls is significantly higher than accuracy on 
implicatures; Est = -2.648, SE = 0.547, z = -4.836, p < .001), a significant effect of Age 
(accuracy is significantly higher for older children; Est = .049, SE = .011, z = 4.304, p < .001), 
a significant effect of Task (accuracy is significantly higher for the ad-hoc than the scalar 





(accuracy is significantly higher for children with higher scores in the Grammatical 
comprehension test; Est = .062, SE = .027, z = 2.288, p = .02).    
Considering the fact that controls were at ceiling, we next ran a logistic regression 
analysis considering accuracy on the implicature condition only as the dependent variable, 
subjects and items as random factors, and type of Implicature, Age (in months), 
Morphosyntax, Lexicon, Raven and 1st order ToM as fixed effects, as well as their 
interactions. For a better fit of the model, all the variables were centered prior to analysis; as 
before, following a backward stepwise elimination procedure, all the factors and interactions 
that resulted as non-significantly contributing to the best fit of the model were removed. As 
before, the model revealed a significant effect of type of Implicature (accuracy on scalar 
implicature was lower than accuracy on ad-hoc implicatures: Est = -1.482, SE = .670, z = -
2.211, p = .03), Age (younger children’s accuracy was lower than older children’s: Est = .053, 
SE = .012, z = 4.325, p < .001) and Morphosyntax is found (accuracy is significantly higher 
for children with higher scores in the Morphosyntax test; Est = .078, SE = .021, z = 3.797, p < 
.001). Focusing on implicatures only, the model also showed a significant interaction between 
type of Implicature and ToM: albeit not being significant as a factor, ToM resulted to 
significantly modulate accuracy on scalar (Est = .391, SE = .184, z = 2.121, p = .03), but not 
ad-hoc implicatures (Est = .029, SE = .215, z = .136, p = .892). 
The gap between children’s performance with ad-hoc and scalar implicature is even 
more evident if we split children in two age groups, as in Figure 8. Clearly, the younger 
children struggle more with scalar than ad-hoc implicatures (57% vs. 78%), while the older 
kids show parallel performance in both (94% for scalar implicature and 96% for ad-hoc 
implicature). No difference is observed for controls across age groups and tasks (in all cases, 
performance is above 90%). It is worth noting that we fully replicated the results from 








Figure 8. Plot (for descriptive purposes only) of children’s accuracy on the two types of 
implicatures (ad-hoc vs. scalar implicature) across school groups (kindergarten children, N = 
75, left panel, and primary school children, N = 66, right panel). 
 
Since we found that the difference between ad-hoc implicatures and scalar implicatures 
is only revealed in the younger group (Figure 8), to further inspect the contribution of the 
different factors we focused on the kindergarten children only (N = 75). We performed an 
analysis considering accuracy on implicatures as the dependent variable, subjects and items as 
random factors, and type of Implicature, Morphosyntax, Lexicon, Raven and ToM, as well as 
their interactions, as fixed effect. We removed all the factors and interactions that resulted as 
non-significant for the best model-fit. As before, the two types of implicatures resulted to be 
significantly different, with scalar implicatures being more difficult than ad-hoc (Est = -1.926, 
SE = .702, z = -2.745, p = .006). For these younger kids, however, Morphosyntax is the only 





independently of type (Est = .076, SE = .026, z = 2.890, p = .004), while a significant 
interaction was again found between ToM and type of Implicature (Est = .823, SE = .276, z = 
2.987, p = .003): while performance on ad-hoc implicatures does not depend on levels of 
ToM (even kids with low ToM scores have a good performance with ad-hoc implicatures), 
performance with scalar implicatures does positively correlate with ToM scores, as shown in 
Figure 9.  
 
 
Figure 9. Correlation effects between levels of ToM and type of Implicature.  
 
Our data suggest that the abilities required to derive the two types of implicatures might 
possibly rely on different modules. To further inspect these results, we performed a Focused 
Principal Component Analysis (Figure 10). This analysis revealed some interesting patterns. 
First of all, ToM, as measured in our tasks, seems to be independent from Linguistic abilities 
and Raven, being it located orthogonally from these factors. Second, the factor that has a 
higher correlation with scalar implicatures is ToM (r = .04), and the factor that correlates less 





case both Raven and Linguistic abilities seem to be the most correlated factors (r = .04 for 
Raven and Lexicon; r = .06 for Morphosyntax). These descriptive analyses reveal an 
interesting difference between the two types of implicatures, which goes beyond the fact that 
children performed differently with them. Such analyses also reveal that the underlying 




Figure 10. Output of the Focused Principal Component Analysis for scalar implicatures 
(SI, left panel) and ad-hoc implicatures (AI, right panel). 
3.4. Discussion 
Children showed an overall excellent performance on controls, and an overall good 
performance on ad-hoc implicatures. In fact, the group of older kids showed an optimal 
performance on both types of implicatures. The younger kids, instead, behaved differently in 
the two tasks: on the one hand, they had not much trouble in detecting the pragmatic target in 
the case of inferences that were built on a contextual basis, like it is the case for ad-hoc 
implicature. On the other, they struggled more to detect the pragmatic target for the scalar 





underinformative target for some. These results are in line with those found by Horowitz et al. 
(2017) in a similar comparison between scalar and ad-hoc implicature. 
Beyond their results, we investigated this difference in a developmental perspective, 
showing that children up to age 6 have more difficulties with scalar implicatures than ad-hoc 
implicatures, while this difference disappears after age 6, when their performance becomes 
optimal in both kinds of implicatures. This result is also in line with previous developmental 
findings about the some but not all implicature (Foppolo et al., 2012: Exp. 1). 
The correlation analyses showed a difference between scalar and ad-hoc implicature in 
the factors underlying children’s success. Specifically, children’s morphosyntactic 
competence positively predicted their ability to generate pragmatic inferences. More 
specifically, the measures of ToM abilities were found to modulate children’s success with 
scalar inference, while no impact of ToM on the ability to generate ad-hoc inferences was 
found.  
   
4. General Discussion 
In this paper we tested pre-school and school-aged children’s ability to compute 
generalized (scalar) implicatures (i) in different tasks (Experiment 1); (ii) in comparison with 
particularized (ad-hoc) implicatures (Experiment 2); (iii) in correlation with other cognitive 
and linguistic measures. 
First, we replicated previous findings in showing that pre-school aged children have 
difficulties in deriving pragmatic inferences, especially those involving a scalar quantifier, 
and that their performance is better with those inferences in which alternatives are construed 
ad-hoc, on the basis of the context (Horowitz et al., 2017). Extending previous findings, we 
also characterized the developmental trajectory of the two types of implicatures: we showed 





delay of the latter over the former kind of implicature is confined to a specific stage in 
development, namely pre-school age, as scalar implicatures reach an optimal performance at 
the same age as ad-hoc implicatures, namely in school-age, as it is evident in Figure 8. 
We also made a methodological contribution in this paper, showing that the Truth Value 
Judgment Task, traditionally employed to investigate children’s pragmatic ability and recently 
criticized, prompts a rate of pragmatic responses comparable to the (allegedly) less 
demanding Picture Selection Task in which alternatives are presented visually and no 
metalinguistic judgment is provided. 
We finally analyzed the impact of different linguistic (lexicon and morphosyntax) and 
cognitive measures (non-verbal IQ and 1st order ToM) on the rate of pragmatic responses and 
showed a different pattern of dependencies in the two types of inferences investigated. In 
particular, we showed that 1st order ToM correlates with the rate of pragmatic answers in the 
case of scalar quantifiers, but not of ad-hoc scales. 
As we outlined in the introduction, children’s difficulty with pragmatic inferences is a 
well attested fact in the acquisition literature. What is still debated is the source or the nature 
of this difficulty: under some accounts this difficulty is believed to be more grounded in a yet 
immature linguistic representation of the scale (Barner et al., 2011; Foppolo et al., 2012); in 
others, it is associated with yet immature pragmatic or processing systems that make children 
more tolerant than adults when facing pragmatic anomalies (Katsos & Bishop, 2011), or less 
prone to detect what is contextually relevant or optimal in a given exchange (Skordos & 
Papafragou, 2016). 
We believe that the results of Experiment 2 can shed some light on the disagreements 
between lexicalist, pragmatic and processing accounts of children’s failure with pragmatic 
inferences. Certainly, it seems hard to reconcile the difference shown between ad-hoc 





in the generation of all kinds of implicatures rest on the same basis, they should require the 
same processing costs, and thus children’s asymmetrical competence is unexpected. It seems 
difficult to provide a sensible explanation of the reason why scalar alternatives are costlier 
than contextually retrieved alternatives without resorting to the linguistic nature of scalar, but 
not ad-hoc implicatures. Similarly, such difference is not readily predicted or easily explained 
by a pragmatic account, or a tolerance account either: if children’s pragmatic system were yet 
immature, the consequence would be a failure in all kinds of pragmatic inferences, unless one 
assumes that the mechanisms involved in the generation of the inference, or in the retrieval of 
the alternatives, are not equivalent across types of triggers. In all cases, it seems hard to 
reconcile these alleged differences in the processes or mechanisms underlying pragmatic 
inference without letting the nature of the scale involved in the computation entering the 
picture.  
Conversely, this difference is straightforwardly accounted for within a lexicalist 
approach to scalar implicatures: according to the latter, some children might have reached the 
stage in which they can compute all the steps involved in the derivation of pragmatic 
inferences, but they might have problems in accessing the scalar alternatives in some cases. In 
particular, problems are predicted in those cases in which the scale requires an a priori 
lexicalization, a process that might take some time. This account would explain why children 
show a good performance with ad-hoc implicatures but not with scalar implicatures: only the 
former does not require a preliminary lexicalization of the scale, as alternatives are directly 
retrieved from the context. The scale <some, all>, instead, needs to be in place before 
enriching the meaning of some as some but not all.  
The analyses of the factors involved in the two types of inferences also reveal a 
difference between the two types of inferences, which is straightforwardly accounted for by a 





ToM does not modulate children’s accuracy with ad-hoc implicatures seems to suggest that 
ToM is not a relevant factor in the derivation of pragmatic inferences; thus, it looks as if the 
fact that it does modulate children’s derivation of scalar implicatures might be interpreted as a 
consequence of the fact that scalar implicatures, like ToM abilities, take time to be acquired. 
We believe that the correlation observed between ToM and scalar-implicature computation 
might simply reflects the maturational stages of both abilities around the age of 5: those 
children that are in a certain maturational stage (that is best captured by ToM tasks, although 
not strictly related to domain specific ToM abilities) are also able to derive the scalar 
inference related to some. Those children that are still in a more immature stage are not able 
to derive scalar implicatures. According to our interpretation, ToM, at least as it is captured 
by the task used in our study, seems not to be a prerequisite for implicature computation; if it 
was, one would have to explain why it is not necessary in the case of ad-hoc implicatures. We 
are well aware of the fact that a measure of ToM ability strictly depends on the task used, and 
how it is difficult to disentangle ToM scores in a specific task from other abilities that might 
interfere in the task, such as verbal intelligence. Even if it is not always easy to look at the 
interface between language and ToM (De Villiers, 2007), we suggest that ToM scores might 
simply capture the maturational level that is required to access scalar implicatures, which is 
higher than that required to access ad-hoc implicatures. As before, a developmental effect 
across implicatures is best captured by a lexicalist approach to scalar implicatures: children 
know how to play the game of being cooperative interlocutors, provided that they know the 
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Appendix 1 (Wellman & Liu, 2004, p. 538). 
 
Diverse Desires  
Children see a toy figure of an adult and a sheet of paper with a carrot and a cookie drawn on 
it. ‘‘Here’s Mr. Jones. It’s snack time, so, Mr. Jones wants a snack to eat. Here are two 
different snacks: a carrot and a cookie. Which snack would you like best? Would you like a 
carrot or a cookie best?’’ This is the owndesire question. If the child chooses the carrot: 
‘‘Well, that’s a good choice, but Mr. Jones really likes cookies. He doesn’t like carrots. What 
he likes best are cookies.’’ (Or, if the child chooses the cookie, he or she is told Mr. Jones 
likes carrots.) Then the child is asked the target question: ‘‘So, now it’s time to eat. Mr. Jones 
can only choose one snack, just one. Which snack will Mr. Jones choose? A carrot or a 
cookie?’’ To be scored as correct, or to pass this task, the child must answer the target 
question opposite from his or her answer to the own-desire question. This task was derived 
from those used by Wellman and Woolley (1990) and Repacholi and Gopnik (1997).  
 
Diverse Beliefs  
Children see a toy figure of a girl and a sheet of paper with bushes and a garage drawn on it. 
‘‘Here’s Linda. Linda wants to find her cat. Her cat might be hiding in the bushes or it might 
be hiding in the garage. Where do you think the cat is? In the bushes or in the garage?’’ This 
is the own-belief question. If the child chooses the bushes: ‘‘Well, that’s a good idea, but 
Linda thinks her cat is in the garage. She thinks her cat is in the garage.’’ (Or, if the child 
chooses the garage, he or she is told Linda thinks her cat is in the bushes.) Then the child is 
asked the target question: ‘‘So where will Linda look for her cat? In the bushes or in the 





answer to the ownbelief question. This task was derived from those used by Wellman and 
Bartsch (1989) and Wellman et al. (1996).  
 
Knowledge Access  
Children see a nondescript plastic box with a drawer containing a small plastic toy dog inside 
the closed drawer. ‘‘Here’s a drawer. What do you think is inside the drawer?’’ (The child can 
give any answer he or she likes or indicate that he or she does not know). Next, the drawer is 
opened and the child is shown the content of the drawer: ‘‘Let’s see y it’s really a dog 
inside!’’ Close the drawer: ‘‘Okay, what is in the drawer?’’ Then a toy figure of a girl is 
produced: ‘‘Polly has never ever seen inside this drawer. Now here comes Polly. So, does 
Polly know what is in the drawer? (the target question) ‘‘Did Polly see inside this drawer?’’ 
(the memory question). To be correct the child must answer the target question ‘‘no’’ and 
answer the memory control question ‘‘no.’’ This task was derived from those used by Pratt 
and Bryant (1990) and Pillow (1989), although it was modified so that the format was more 
parallel to the contents False-Belief task.  
 
Contents False Belief  
The child sees a clearly identifiable Band-Aid box with a plastic toy pig inside the closed 
Band-Aid box. ‘‘Here’s a Band-Aid box. What do you think is inside the Band-Aid box?’’ 
Next, the Band-Aid box is opened: ‘‘Let’s see y it’s really a pig inside!’’ The Band-Aid box 
is closed: ‘‘Okay, what is in the BandAid box?’’ Then a toy figure of a boy is produced: 
‘‘Peter has never ever seen inside this Band-Aid box. Now here comes Peter. So, what does 
Peter think is in the box? Band-Aids or a pig? (the target question) ‘‘Did Peter see inside this 
box?’’ (the memory question). To be correct the child must answer the target question 





initially by Perner, Leekam, and Wimmer (1987) and widely modified and used since then 
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ATYPICAL CHILDHOOD:  













Scalar- and Ad-hoc-Implicature Processing in Children with Autism 













This chapter is based on the following original article:  
Mazzaggio, G., Foppolo, F. Job, R., & Surian, L. (2018). Ad-hoc and Scalar 
Implicatures in Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder. 













Pragmatic abilities of people with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) are generally considered 
impaired. Nonetheless, previous studies demonstrated a good competence of ASD people in 
some areas of pragmatics, like the derivation of the scalar implicatures related to the use of a 
linguistic scale, such as the scale of quantifiers that includes “some” and “all”. Our study 
extends previous research to younger children with ASD (4-9 years old) and compares the 
derivation of scalar implicature to a different type of implicature, the so-called ad-hoc 
implicatures, which are based on a contextual – rather than a linguistic – scale. Although 
more than 50% of the children with ASD performed well on both kinds of implicatures, as a 
group their performance with both kinds of implicatures remains significantly lower than age-
matched typically developed peers. By assessing the contribution of morphosyntactic skills, 
IQ and Theory of Mind (ToM) skills, we found that general cognitive abilities (IQ) seem to 
play a role in ASD children’s pragmatic performance, while ToM skills seem to modulate 












When we speak, sometimes what we literally say is different from what we implicitly 
communicate. Indeed, by uttering a proposition in a particular context or by means of specific 
linguistic expressions, we might implicate something more than the simple combination of the 
words in that sentence. This module of language use is known as ‘Pragmatics’, and 
notoriously constitutes an area of weakness for Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD). People 
within the spectrum are characterized by impairment in social interactions with, for example, 
failure of to- and-fro conversations with others (DSM-5: American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). Researchers, indeed, often found difficulties in ASD in some areas of pragmatics, 
particularly with irony processing, turn taking, inappropriate topic change, difficulties with 
the use of an appropriate register, pronouns and deictic terms use, metaphors and humor 
comprehension (e.g., Baltaxe, 1977; Chin & Bernard-Optiz, 2000; Clifford & Dissanayake, 
2008; Loukusa, Leinonen, Kuusikko, Jussila, Mattila, Ryder, Ebeling, & Moilanen, 2007; 
Mazzaggio, Panzeri, Giustolisi, & Surian, 2018; Naigles, Cheng, Rattanasone, Tek, 
Khetrapal, Fein, & Demuth, 2016; Ozonoff & Miller, 1996; Reddy, Williams, & Vaughan, 
2002; Rundblad & Annaz, 2010; Surian, Baron-Cohen, & Van der Lely, 1996). 
In this paper we will focus on a specific aspect of pragmatics, namely conversational 
implicatures. These are pragmatic inferences that arise when a speaker utters certain items, 
like some, that might be pragmatically enriched so as to mean some but not all.  These will be 
introduced in section 1.1. Some previous researches tested these pragmatic inferences in ASD 
individuals; we will discuss these in section 1.2. Beyond previous findings, we extended our 
investigation to different kinds of implicatures; we also tested children at an age in which the 
ability to compute implicatures is known to be under development in typically developing 
populations; most crucially, we also correlated ASD children’s performance in conversational 





skills. Our final aim was to understand how ASD children and TD children differ in the 
development of their ability to draw pragmatic inferences, and which factors modulate this 
ability. Our findings will contribute to a more thorough understanding of ASD individuals’ 
difficulty in pragmatic tasks, and it will also contribute to the current theoretical debate about 
the nature of pragmatic inferences.  
 
1.1. Conversational Implicatures 
  Implicatures arise because, according to the philosopher Paul Grice, people 
communicate in accordance to a general Cooperative Principle:  
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it 
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are 
engaged. (Grice, 1975, p. 45) 
 
 
More specifically, Grice outlined a series of maxims and sub maxims that must be respected 
to act cooperatively in the exchange, and that can be divided in four categories (Grice, 1975, 
pp. 45-46). According to the category of Quantity, our contribution should be as informative 
as it is required by the purposes of the exchange. According to the category of Quality we 
should try to make our contribution one that is true, and we should not say what we believe to 
be false or that for which we lack adequate evidence. We should also be relevant (Relation) 
and we should be perspicuous, that is we should avoid obscurity of expression or ambiguity 
and we should be brief and orderly (Manner). 
From the listener’s basic assumption that the speaker will obey these maxims, a certain 
kind of conversational implicatures may arise. Let us consider examples in (1).  
 
1) a. My grandmother took some of her pills. 
b. My grandmother took some but not all of her pills. 





d. My grandmother took all of her pills. 
 
In hearing (1a) the listener might derive the implicature in (1b); such kind of implicature is 
one example of what Grice (1975) called generalized implicature, also defined scalar 
implicature (Horn, 1972). According to Horn, scalar implicatures are generated thanks to the 
use of specific lexical items that are part of a scale in which they are ordered with respect of 
their informativeness, from the less informative to the most informative. The quantifiers some 
and all are an example of scalar quantifiers linked in such scales, that take the form of <some, 
all>, in which all is the most informative element and some the less informative one, provided 
that all logically entails some and thus some is true in larger set of circumstances, including 
all situations in which the more informative quantifier all applies. Accordingly, given the 
lexical scale <some, all>, when the speaker utters (1a) over the more informative (1d), by 
virtue of the maxim of Quantity stated above, s/he automatically implicate the negation of the 
stronger alternatives in the scale, and this is how the scalar implicature in (1b) arises. This 
interpretation, however, is not part of the lexical content of some, which is logically 
compatible with the lower-bound interpretation in (1c) where some is interpreted as some and 
possibly all (logical interpretation); it constitutes, instead, the upper-bound interpretation in 
(1b), where some is interpreted as some but not all (pragmatic interpretation). Being an 
implicature, the inference in (1b) is cancellable: one could say ‘my grandmother took some of 
her pills, indeed she took all of them’, without contradiction. In a Gricean view, scalar 
implicatures are derived in three steps: the first step requires the computation of the literal 
meaning of the sentence, like in (1c); the second step requires the access to the relevant 
alternatives, such as in (1d); the third step requires the negation of the relevant stronger 
alternative, to obtain the reading in (1b). Whether this third step requires considering the 





is still under debate. In Gricean terms, in order to compute the third step, we should consider 
our interlocutor’s willingness of being cooperative, thus we need to consider that if s/he did 
not utter the more informative statement it is because s/he does not know or believe that 
statement to be true, obeying the Maxim of Quantity. Other views (e.g., Chierchia, 2006 & 
2013), even if not explicitly excluding the role of mentalizing reasoning, also consider the 
intervention of grammatical operators in the derivation of generalized implicatures, and in the 
activation of the alternatives. 
 Together with those generalized implicatures, Grice described also the so-called 
particularized implicatures, henceforth ad-hoc implicatures. We can define ad-hoc 
implicatures all those inferences that arise by uttering a particular proposition in a specific 
context. Let us consider a situation in which a person should find the correct t-shirt (e.g., a t-
shirt with dots) in a chest with a t-shirt with dots and stripes and a t-shirt with only dots, after 
listening to the sentence in (2a). That person should not have particular problems in choosing 
the t-shirt with only dots, since s/he knows that there was an alternative instruction, (2b), that 
could have been uttered instead of (2a), but it was not: this led to the inference in (2c), which 
is an example of ad-hoc implicature. 
 
(2) a. Bring me my t-shirt: it is the one with dots. 
 b. Bring me my t-shirt: it is the one with dots and stripes. 
 c. Bring me my t-shirt: it is the one with (only) dots. 
	
Similarly to scalar implicatures, ad-hoc implicatures require some steps in order to be 
computed: in the first step, the literal meaning of the sentence is computed (2a); the second 
step requires the access to the relevant alternatives, such as in (2b); the third step requires the 
negation of the relevant stronger alternative, to obtain the reading in (2c). Despite the fact that 





second step: if for scalar implicatures the relevant alternatives are linguistically accessed 
through the activation of the linguistic scale <some, all>, for ad-hoc implicatures the relevant 
alternatives are built ad-hoc through the context.  
In the past years, the psycholinguistic literature mainly focused on scalar-implicatures 
computation in children and adults (for a review, Chemla & Singh, 2014a,b). It has been 
extensively demonstrated that children compute less scalar implicatures than adults, 
especially at age 4 and 5 (e.g., Chierchia, Crain, Guasti, Gualmini, & Meroni, 2001; 
Chierchia, Guasti, Gualmini, Meroni, Crain, & Foppolo, 2004; Foppolo, Guasti, & Chierchia, 
2012; Guasti, Chierchia, Crain, Foppolo, Gualmini, & Meroni, 2005; Huang & Snedeker, 
2009; Noveck, 2001; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003) even if when manipulating features of 
the context or of the experimental design they can reach a pragmatic interpretation more 
easily (Foppolo, Guasti ,& Chierchia, 2012; Papafragou & Tantalou, 2004; Pouscoulous, 
Noveck, Politzer, & Bastide, 2007). Children difficulties have been ascribed to different 
factors, and the debate is still open. According to what we can define the ‘tolerance account’ 
(Katsos & Bishop, 2011), children do not generally lack the competence to compute scalar 
implicatures, but they are more tolerant regarding pragmatic violations compared to adults. 
Differently, the ‘relevance account’ (Skordos & Papafragou, 2016) predicts that accessibility 
of the stronger scalar term is crucial for children and that failure in pragmatic processing is 
due to a difficulty in recognizing what is relevant in the conversation. Finally, according to 
the ‘lexicalist account’ (Barner & Bachrach, 2010; Barner, Brooks, & Bale, 2011; Foppolo et 
al., 2012; Tieu, Romoli, Zhou, & Crain, 2015) children fail with scalar implicatures because 
they do not have access to scalar alternatives (yet); more specifically, children are not in the 
developmental stage in which they have lexicalized the scale and in which they can easily 





the meaning of some and the meaning of all, but they do not consider them as one the 
alternative of the other, with one being less informative and the other one more informative.  
Interestingly, when we consider the computation of ad-hoc implicatures, children do 
not show the same difficulties than for scalar implicatures and they can compute them at four 
– and even three – years old (Stiller, Goodman, & Frank, 2015). Moreover, when children are 
tested with the same task for ad-hoc implicatures and scalar implicatures, they perform 
significantly better with the former (Foppolo, Mazzaggio, Panzeri, & Surian, 2018; Horowitz, 
Schneider, & Frank, 2017). All in all, these results suggest that different kinds of implicatures 
possibly require different mechanisms, and might rely on different abilities in order to be 
derived: for example, provided that the scale is lexically built for scalar implicatures, these 
kind of implicatures might rely more on linguistic abilities; on the contrary, particularized 
implicatures such as ad-hoc implicatures might rely more on general cognitive or ToM 
abilities in which the alternative statements are evaluated with respect to a shared 
conversational context. 
Testing populations with ASD, specifically with High Functioning Autism (HFA), 
might be of particular interest to assess the role of intervening factors in implicature 
computation because people with such disorders are characterized by normal intelligence and 
good verbal abilities, but impairments in social relation and in ToM.  
 
1.2. Scalar implicatures in autism 
With respect to the derivation of conversational implicatures, a series of studies 
assessed the ability to compute scalar implicatures in populations with HFA. Results are not 
consistent; some researchers did not find a difference with typical population (Chevallier, 
Wilson, Happé, & Noveck, 2010; Hochstein, Bale, & Barner, 2017; Pijnacker, Hagoort, 





Cerezuela, Tordera Yllescas, González-Sala, Montagut-Asunción, & Fernández-Andrés, 
2018; Shaeken, Van Haeren, & Bambini, 2018). 
In their seminal study, Pijnacker et al. (2009) tested 56 Dutch adults, 28 with ASD and 
28 matched controls; the ASD group included 11 participants with High-Functioning Autism 
(HFA) and 17 with Asperger syndrome.2 Participants had to judge sentences as true or false, 
and were exposed to underinformative sentences containing the scalar quantifier ‘some’ (e.g., 
Some sparrows are birds) and ‘or’ (e.g., Zebras have black or white stripes), that are logically 
true but pragmatically infelicitous if a scalar implicature is derived (namely, Some but not all 
sparrows are birds and Zebras have black or white stripes but they do not have black and 
white stripes). Due to their ToM deficits, the ASD group was expected to provide less 
pragmatic answers compared to matched typical adults. Unexpectedly, results showed a 
similar pattern of responses in the two groups. Overall, the ASD group’s pragmatic answers 
were not significantly different from those observed in the control group, when considering 
the scalar terms. However, when considering separately HFA and Asperger participants 
within the ASD group, the former gave less pragmatic answers than the latter in the 
underinformative condition with some and – marginally – also in the underinformative 
condition with or. Moreover, researchers found a correlation between pragmatic answers and 
verbal intelligence in the HFA group; the higher the verbal intelligence, the more frequent the 
pragmatic answers. On one hand, these findings seem to support the view that linguistic 
abilities play a role in the computation of scalar implicatures; according to the authors, it 
might be that HFA participants leverage their verbal intelligence to compensate for pragmatic 
difficulties. On the other hand, the correlation between verbal intelligence and the 
computation of scalar implicatures was not found in the Asperger group and in the control 
																																																								
2	This distinction in the autistic spectrum still existed in the previous version of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR: American Psychiatric Association, 2000) but 





group. According to these authors, the verbal-intelligence differences between the two ASD 
subgroups might be a limitation of this study. Furthermore, authors wrote that ‘with regard to 
the dominant cognitive theories on autism’ they ‘think that it is more plausible to assume that 
deriving scalar implicatures is related to the theory of mind account’ (p. 615), but ToM 
abilities had not been experimentally tested in their paradigm.  
Similarly, Chevallier et al. (2010) tested 22 ASD adolescents (6 HFA and 16 
Aspergers) and 22 controls on the pragmatic interpretation of underinformative connectives. 
The experimental paradigm was a Truth-Value Judgment Task in which participants had to 
decide whether they agreed or disagreed with sentences like “there is a sun or a train” when 
both a sun and a train were present in a picture. Like in Pijnacker et al. (2009), the rate of 
pragmatic interpretations in the critical condition did not diverge across the two groups and 
verbal intelligence correlated with pragmatic answers only in the ASD group. Researchers 
concluded that some semantic and pragmatic abilities are preserved in people in the HFA and 
Asperger spectrum.  
More recently, Su and Su (2015) extended those results testing 28 Mandarin-speaking 
children with ASD with an age that ranged from 4 to 15 years, divided in two age-groups 
(mean age of the younger group: 6.6; mean age of the older group: 11.7), 15 with Asperger 
syndrome, 12 with autistic disorder, 1 diagnosed with pervasive developmental disorder). 
Children had been assessed on a Truth-Value Judgment Task on scalar implicatures 
associated with the scalar items ‘some’ and ‘or’. In the underinformative conditions, children 
had to judge sentences like ‘Some children found sea snails’ in a scenario in which all 
children found sea snails, or sentences like ‘Every child got a sea star or a shell’ in a scenario 
in which all children had both a sea star and a shell. Authors divided participants in two 
groups based on mean age, one with younger participants (M = 6.6) and one with older (M = 





ASD participants answered similarly to their typically developing (TD) peers in the some-
condition (ASD = 93%; TD = 96%) but not in the every…or-condition, in which they tended 
to reject the underinformative sentences significantly less than their peers (ASD = 59%; TD = 
71%). The younger ASD participants answered as poorly as their TD peers in the every…or-
condition (ASD = 36%; TD = 38%) and similarly to their peers in the some-condition (ASD = 
64%; TD = 79%). Authors concluded that, in general, ASD participants did not seem to differ 
significantly from TD participants of the same age. Su & Su’s study is of particular interest 
because they assessed children in the critical age for the computation of scalar implicatures, 
provided that they also included children as young as 4 in their group. On the other hand, the 
study has some limits: ToM had not been tested and the age range of the participants is too 
wide to perform comparisons across age groups. Moreover, they included children with 
Asperger, ASD and pervasive developmental disorder in the clinical group, and for this 
reason it is difficult to generalize this result. Indeed, the authors recognized that a limit of 
their study is the fact that they lacked the gold standards for ASD diagnosis.  
A recent study by Hochstein et al. (2017) criticized the use of the Truth-Value 
Judgment Task since it is generally agreed that an underinformative statement is neither ‘true’ 
nor ‘false’; rather, participants’ answers can be either ‘logic’ (i.e. accepting the statement) or 
‘pragmatic’ (i.e. rejecting it). They suggested that in all previous tasks it is not clear whether 
participants answered regarding the truthfulness or the felicity of the sentences they had to 
judge. For this reason, these authors decided to test adolescents with ASD (N = 18) with the 
use of interactive tasks on the role of epistemic reasoning in scalar implicatures and ignorance 
implicatures that require inferring speaker’s ignorance. In these tasks, two puppets made a 
comment about something that happened, and the child had to detect which of the two 
puppets talked. Crucially, in the task for ignorance implicatures, one of the two characters 





the task for scalar implicatures, instead, one of the two characters was introduced as smart and 
the other as silly. To further manipulate the epistemic state of the speaker, a third task was 
introduced, in which a puppet uttered a statement about the content of a box, sometimes after 
he peeped inside the box and sometimes after he didn’t. They found that ASD participants 
inferred scalar implicatures both for fully knowledgeable and for partially knowledgeable 
speakers, suggesting that they computed implicatures without considering the interlocutors’ 
epistemic states: even if they inferred the ignorance of the speakers they were not able to 
spontaneously work with such awareness when processing scalar implicatures.  
Summing up, previous researches showed that adolescents and adults with ASD might 
have spared abilities to compute scalar implicatures, even if these results are not entirely clear 
due to the heterogeneity of the groups with respect to age and diagnosis, and the tasks used. 
All reported literature also shows that computing scalar implicatures has a strong connection 
with verbal abilities, with the caveat that all the tasks employed in those studies relied a lot on 
verbal abilities. As for the interpretation of these results, on the other hand, these have been 
explained in quite different ways. On the one hand Chevallier et al., 2010 proposed that HFA 
have spared pragmatic abilities; on the other, Pijnacker et al., 2009 proposed that scalar 
implicatures are related with easier, first-order ToM abilities that are typically acquired by 
adults with ASD and not with the most complex second-order ToM abilities. Finally, other 
authors suggested that ASD participants might compute scalar implicatures using different 
processing strategies that are not related with epistemic reasoning about others’ mental states 
(Hochstein et al., 2017).  
 
2. The present study 
In our study we assessed the derivation of conversational inferences in ASD by 





implicature computation, as attested from the acquisition literature on typically developing 
children. Second, we controlled for linguistic, cognitive and ToM abilities by assessing 
children with a battery of standardized tests on such skills. Finally, we aimed at extending 
previous results by comparing two kinds of implicatures with the same task: one that is linked 
to the use of a scalar term and thus requires the lexicalization of a semantic scale (scalar 
implicatures), and one that arises by contextual features of the context (ad-hoc implicatures). 
We decided to use a Picture Selection Task for both scalar and ad-hoc implicatures, provided 
that this task relies less on metalinguistic abilities, and no verbal answer is required.  
Our main aim was threefold: first, we aimed at assessing ASD children’s pragmatic 
performance on different types of implicatures, namely, not only scalar implicatures but also 
ad-hoc implicatures to extend previous findings. Second, we aimed at investigating how this 
performance is related to general intelligence, linguistic skills, and ToM skills, so as to shed 
light on which linguistic and cognitive factors might play a role in the process of computing 
implicatures in ASD children. Particularly, ToM is taken into consideration; we think that it is 
important to consider it, since our participants are in an age in which ToM skills develop, as 
well as the ability to compute implicatures, as we know from previous research on TD 
children. Third, we aimed at contributing to the theoretical debate on the mechanisms 
underlying conversational inferences; despite the fact that the main focus of our study is 
testing pragmatic abilities in on ASD children, our data might also contribute for the general 
theoretical debate on implicature processing.  
 
2.1.  Methods 
2.1.1. Participants 
Twenty-six TD children and 26 ASD children between 4 and 9 years participated to 





Social (Pragmatic) Communication Disorder. The two groups were matched for age and were 
tested with standardized tests for linguistic abilities (lexicon and syntax), non-verbal IQ and 
ToM (all tasks will be detailed in the next section). Statistical comparisons between the two 
groups revealed no difference in age, IQ, and lexicon abilities. The ASD group syntactic and 
ToM abilities were significantly lower than the control group  (Table 1). ASD participants 
had been recruited and diagnosed at the Hospital ‘Azienda Provinciale per i Servizi Sanitari’ 
(APSS) in Trento, Italy; in this structure, child psychiatrists used standard clinical criteria as a 
diagnostic tool for their evaluation (i.e., ADOS: Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule). 
ADOS scores for each individual child are reported in details in the Appendix A. Trained 
specialists at the APSS regularly follow all the children. TD children had been recruited in 
kindergartens and primary schools from two provinces in the northeast of Italy: Trento and 
Vicenza. According to Ethical Committee’s guidelines, parents were informed about the 
experiments and they gave written consent to their children being part of our study. This 
study is part of a more extensive research on pragmatic deficits in ASD population that has 
been approved by University of Trento’s Ethical Committee.  
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Age 84.88 (21.70)  50-111     87.08 (24.28)  45-123     t = .343; p =  0.73 	
IQ 27.23 (6.71)  14-36         24.50 (6.56)  11-36 t = -1.48; p = 0.14 






2.1.2.  Materials and Procedure 
We tested children with two similar pragmatic tasks, one for scalar implicatures and 
one for ad-hoc implicatures. In addition, participants have been tested for their non verbal-IQ 
by means of the Raven Coloured Progressive Matrices (Italian standardization by Belacchi, 
Scalisi, Cannoni & Cornoldi, 2008); for their lexical and morphosyntactic abilities by means 
of two tasks taken from the Batteria di Valutazione del Linguaggio 4-12: a test for receptive 
vocabulary, that includes 18 items for pre-schoolers and 42 items for primary school kids 
(Marini, Marotta, Bulgheroni & Fabbro, 2015); a test of grammatical competence that 
includes 40 items varying in level of morphosyntactic difficulty. Moreover, we assessed first 
order ToM skills with a battery of tests adapted from the first four tasks of Wellman & Liu 
(2004): Diverse Desires, i.e. the ability to judge that people might have different desires; 
Diverse Beliefs, i.e. the ability to judge that people might have different beliefs; Knowledge 
Access, i.e. the ability to judge that people might have different knowledge; and Content 
False Belief; i.e. the ability to understand that people can have a false belief. 
Children have been tested alone in a quiet room; we decided to split the experiment 
session in two or three days, depending on the individual child’s level of attention, to avoid 
possible tiredness and distraction.   
 
2.2.1 Picture Selection Task for scalar implicatures 
Moving from Surian & Job (1987) and Stiller, Goodman & Frank (2015), we created a 
Picture Selection Task to assess children’s abilities in computing pragmatic inferences.  This 
Syntax 32.81 (6.22)  22-40  28.81 (5.96)  19-39 t = -2.37; p = 0.02 
ToM 3.50 (.648)  2-4     2.00 (1.33) 0-4    t = -5.18; p < 0.001 
 






task was the same used by Foppolo et al. (2018) with TD children in a different study. We 
considered this task as more ASD oriented compared to the classical Truth Value Judgement 
Task because children were visually provided with all the alternatives and they did not need to 
answer verbally to the experimenter. Our task required participant to pinpoint the requested 
target (among four pictures) after listening to a sentential prompt. Prior to the test phase, we 
introduced the main character (a boy called Daniele) to children, explaining that he wanted to 
play a guessing game with them: following his clues, children had to find the object that 
Daniele asked for on the screen. All Daniele’s sentences had been previously recorded to 
control for prosody.  
In the scalar-implicature task, children were then presented with a warm-up trial and in 
this phase the experimenter could correct them in case of inaccurate answers. After this trial, 
children began the test phase that consisted of two sentences with the quantifier all, four 
sentences with the quantifier some and one control trial (with no quantifier). We decided to 
use a pseudo-randomized order in which the first all-item had always been presented before 
the first some-item; in this way, we were confident that children were provided with the most 
informative element in the scale before listening to the less informative one (Foppolo et al., 
2012). In Figure 1 there is an example of a some-scenario. The items unfolded as follows. 
First of all, Daniele appeared on the screen saying, for example, “Guess which my cake is, I 
give you a clue”; then children were presented with a scenario in which there were four cakes 
and listened to Daniele’s clue:  “On my birthday cake, some of the candles are burning”. By 
exploiting this linguistic clue, children had to spot Daniele’s birthday cake among a cake with 
no candles (distractor), a cake with no burning candles (distractor), a cake with some (3 out of 
5) burning candles (pragmatic target) and a cake with all burning candles (underinformative-
target). If children interpreted the quantifier some pragmatically as some but not all, then we 





children interpreted some logically as some and possibly all we expected them to select the 
cake with all the candles burning. If children selected one of the two distractors, then they 
showed a poor understanding of the sentence or the task. In Figure 2 there is an example of an 
all-scenario. In this all-scenario, Daniele’s sentence was “Guess which my favorite 
playground is, I give you a clue: at my favorite playground, all the flowers are red”: the target 
picture was the one with 5 red flowers out of 5; the other pictures displayed a playground 
without flowers (distractor), a garden with 3 red and 2 blue flowers and a garden with 3 blue 
and 2 red flowers (subset competitors). The expected reasoning that the child should follow to 
select the target cake in the some example was the following: if Daniele’s cake was the one 
with all the candles lit, then he should have clearly used the most informative quantifier all. 
Since Daniele used the less informative quantifier some instead, the intended target had to be 
the cake with not all the candles burning.  
What is interesting about this particular experimental design is that participants are 
provided (both linguistically and visually) with the more informative scalar alternative all 
and, in this way, access to the relevant alternative and its contextual relevance should 
increase. Moreover, the epistemic state of the speaker can be easily inferred: in the way the 
game is posed, it is clear that (i) Daniele has full knowledge of the facts and (ii) the target is 







Figure 1. Example of a some 
underinformative item in the Picture 
Selection Task for scalar implicatures:  
Guess which my cake is, I give you a clue: on 
my birthday cake, some of the candles are 
burning. 
Figure 2. Example of an all true item in the 
Picture Selection Task for scalar implicatures: 
Guess which my favorite playground is, I give 
you a clue: at my favorite playground, all the 




2.2.2 Picture Selection Task for ad-hoc implicatures 
The Picture Selection Task for ad-hoc implicatures was modeled after Stiller et al. 
(2015). The procedure was the same of the task for scalar implicatures, since the goal was to 
compare the two kinds of implicatures with the same experimental design. For this reason, the 
main character remained the same, Daniele, and even in this task children had to play the 
spotting game finding a target, among four pictures, after listening to a prompt. The 
experiment consisted of two control trials and four test trials for ad-hoc implicatures. In 
Figure 3 there is an example of a test item: first, Daniele appeared saying, for example, 
“Guess which my bed is, I give you a clue”; as in the task for scalar implicatures, four 
different beds appeared on the screen and Daniele added: “On my bed there is a teddy bear”. 





an empty bed), the pragmatic target (the bed with only the teddy bear) and the 
underinformative target (the bed with both a teddy bear and a penguin). The expected 
reasoning that the child should follow to select the target bed was the following: if Daniele’s 
bed was the one with both the teddy bear and the penguin, then he should have clearly said 
this. Since Daniele mentioned only the teddy bear, the correct target had to be the bed with 
only the teddy bear. 
 
 
Figure 3. Example of an underinformative item in the Picture Selection Task for ad-hoc 
implicatures: Guess which my bed is, I give you a clue: on my bed there is a teddy bear. 
 
3. Results 
The responses were coded as “correct” if the child selected the pragmatic target in the 
test conditions, and the correct target in controls. Children's accuracy on controls was above 
95% in both groups (95.4 % in the ASD group and 97.7% in the TD group), while the rate of 
implicature derivation was lower than controls in both groups, in the ASD group especially 
(65.4 % in the ASD group and 84.6% in the TD group). 
We run a logit mixed effects model to predict accuracy (as a binomial variable) 
considering subjects and items as random factors, and Group (ASD vs. TD), Task (scalar 





as fixed effects. For a better fit of the model, Age was centered prior to analysis. All mixed 
effects models were fit in R using the lmerTest package. A significant effect of Condition (Est 
= -3.734, SE = .956, z = -3.900, p < .001), Group (Est = 2.001, SE = .564, z = 3.549, p < .001) 
and Age (Est = .065, SE = .013, z = 5.122, p < .001) emerged: accuracy of children on 
implicature items is significantly lower than on control items, performance is worse for the 
ASD group compared to the TD group and it is worse for the younger kids. No significant 
interactions were observed, so these were removed from the model.  
Considering children’s performance with scalar and ad-hoc implicatures separately, 
we observe that: children’s accuracy on ad-hoc implicatures is higher than scalar implicatures 
for both groups, the difference being greater in the TD group (70.2% vs. 60.6% in the ASD 
group; 91.3% vs. 77.9% in the TD group); TD children performed better than ASD in both 
kind of implicatures (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Mean pragmatic choices made for Ad-Hoc- and Scalar-implicature items in the two 






We further inspect children’s distribution in each group and counted the number of 
times children in each group selected the pragmatic target in each implicature task (Table 2). 
This number ranged from 0 to 4 for each task provided that each participant was tested with 4 
scalar and 4 ad hoc critical items The distribution of pragmatic choices (i.e. the number of 
times children selected the pragmatic target, that ranged from 0 to 4 times, Table 2)was 
compared between groups and resulted to be significant for both types of implicatures (scalar 
implicatures: W = 312, p < .001; ad hoc implicatures: W = 416, p < .001). 
 
Table 2. Distribution of pragmatic choices (Scalar vs. Ad Hoc) and Group (ASD vs. TD) 
 
Scalar Task  Ad Hoc Task 
Group 0 1 2 3 4  0 1 2 3 4 
           
TD 3 1 1 6 15  0 0 3 3 20 
ASD 4 6 0 7 9  2 4 3 5 12 
 
 
Despite the fact that the ASD kids perform worse than the TD kids in the implicature 
condition, it is noteworthy that 16 (62%) children in the scalar implicature task and 17 (65%) 
in the ad-hoc task selected the pragmatic target most of the times (at least 3 out of 4 times).   
By splitting children on the basis of their schooling, we further observe that the gap 
between ASD and TD children increases with age: while TD kids in primary school (N=17) 
are at ceiling with all conditions, the ASD kids in primary school (N = 18) keep showing a 





the kindergarten (N = 9) perform better with ad-hoc implicatures than with scalar implicatures 
(paired Wilcoxon-test: W = 864, p =. 004), ASD younger children (N = 8) perform poorly 
with both implicatures, independently of type (W = 544, p = .614). 
Given that controls were (almost) at ceiling in both groups, independently from Age or 
Type of implicature, we performed a separate analysis focusing on implicature items only. As 
before, we run a logit mixed effects model to predict accuracy (as a binomial variable) 
considering subjects and items as random factors, and Group (ASD vs. TD), Condition (scalar 
implicatures vs. ad-hoc implicatures), and Age in months as fixed effects, as well as their 
interactions. The model that best fits the data reveals a significant effect of Group (Est = 
2.900, SE = .772, z = 3.759, p < .001) and Age (Est = .066, SE = .013, z = 4.912, p < .001), 
showing that accuracy on implicatures is higher in the TD group than in the ASD group, and 
it increases with age. A marginally significant interaction between Type of implicature and 
Group was also found (Est = -1.270, SE = .695, z = -1.827, p = .07).  
To understand the observed interaction, we conducted further analyses by means of a 
series of Wilcoxon non parametric tests: accuracy on ad-hoc implicatures was found to be 
higher than accuracy on scalar implicatures in the TD group only (T = 178.5, p = .002), but 
not in the ASD group, for which the difference between ad-hoc implicatures and scalar 
implicatures is only marginally significant (T = 425.5, p = .097). We also found a significant 
difference between ASD and TD children in the rate of derivation of ad-hoc implicatures (W 
= 4264, p < .001) and scalar implicatures (W = 4472, p = .007), but not in the rate of accuracy 
in controls (W = 8320, p = .521), that remains high for both groups, as we said previously. 
Accuracy on control is particularly relevant when assessing children’s competence, because it 
reveals that participants are understanding and attending to the task.    
To further understand the factors underlying ASD performance with implicatures, we 





cognitive abilities, ToM tasks, as well as their ADOS score. These are detailed for each 
individual participant in the appendix (Appendix A-B). The distribution of each group in each 
task is also plotted in Appendix C (see also Table 1 for mean scores and pairwise 
comparisons between groups).  
Considering ToM tasks, ASD children showed difficulties compared to TD children, 
especially with the more complex tasks. Table 3 summarizes the mean accuracy (and standard 
deviation) for each sub-task of 1st order ToM for each group. 
 
Table 3. Participant’s mean accuracy (and standard deviation) for each sub-task of 1st order 
ToM for each group. 
 
 TD children  
N = 26 
ASD children 






















.96 (.20)  .42 (.50)  p < 0.001 
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To test the contribution of these factor on implicature computation, we ran a mixed 
model analysis on ASD children’s accuracy with implicature, testing the different scores 
obtained in the linguistic, cognitive, and ToM tasks and their ADOS score as predictors, with 





significant factors and interactions were removed from the final model. The model that best 
fits the data reveals a significant effect of Raven (Est = .170, SE = .061, z = 2.805, p = .005), a 
significant interaction of type of implicature and ToM (Est = .984, SE = .369, z = 2.667, p = 
.007) and a marginally significant effect of Lexicon (Est = -3.731, SE = 2.151, z = -1.735, p = 
.08). Children with higher IQ computed more implicatures. Furthermore, ToM seems to play 
a role just for scalar implicatures and not for ad-hoc implicatures: the higher the ToM skills, 
the more scalar implicatures were computed, while the correlation between ToM scores and 
pragmatic answers in the ad-hoc task seems weaker (Figure 5). 
A parallel analysis was conducted on TD children. In this case, the model reveals a 
significant effect of type of implicature (Est = -2.56, SE = 1.256, z = -2.043, p = .04) and 





Figure 5. Correlation between ToM scores (from 0 to 4) and proportion of pragmatic answers 
in the ad-hoc task (left panel) and the scalar task (right panel) for all 26 individuals in the 







In our study, we tested ASD children’s ability to derive two types of conversational 
implicatures, scalar implicatures - which are based on linguistically encoded scales- and ad-
hoc implicatures, which are based on contextually retrieved scales. Both kinds of implicatures 
arise from the cooperative exchange among speakers, that are prompted to be maximally 
informative and cooperative in their communications, and recipients of a message, that 
ascribe their interlocutors this intent and draw inferences on the basis of such assumption. In 
our study, we tested the pragmatic abilities of ASD children aged between 4 and 10 years and 
compared them with a group of TD peers matched by age. We know from the acquisition 
literature on scalar implicatures that preschool TD children may find difficulties in the 
derivation of these inferences, and that they develop this ability during school years. 
Nonetheless, most previous studies on scalar-implicatures computation in ASD tested 
adolescents or adult individuals with ASD (Chevallier et al., 2010; Hochstein et al., 2017; 
Pijnacker et al., 2009). The high performance obtained in those groups might simply hide a 
developmental delay in the acquisition of this ability. Moreover, none of the groups of ASD 
tested in previous studies were homogeneous and always included a subgroup of individuals 
with Asperger syndrome: it is not clear how this inclusion contributed to the results obtained 
in those studies. 
From the results obtained in our study, we can draw two main conclusions. First, ASD 
children show some pragmatic competence: in our study, about 65% of the ASD children 
tested could compute implicatures and their performance increases with age in both types of 
implicatures, in line with previous conclusions that found a surprising ability in ASD adults in 
deriving scalar implicatures. However, by comparing the group of ASD children and TD 





pragmatic inferences of both of the kinds tested. Such difficulties are not due to general 
problems with the task, given that they do not differ from their peers in the control conditions. 
Also, the gap between ASD and TD children persist during primary school: while TD kids 
from the age of 6 perform at ceiling in all conditions, even the older ASD kids in our group 
keep showing a difficulty with the computation of pragmatic inferences, though the 
evidence suggests a developmental trend and an above chance performance. 
Our results on scalar implicatures are somewhat at odd with findings on children with 
ASD reported by Su & Su (2015). Both the age of the tested population and the type of task 
used in the two studies may account for the inconsistency in the results. With respect of the 
participants’ age, Su and Su tested participants of a wider and older range of age (4 to 15 
years) than the present study (4 to 9 years) and this might have reduced the chance to look at 
the developmental stage in which scalar implicatures led to computational difficulties also in 
TD children. Both looking at our developmental data and at other studies on ASD participants 
of older age (Chevallier et al., 2010; Hochstein et al., 2017; Pijnacker et al., 2009), a 
developmental growth in the ability to compute scalar implicatures is quite visible, possibly 
due or linked to increased linguistic and cognitive skills. Results reported by Whyte and 
Nelson (2015) go in this direction. They considered pragmatic development in ASD and, by 
mean of a cross-sectional trajectory analysis, they showed that ASD children display slower 
development of inferential abilities. 
With respect to the task, on the other hand, Su and Su (2015) assessed their children 
through a Truth Value Judgement Task on underinformative sentences that are not ‘false’ per 
se but are simply ‘not felicitous’. Furthermore, such task is not designed to consider the 
context and the role of the speaker’s mind and answers might be given even without 
considering it. Conversely, our Picture Selection Task has been designed to enhance the 





in a recent study, Schaeken,Van Haeren and Bambini (2018) showed that ASD children tested 
on implicatures with a binary judgment tasks (i.e., agree/disagree) can derive them as much as 
TD controls. However, when tested with a ternary option (i.e., totally agree/agree a bit/totally 
disagree) ASD children showed a dichotomized pattern of answers, by opting to either ‘fully 
agree’ or ‘fully disagree’ with underinformative statements, differently from TD children, 
who opted for the middle option. The authors suggested that ASD children presented 
difficulties with implicatures, but such difficulties might have been evened out with the use of 
a standard binary task. They pointed out the importance of the task when assessing pragmatic 
abilities, especially with impaired population. Similarly, when Pastor-Cerezuela, Tordera 
Yllescas, González-Sala, Montagut-Asunción and Fernández-Andrés, (2018) tested children 
with a (different) ternary option task, they found difficulties in the comprehension of 
implicatures. 
The second goal of the present study was to investigate the links between performance 
on the implicatures task and measures of intelligence, language development and social 
cognition. Previous works on ASD children showed a correlation between linguistic abilities 
and the rate of derivation of scalar implicatures. However, none of the previous studies on 
ASD children analyzed correlations between scalar-implicatures computation and other 
cognitive factors, such as ToM. After examining the influence of those skills in the 
computation of implicatures in the ASD group, evidence shows that – surprisingly – ToM 
only predicts the performance for scalar implicatures and that general intelligence (IQ) is a 
good predictor of the performance for both scalar implicatures and ad-hoc implicatures. 
Considering other studies, the role of IQ is not entirely surprising (see also Schaeken et al., 
2018); what is puzzling, instead, is the role of ToM in implicature computation, although this 
is in line with recent findings by Foppolo et al. (2018) on TD children. Following Neo-





implicatures, whereas following lexicalist/grammatical accounts we should have expected a 
modulation of scalar implicatures by linguistic abilities. Indeed, by modelling accuracy on 
different predictors, it seems that ad-hoc implicatures and scalar implicatures rely on different 
mechanisms, while data on accuracy shows that their development seems to follow a common 
path in ASD children, that is, interestingly, clearly different from that of TD children. 
A tentative explanation of this picture might be offered by considering the role of IQ 
in the ASD group on the one hand, and the developmental trajectory of ToM on the other. 
This relation between pragmatic ability and general intelligence also goes in the direction of 
studies that explored the idea that people in the autistic spectrum might compensate for their 
deficits using specific strategies. Indeed, also for ToM skills it has been demonstrated that 
ASD population might solve tasks that require this ability through compensatory learning 
(Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009; Schneider, Slaughter, Bayliss, & Dux, 2013). 
Similarly, it has been shown that in pragmatic tasks ASD population might use different 
processing strategies compared to typical population (Pexman, Rostad, McMorris, Climie, 
Stowkowy, & Glenwright, 2011). Moreover, a functional MRI study on irony processing in 
ASD population (Wang, Lee, Sigman, & Dapretto, 2006) showed a different pattern of brain 
activation (in the right inferior frontal gyrus and in the bilateral temporal regions) in ASD 
compared to TD: authors concluded that the greater activation may be related with more 
effortful processing. Moving from these results, we might speculate that ASD participants 
learn with age and with increased IQ skills how to deal with pragmatic tasks, even in the 
absence of a full mastery of ToM skills. Building on this conjecture, we can combine the 
evidence that scalar implicatures are more difficult for TD children with the significant role of 
ToM in scalar-implicature computation in ASD children: a full mastery of ToM is presumably 
neither necessary nor sufficient to derive scalar implicatures; for this kind of implicature, an 





the TD group, or compensated by other mechanisms, as shown by the role of IQ in the ASD 
group. 
Our third goal was to contribute to the understanding of the different mechanism 
behind ad-hoc implicatures and scalar implicatures. As we outlined in the introduction, ad-hoc 
implicatures and scalar implicatures might rely on different mechanisms for their derivation. 
In particular, while the alternative for ad-hoc scales are purely retrieved on a contextual basis, 
the alternatives for scalar implicatures need to be retrieved from the lexicon. According to 
some theories of scalar implicatures, this special kind of inferences might be grammaticalized, 
and a delay in their development might be linked to a delay in the lexicalization of the scale 
and/or in some difficulty in scale retrieval. As we said, the theoretical debate is still open with 
respect to the nature and differences of pragmatic inferences. Although our main aim in this 
paper is not to evaluate competing pragmatic theories, we think that the data from ASD 
children might inform the theoretical debate as to the nature of different implicatures. 
With respect to this point, previous works demonstrated that TD children are more 
competent with ad-hoc implicatures than with scalar implicatures (Foppolo et al., 2018; 
Horowitz et al., 2017; Stiller et al., 2015) and we replicated the same finding in our group of 
TD children. In addition to this, for the first time we compared ad-hoc implicatures and scalar 
implicatures in ASD children and, interestingly, we observed a different pattern: specifically, 
for ASD children, ad-hoc implicatures are found to be as difficult as scalar implicatures. 
These results might be evidence that, despite their differences, some underlying general 
mechanism is shared in the derivation of these inferences, one that is not spared in ASD 
population. The best candidate for this role is indeed ToM, which has been found to be one 
parameter that significantly differentiated the two populations tested, one which is 
specifically impaired in ASD children and that we found was significantly associated with the 





 In conclusion, it seems that ASD children can compute implicatures even if they 
display some difficulties compared to TD peers. Such difficulties slowly decrease with age, 
probably due to the acquisition of more advanced linguistic and cognitive skills, as well as to 
compensatory learning. Future longitudinal studies might shed light on factors affecting this 
developmental path that seems, however, different and slower compared to the one of TD 
children. Future studies should also test an ASD population with lower IQ and verbal skills to 
better understand the role of the various factors involved in pragmatic processing of people in 
the autistic spectrum. This will be helpful both to provide a better understanding of the 
mechanisms that rule cooperative exchanges and to highlight effective strategies of 
intervention to improve communication.  
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Appendix A.  Participant’s ADOS Scores – ADOS versions and modules are specified. 






ASD_1 2 3 14 
ASD_2 2 1 18 
ASD_3 2 1 22 
ASD_4 2 2 10 
ASD_5 2 3 10 
ASD_6 1 2 15 
ASD_7 2 1 14 
ASD_8 1 2 19 
ASD_9 2 3 9 
ASD_10 1 1 17 
ASD_11 2 1 16 
ASD_12 1 1 14 
ASD_13 2 1 12 
ASD_14 2 2 8 
ASD_15 2 1 16 
ASD_17 2 3 8 
ASD_18 2 2 10 
ASD_19 1 2 11 
ASD_20 2 2 8 
ASD_21 2 3 13 
ASD_22 1 2 13 
ASD-23 2 1 9 
ASD-24 2 1 11 
ASD-25 2 2 9 
ASD-26 2 2 9 







Appendix B.  Participant’s scores on different standardized tests and subtests. ASD_16 is 
missing because of a re-diagnosis of Social (Pragmatic) Communication Disorder. 
 
 
  Language tests 
(accuracy) 
1st order ToM tasks (1=correct response) 
 
 








ASD_1 27 71% 83% 1 1 1 1 
ASD_2 23 67% 60% 0 0 0 0 
ASD_3 17 83% 68% 1 1 1 1 
ASD_4 26 62% 80% 1 1 1 0 
ASD_5 30 83% 80% 1 1 1 1 
ASD_6 22 50% 70% 1 0 1 0 
ASD_7 20 50% 58% 0 0 0 0 
ASD_8 36 93% 98% 1 1 1 1 
ASD_9 19 74% 65% 1 1 0 0 
ASD_10 20 71% 73% 1 0 0 0 
ASD_11 21 83% 73% 1 0 1 0 
ASD_12 34 81% 75% 0 0 0 0 
ASD_13 11 72% 60% 1 0 0 0 
ASD_14 34 81% 98% 1 1 1 1 
ASD_15 20 71% 68% 1 1 0 0 
ASD_17 21 60% 53% 1 0 0 1 
ASD_18 31 74% 85% 1 1 1 0 
ASD_19 26 57% 70% 1 1 0 0 
ASD_20 33 95% 95% 1 0 1 0 
ASD_21 34 98% 98% 1 1 0 0 
ASD_22 28 62% 65% 1 0 1 0 
ASD_23 17 78% 48% 0 0 0 0 
ASD_24 21 67% 58% 0 0 0 0 





ASD_26 20 69% 85% 1 1 0 0 
ASD_27 18 50% 65% 1 1 0 0 
TD_1 36 93% 95% 1 1 1 0 
TD_2 20 89% 55% 0 1 1 0 
TD_3 21 78% 55% 1 1 1 1 
TD_4 35 90% 98% 0 1 1 1 
TD_5 31 88% 95% 1 1 1 1 
TD_6 34 81% 93% 1 0 1 0 
TD_7 19 78% 60% 1 1 1 0 
TD_8 36 81% 95% 1 1 1 0 
TD_9 34 95% 98% 1 1 1 1 
TD_10 34 88% 98% 1 1 1 1 
TD_11 19 56% 63% 1 1 0 1 
TD_12 21 81% 85% 1 1 1 0 
TD_13 28 88% 90% 1 1 1 0 
TD_14 26 90% 83% 1 1 1 1 
TD_15 31 78% 83% 1 1 1 1 
TD_16 26 76% 80% 1 1 1 0 
TD_17 33 83% 88% 1 1 1 1 
TD_18 30 88% 90% 1 1 1 1 
TD_19 31 88% 95% 1 1 1 1 
TD_20 30 98% 100% 1 1 1 1 
TD_21 32 88% 93% 1 1 1 1 
TD_22 14 67% 63% 1 1 1 1 
TD_23 16 72% 60% 1 1 1 0 
TD_24 29 81% 83% 1 1 1 1 
TD_25 19 83% 55% 1 1 1 1 




































PART 3 –  
ADULT COMPETENCE  











Chapter 3.  
 
Scalar Implicature Computation  














This chapter is based on the following original article:  
Mazzaggio, G., & Surian, L. (2017). The propensity to compute scalar 
implicatures is linked to autistic traits.  













We investigated whether there is an association between autistic traits in the broader 
phenotype and the ability to compute scalar implicatures. Previous studies found that the 
frequency of autistic traits is higher in students of science than of humanities; therefore, the 
two experiments reported here recorded the degree of rejection of underinformative scalar 
items in students enrolled either in a science or in a humanities curriculum.  Also, we assessed 
their autistic traits using the Autism-Spectrum Quotient questionnaire. We found that students 
enrolled in science curricula provided fewer rejections compared to students enrolled in 
humanities curricula. Moreover, rejections were associated negatively with autistic traits and 
positively with performance on Theory-of-Mind tasks. These findings suggest that autism 













Grice (1975) made an important distinction between saying and conveying, which 
corresponds to a distinction between utterance meaning (i.e., the semantic meaning) and 
speaker meaning. Specifically, the speaker meaning is the meaning that the speaker intends to 
convey to the addressee. The distinction is reflected in the fact that speaker meaning can 
differ from utterance meaning, which is the conventional meaning of the words and syntax. 
An example is given in (1).  
 
(1) A: Do you want to come out for a drink? 
      B: I have a job interview tomorrow. 
 
The literal meaning of B’s response (the utterance meaning) does not provide a direct 
answer to A's question. However, the answer is provided by the speaker meaning, it seems 
that B is unable to accept A's invitation. A's recognition of this meaning depends upon the 
specific (particular) contextual features. In a neutral context, the utterance ‘I have a job 
interview tomorrow’ does not convey that the speaker is unable to go out for a drink. In this 
example, such information is implicated and this is why we speak about ‘implicatures’. 
Grice distinguished particularized conversational implicatures, like in (1), from 
generalized conversational implicatures, which are, differently from the former, context-
independent. An example of generalized conversational implicatures are ‘scalar implicatures’, 
which refer to sets of lexical items that constitute a scale in which the items are ordered with 
respect to their informativeness. The speaker's use of a weaker term in a scale implicates the 
negation of all the stronger terms (Horn, 1972). Considering the quantifiers scale <some, all> 
in (2) B's use of some implicates that he did not buy all the books for the exam, even if the 






(2) A: Did you buy the books for the English exam? 
      B: I bought some. 
  
According to Grice (1975), addressees derive an implicature as a result of assuming that 
speakers adhere to a Cooperative Principle, which, in turn, requires them to obey a set of 
implicit rules or maxims. Specifically, speakers are expected to make their contribution as 
informative as required and not more or less so (Quantity maxims). They are to believe that 
their contribution is true and they should not say that for which they lack adequate evidence 
(Quality maxims). They are to make their contribution relevant (Maxim of Relation), and they 
are to be perspicuous; in particular, they are to avoid obscure and ambiguous expressions, and 
they are to be brief and orderly (Manner maxims). Thus, in the example in (2), if B bought all 
the books for the exam, then B's utterance violates the first Quantity maxim (i.e. make your 
contribution as informative as required) because the quantifier some is less informative than 
all. The reason for which the existential quantifier some is less informative than the universal 
quantifier all is because the latter can be true in less circumstances.  
Indeed, as expressed in (3a), a sentence like ‘All As are Bs’ can be true if, and only if 
(iff), all the elements present in the set of As are also present in the set of Bs. On the other 
hand, as expressed in (3b), a sentence like ‘Some As are Bs’ is true iff the interception of As 
and Bs is not empty (Katsos et al., 2016). This means that for (3a) to be true, (3b) must be 
true as well, but (3b) can be true also if (3a) is not. In other words, the quantifier “some” can 
logically be interpreted as “some and possibly all” but, since there is a more informative 
quantifier (i.e., all) available in the scale, “some” is interpreted pragmatically as “some but 
not all”. This kind of reasoning can be applied for several other sets of terms than can be 





(<warm, hot>), verbs (<start, finish>), adverbs (<sometimes, often, always>). 
 
(3) (a)‘ All As are Bs’ is true iff A∩B=A 
  
(b) ‘Some As are Bs’ is true iff A ∩ B ≠ ∅ 
 
Two main theoretical views on the computation of scalar implicatures have been 
proposed (for a review of all the models see Chemla & Singh, 2014a). An ongoing debate 
concerns whether scalar implicatures are computed through linguistic (e.g. semantic or 
syntactic) or pragmatic mechanisms that require mental state reasoning. For example, 
Chierchia's (2013) Extended Standard Gricean Theory assumes that a scalar implicature is 
derived from an utterance such as (4a) by means of an exhaustivity operator (O), which is a 
covert counterpart of only as shown in (4b). The result of the operator is shown in (4c). The 
‘exhaustification process’ operates on the set of lexical scalar alternatives when they are 
relevant to the conversational goals. If deriving the implicature is not advantageous in a 
particular context, the exhaustification process will not occur. 
 
(4) a. Some linguists are smart. 
b. Only some linguists are smart. 
c. O [some linguists are smart]. 
As we have previously seen, other researchers attribute the computation of scalar-
implicatures to the ability to recognize the speaker's communicative intentions. Based on 
Grice’s account, if we consider the dialogue in (2), the interlocutor A, after listening the 





“I bought all” that B could have uttered instead. Because A knows (and knows that B knows 
too) that some is less informative than all and that B used some instead of all, A assumes that 
if B bought all the books, then B would have used the quantifier all as required by the 
Quantity maxim. This ability to ‘read the mind’ of another person is known in the literature as 
Theory of Mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978) or mentalizing ability (Frith, Morton & Leslie, 
1991). Chemla and Singh (2014) suggested that both the Gricean view and the grammatical 
theory (i.e. Extended Standard Gricean Theory), theorize the involvement, at a certain point, 
of a pragmatic decision in scalar-implicature computation. However, there is no consensus on 
the role of Theory of Mind in pragmatic inferences. While some authors support the idea of a 
central role of mentalizing abilities (Nieuwland et al. 2010; Surian et al. 1996), other authors 
do not (Andrés-Roqueta & Katsos, 2017). Studies on population with less mature Theory-of-
Mind skills might be of interest for this specific theoretic aspect of the debate. 
People with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) present impairment in Theory-of-Mind 
development (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985) and this lack of or non-mature Theory of 
Mind has often been linked to pragmatic deficits (Baron-Cohen, 1988). ASD population is 
well known for presenting pragmatic difficulties, for example with obeying Gricean Maxims 
(Capps, Kehres & Sigman, 1998; Surian, Baron-Cohen & Van der Lely, 1996), with 
comprehending jokes (Baron-Cohen, 1997a; Reddy, Williams & Vaughan, 2002), irony and 
metaphors (Happé, 1993; MacKay & Shaw, 2004). A recent study reported that adolescents 
with ASD can compute scalar implicatures, but they seem do so without reasoning about the 
interlocutor’s epistemic states (Hochstein, Bale & Barner, 2017). 
The aim of the present study was to further investigate scalar-implicature computation 
and the role of epistemic reasoning by testing typically developing adult students enrolled in 
scientific and humanistic curricula (Experiment 1) and by assessing the presence of autistic 





autistic traits, such as weak Theory-of-Mind skills, are associated both to gender, with males 
scoring higher than females, and to vocational choices, with peoples involved in some 
scientific or technical profession scoring higher than people involved in social professions 
(Baron-Cohen, 1997; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Scott, Bolton & Goodyer, 1997; Baron-
Cohen, Bolton, Wheelwright, Scahill, Short, Mead & Smit, 1998; Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin & Clubley, 2001). If scalar-implicature computation is linked 
to mental state reasoning, then one should expect less pragmatic answers and more logical 
interpretations of underinformative sentences (i.e., sentences including some) in students of 
scientific curricula and in males, than in students of humanities curricula and in females.  
Baron-Cohen (1997) proposed that people with high-functioning autism have weak  
‘folk psychology’ abilities, such as inferring mental states from people’s behavior, but well 
developed ‘folk physics’ abilities, such as inferring the physical causes of natural events.  
These folk physics skills are superior compared to typical population (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & 
Frith, 1986; Sigman, Ungerer, Mundy & Sherman, 1987; Baron-Cohen, 1989; Leekam & 
Perner, 1991; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997).  
Coherently with such proposal, Baron-Cohen et al. (1997) found that fathers and 
grandfathers of children with autism are more likely to be employed in fields such 
engineering and informatics than fathers and grandfathers of children without autism. In line 
with this, Baron-Cohen et al. (1998) showed that students of physics, engineering and 
mathematics have more biological relatives with autism compared to students of literature. 
Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) also found that male students and scientists score higher on autistic 
traits compared to females and to students of humanities and social sciences.  
Thus, Experiment 2 included the ‘Autism-spectrum Quotient’, which is a standardized 
tool to measure the extent of autistic traits in the typical adult population with an average IQ 





interested in the relation between scalar-implicature computation and autistic traits measured 
by the Autism-spectrum Quotient, such as social skills, attention switching skills, attention to 
detail skills, communication skills, imagination skills and, as we proposed, Theory-of-Mind 
skills.  
A strong difference in autistic traits, when comparing two groups, is of course found 
when one compares a group of people with autism with a control group of people without 
such disorder. In our case in which autistic traits in the broader phenotype are assessed, if we 
assume that the computation of scalar implicatures involves some reasoning about mental 
states and this type of reasoning is negatively associated with the presence of autistic traits, 
then we should predict that the amount of pragmatic responses obtained in a scalar-
implicature task would be a function of autistic traits. Moreover, since these traits are also 
associated with different vocational choices, we should also predict that pragmatic responses 
in the scalar-implicature task would vary as a function of the course attended by students.  
 
2. Experiment 1 
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Participants 
Participants were 428 students (277 females, mean age 23.2 years, SD = 4.6) who were 
attending a university in Italy. Students were recruited online and received no compensation 
in exchange for participation. Following Baron-Cohen et al. (2011), participants were divided 
into a ‘science group’ (N = 176, 99 males, mean age 22.8, SD = 3.76) and a ‘humanities 
group’ (N = 252, 199 females, mean age 23.5, SD = 5.12). The science group consisted of 
students enrolled in mathematics (N = 74), chemistry (N = 4), medicine (N = 21), engineering 
(N = 21), physics (N = 19), informatics (N = 19), neuroscience (N = 8) and natural sciences (N 





(N = 201), sociology (N = 5), law (N = 6), literature and philosophy (N = 6), foreign 
languages and literatures (N = 8), economy (N = 15), archeology and architecture (N = 3), 
history (N = 5), and communication sciences and social services (N = 3). Two participants 
were eliminated because they were less than 18 years old. 
 
2.1.2. Materials and procedure 
Participants completed an online Sentence Evaluation Task, that has been used in a 
number of previous studies of scalar implicatures (see Noveck, 2001; Guasti, Chierchia, 
Crain, Foppolo, Gualmini & Meroni, 2005;	Pouscoulous, Noveck, Politzer & Bastide); 
sentences were adapted from Bott and Noveck (2004). On each trial, a sentence with the basic 
form, All/Some X are Y, was presented and participants indicated whether they agreed by 
using the mouse to click on Agree or Disagree displayed below the sentence.  There were 32 
sentences presented, half began with all and half began with some. Of the sentences with all, 
8 were universally true (All-true) and 8 were false or absurd statements (All-false). Of the 
sentences with some, 8 were true (Some-true) and 8 were underinformative (Some-
underinformative). In Table 1 some examples are presented. The complete list of sentences 
translated from Italian is given in Appendix 1.  
 
Table 1. Typologies, examples and expected answers of the sentences used in Experiments 1 
and 2. 
Type Example Sentence Expected Answer 
All-True All snakes are reptiles Agree 
All-False All animals are carnivorous Disagree 
Some-True Some dogs are Labrador Agree 








2.2. Results and discussion 
Agree was a correct response for the 16 true sentences (8 All-true and 8 Some-true), and 
Disagree was a correct response for the 8 All-false sentences. Both the science group and the 
humanities group were highly accurate in responding to all three sentence-types (mean correct 
responses range from 7.85 to 7.97). 
Agree responses to the underinformative sentences were considered logical responses 
whereas Disagree responses were considered pragmatic responses. Consistent with our 
prediction, the number of logical responses in the science group (M = 2.91, SD = 3.58) was 
significantly higher than in the humanities group (M = 2.10, SD = 3.15; Kruskal-Wallis H test, 
χ2 (1) = 5.29, p = .02, d = .20), as is visible in Figure 1.3 Moreover, we found an effect of 
gender: the mean number of logical responses in males was 2.99 (SD = 3.57) and it was 
significantly higher than in females 2.14 (SD = 3.19; Kruskal-Wallis H test, χ2 (1) = 9.13, p = 
.003, d = .28). However, the gender effect on the mean number of logical responses only 
approached significance in the science group (MMALE = 3.35, SD = 3.72; MFEMALE = 2.37, SD = 
3.33; Kruskal-Wallis H test, χ2 (1) = 3.73, p = .05, d = .25), and it was not significant in the 
humanities group (MMALE = 2.32, SD = 3.21; MFEMALE = 2.05, SD = 3.14; Kruskal-Wallis H test, 
χ2 (1) = 1.96, p = .16). 
 
																																																								
3 As an anonymous reviewer noted, the scientific group did not answer ‘logically’ above 
chance in the underinformative utterances. Actually, we never expected that typical adults 
might answer ‘logically’ tout court; indeed, in the literature such behavior is characteristic of 
children before the age of 5 or 6 (for a short review, Chemla & Singh, 2014b: 390-391). Our 
prediction was that, overall, students of scientific disciplines would interpret 







Figure 1. The Science group and Humanities group's mean number of logical responses to 
underinformative statements with Some in Experiments 1 and 2. Error bars are standard errors 
of the mean.   
 
3. Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was aimed at consolidating the results of Experiment 1 by adding a direct 
measure of autistic traits. Thus, Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 except that 
participants also completed the Italian version of Baron-Cohen et al's (2001) Autism-spectrum 




Participants were 198 Italian university students  (89 males, mean age 23.8 years, SD = 
3.08), who were recruited online and were not compensated for their participation. As in 
Experiment 1, Baron-Cohen et al.’s (2011) criteria were used to divide participants into a 



















(N = 108, 37 males, mean age 23.8 years, SD = 3.63). The science group consisted of students 
enrolled in mathematics (N = 38), physics (N = 4), engineering (N = 27), medical and medical 
biotechonologies schools (N = 3) and informatics (N = 18). The humanities group consisted of 
students enrolled in literature and philosophy (N = 22), foreign languages and literatures (N = 
35), communication sciences (N = 6), history (N = 2), sociology (N = 2), art (N = 12), law and 
economy (N = 7), pedagogy and social sciences (N = 22). 
 
3.1.2. Materials and procedure 
Experiment 2 used the materials and procedure for the online Sentence Evaluation Task 
as in Experiment 1. In addition, participants completed Baron-Cohen et al's (2001) Autism-
spectrum Quotient before the scalar-implicature task. The measure consists of 50 questions 
with 10 questions assessing each of five skills/traits: social (e.g., “I prefer to do things with 
others rather than on my own.”), attention switching (e.g., “It does not upset me if my daily 
routine is disturbed.”), attention to detail (e.g., “I usually notice car number plates or similar 
strings of information.”), communication (e.g., “Other people frequently tell me that what 
I’ve said is impolite, even though I think it is polite.”) and imagination (e.g., “If I try to 
imagine something, I find it very easy to create a picture in my mind.”).  
All questions were presented with four answer choices: definitely agree, slightly agree, 
slightly disagree or definitely disagree. Participants had to click on one of the four answers 
and responses were scored as 1 or 0. Half of the questions are created to elicit an “agree” or 
“slightly agree” answer, thus with 1 point assigned if one of those two answers are given; half 
of the questions are created to elicit a “disagree” or “slightly disagree” answer, thus with 1 
point assigned if one of those two answers are given. The higher the obtained score, the 
higher the presence of autistic traits; according to Baron-Cohen et al's (2001), a score of 32+ 





However, obtaining a score of 32+ does not mean the individual actually has an autistic 
disorder. The maximum score is 50, and Baron-Cohen, et al.  (2001) reported an average 
score of 16 for a group typical adults, an average score of 36 for a group with Asperger 
Syndrome or high-functioning autism (HFA), and an average score of 25 for a group of 
winners of the UK Mathematics Olympiad. 
 
 
3.2. Results and discussion 
Both the science and humanities groups were highly accurate in responding to the All-
true, Some-true, and All-false statements (mean correct responses ranged from 7.68 to 7.93). 
Like in Experiment 1, the mean number of logical answers in the science group was 
significantly higher than in the humanities group (Figure 1; MSC. = 2.96, SD = 3.61 vs. MHUM = 
1.55, SD = 2.67; Kruskal-Wallis H test, χ2 (1) = 4.33, p = .04, d = .26). The difference 
between the males and females in the number of logical responses was not significant, MMALE 
= 2.63, SD = 3.46; MFEMALE = 1.83, SD = 2.95, Kruskal-Wallis H test, χ2 (1) = 2.14, p = .14).  
When looking at the AQ, we replicated Baron-Cohen's (2001) data. Figure 2 represents 
the means of the scores obtained in the Autism-spectrum Quotient by males and females in 
the two groups. The science group had a higher average Autism-spectrum Quotient than the 
humanities group (22.84 vs. 19.33, respectively, Kruskal-Wallis H test, χ2 (1) = 18.31, p < 
.001, d = .62). If we consider a score of 32+ as a cutoff for clinically significant levels of 
autistic traits, in our sample no students in the humanities group equaled that high score, but 6 
individuals in the science group did, as it is visible in Figure 3.  In addition, males had a 
higher average Autism-spectrum Quotient than females (22.21 vs. 19.88, respectively, 
Kruskal-Wallis H test, χ2 (1) = 6.81, p = .009, d = .35). Correlation between the participants' 





significant (Pearson r = 0.136, N = 198, p = .06). Such correlation, however, is also 
significant when considering  students in the humanities group separately (Pearson r = .202, N 
= 108, p = .04), but it is not significant when analyzing  students of the scientific group 
separately (Pearson r = -.021, N = 90, p = .85). 
 
 
Figure 2. The mean number of scores obtained in the Autism-spectrum Quotient in 
Experiments 2, divided by science / humanities and males /females. Error bars are standard 





































Figure 3. Frequency of obtained scores in the Autism-spectrum Quotient by the Scientific 
group and the Humanities group.  
 
Thirteen items in the Autism-spectrum Quotient appeared to tap into Theory-of-Mind 







































intentions', ‘When I was young, I used to enjoy playing games involving pretending with 
other children’, ‘I find it difficult to imagine what it would be like to be someone else’. These 
items were distributed across the categories of ‘social skills’, ‘communication skills’ and 
‘imagination skills’. The complete list is given in Appendix 2. Our results show a positive 
relationship between participants’ score for these thirteen Theory-of-Mind items (a high score 
implies low Theory-of-Mind skills) and the number of logical answers for underinformative 
items (r = .165, p = .02). Again, such correlation is not shown when considering only students 
of the science group (Pearson r = -.069, N = 90, p = .52), but remains significant when 
considering only students in the humanities group (Pearson r = .322, N = 108, p = .001). In 
contrast, there was no relationship between the score for the other 47 items and number of 
logical responses (r = .086, p = .226). 
 
4. General discussion 
In Experiments 1 and 2 we found that science students gave less pragmatic answers 
and were more likely to respond logically to scalar-implicature statements than humanities 
students. These findings are consistent with the observation of higher incidence of autistic 
traits among science majors compared to humanities majors (Baron-Cohen, 1997; Baron-
Cohen et al., 1997; Baron-Cohen et al., 1998; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Experiment 2 further 
showed a positive relationship between typical adults' scores on the Autism-spectrum 
Quotient, which measures autistic traits, and the number of logical (as opposed to pragmatic) 
responses to scalar-implicature statements. Finally, there was a trend for lower scores in 
questions most relevant to the assessment of Theory of Mind to be associated with a higher 
number of logical responses.  
Our results suggest that autistic traits are associated with weaker tendencies to draw 





ERP study on autism and pragmatic processing that examined electrophysiological responses 
to evaluate individual differences in the pragmatic processing of underinformative statements 
(Nieuwland, Ditman & Kuperberg, 2010). They found individual variations in N400 
responses based on participants’ pragmatic skills, assessed with the Autism-spectrum 
Quotient. That is, participants with higher Autism-spectrum Quotient scores (and, 
particularly, with higher autistic traits in the Communication subscale) were less sensitive to 
pragmatic violations in underinformative sentences and actually showed no pragmatic N400 
effect. 
However, our results are surprising if one considers the outcomes of previous studies 
showing intact performance of teens and adults with ASD in scalar-implicature computation 
tasks (Chevallier,	Wilson, Happé & Noveck, 2010; Pijnacker, Hagoort, Buitelaar, Teunisse & 
Geurts, 2009. Similar findings were also reported on children with ASD by Su and Su (2015). 
Pijnacker et al. (2009), tested 56 Dutch adults, 28 with ASD (11 participants with high-
functioning autism (HFA) and 17 with Asperger syndrome) and 28 matched controls.4 All 
participants completed a Truth-Value Judgment Task on two different types of scalar terms: 
<some, all> and <or, and>. Pijnacker et al. expected more logical answers from the ASD 
group, due to their Theory-of-Mind deficits. However, they did not find differences in the 
pragmatic answers of the two groups. There was also a positive correlation between the HFA 
group's pragmatic answers and their verbal intelligence. On the other hand, according to 
authors, the verbal-intelligence differences between the two ASD subgroups might be a 
limitation of this study (HFA verbal-int. = 109.8, Aspergers verbal-int. = 122.4). Furthermore, 
authors wrote that it is plausible that Theory of Mind is involved in scalar implicatures 
computation; however, the study did not assess Theory-of-Mind abilities.  
																																																								
4The distinction between Asperger syndrome and high functioning autism made by 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 
2000) has been now abandoned in the last, fifth edition of the DSM (American Psychiatric 





Chevallier et al. (2010) tested 22 ASD adolescents (6 HFA and 16 Aspergers) and 22 
controls on the pragmatic interpretation of underinformative connectives; also in their study 
they did not assess Theory-of-Mind skills. Like Pijnacker et al's (2009) findings, the rate of 
pragmatic interpretations was the same for the ASD and control groups, and there was a 
positive correlation between pragmatic responses and verbal intelligence, but only in the ASD 
group. Finally, Su and Su (2015) tested 28 Mandarin-speaking children (age range 4-15 yo) 
with ASD (12 children with autistic disorder, 15 children with Asperger syndrome and 1 child 
with pervasive developmental disorder) and 28 controls on the computation of 
underinformative sentences with the logical words “some” and “every…or”. ASD children 
didn’t show any delay in the derivation of scalar implicatures compared to the matched 
controls. 
One possibility to explain the inconsistency of our results with previous findings in 
literature on autism is that students of scientific disciplines are trained to focus on the literal 
meaning when performing academic tasks or logic puzzles and this shaped their pragmatic 
reasoning in our task. This explanation is supported by the fact that scores in the AQ, and 
particularly of the items we considered related to Theory-of-Mind skills, correlated with the 
number of pragmatic answers only in the humanities group and not in the scientific group. If, 
at first glance, this result seemed in contrast with our first hypothesis, we should nonetheless 
consider that the main goal of our study was precisely to demonstrate that higher autistic traits 
might lead to more logical answers. If the idea of testing scientific students for such purpose 
may have been relevant in the light of previous studies (Baron-Cohen, 1997; Baron-Cohen et 
al., 1997; Baron-Cohen et al., 1998; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), we now have to consider that 
the fact that students of scientific disciplines are trained to answer logically in academic tests, 
might have leveled the differences, in the implicature task, between participants with higher 





interesting in terms of correlation between autistic traits and pragmatic answers, with less 
pragmatic answers related to higher autistic traits. 
The inconsistency between current and previous results might also be explained by 
considering task differences between our study and the others, since it has been demonstrated 
that, when assessing the understanding or computation of scalar implicatures, sentence-
evaluation tasks are preferable to truth-value judgment tasks. Indeed, if we consider the 
sentence “Some dogs are animals” we cannot judge a logical answer (i.e. true) as incorrect, as 
it is judged in the truth-value judgment task; we should be simply interested in a felicity 
evaluation, which is whether the participant agrees or disagrees with the content of the 
statement.  
Moreover, people in the autistic spectrum are aware of their pragmatic difficulties and 
might use compensatory strategies to deal with their deficit, as suggested by Hochstein et al. 
(2017). This may account in part for the divergence between the findings of previous studies 
on scalar implicatures in ASD patients and the findings of the present study.  Finally, by 
testing typically developing students with a high Autism-spectrum Quotient, we could assess 
a high number of participants, whereas previous studies on populations with autism were 
carried out using smaller samples and it is not yet confirmed whether the same results would 
also be found using larger samples. Further research is, however, needed to fully explain the 
origins of the inconsistency in available evidence and clarify the roles of Theory-of-Mind 




This work has been supported by grants from the Fondazione ONLUS Marica De Vincenzi. 
We are grateful to Prof. Kathleen Eberhard and Prof. Remo Job for reading the proofs and 





Appendix 1 - Statements presented in the Sentence Evaluation Task 
 
All true 
All snakes are reptiles 
All cats are animals 
All men are humans 
All birds are animals 
All cobras are snakes 
All dogs are animals 
All horses are mammals 
All sunflowers are flowers 
 
All false 
All animals are carnivorous 
All cats are dogs 
All stones are singers 
All flowers are professors 
All pens are animals 
All children are grandmothers 
All televisions are cars 
All books are drinks 
 
Some true 
Some dogs are Labrador 





Some flowers are red 
Some cats are Persian 
Some houses are rented 
Some mobiles are iPhones 
Some dresses are blue 
Some lakes are big 
 
Some underinformative 
Some children are humans 
Some salmons are fish 
Some horses are animals 
Some tulips are flowers 
Some dogs are animals 
Some women are humans 
Some giraffes are animals 





Appendix 2 - Items from the Autism-spectrum Quotient that are related to Theory of Mind. 
 
1. I find it easy to “read between the lines” when someone is talking to me. 
2. I know how to tell if someone listening to me is getting bored. 
3. I find it easy to work out what someone is thinking or feeling just by looking at their 
face. (Social skills) 
4. I am good at social chit-chat. 
5. When I was young, I used to enjoy playing games involving pretending with other 
children. 
6. I find it very easy to play games with children that involve pretending. 
7. Other people frequently tell me that what I’ve said is impolite, even though I think it is 
polite. 
8. When I’m reading a story, I find it difficult to work out the characters’ intentions. 
9. I don’ t particularly enjoy reading fiction. 
10. I frequently find that I don’t know how to keep a conversation going. 
11. When I talk on the phone, I’m not sure when it’s my turn to speak. 
12. I am often the last to understand the point of a joke. 








Scalar-Implicature Computation  





























This chapter is based on the following original article:  
 
Mazzaggio, G., & Surian, L. (2018). Scalar implicatures are not generated by 
default: Evidence from second-language oral processing. 












We investigated the effect of a second language (L2) on scalar-implicatures processing. 
To ensure that L2 processing was more effortful than first-language (L1) processing, 
participants were late learners of L2 immersed in an L1 environment and they were presented 
with oral stimuli under time constraints. If scalar-implicatures computation requires cognitive 
effort one should find that people are more likely to compute scalar implicatures in L1 than in 
L2. In two experiments (N = 479), participants were asked to perform a Sentence Evaluation 
Task either in their L1 (Italian) or in their L2 (English or Spanish). The task included 
underinformative statements such as “Some dogs are animals” that, if interpreted in a 
pragmatic way (i.e., “Some but not all dogs are animals”) should be rejected as false. We 
found more rejections when participants listened to L1 rather than L2 utterances. These 













According to the influential theory set out by Paul Grice (1975, 1989), communication 
is a co-operative exchange governed by rational expectations about how a conversation 
should be conducted. Along this line, Grice proposed that participants in a conversation 
expect each other to obey a set of conversational maxims. These maxims constrain the quality 
and quantity of the information to be conveyed, and determine how it should be encoded in an 
utterance. For example, the first maxim of Quantity requires speakers to provide only 
necessary and sufficient information given the purpose of the exchange. This maxim is 
violated by the use of (1a) instead of (1c) in a context in which the speaker knows that all 
students got an A. 
 
(1) a. Some students got an A. 
b. Not all students got an A. 
c. All students got an A. 
 
Inferring (1b) from (1a) is known in the literature as ‘scalar implicature’ (Horn, 1972) and 
arises from some belonging to a set of alternative quantifiers that are semantically (logically) 
more informative. The set creates a quantificational scale <some, most, all> that ranges from 
weak to strong. The quantifier all is stronger/more informative than some, because all ⊆ 
some (all logically entails some). The logical interpretation of some and possibly all is the 
lower-bound interpretation in (2a) whereas the pragmatic interpretation of some but not all is 
the upper-bound interpretation in (2b). The latter arises from listeners assuming that a speaker 
chose the most informative quantifier from the scale. Furthermore, under certain 





in ‘Some students got an A, indeed all of them got an A’.  
 
(2) a. ||some|| = λPλQ∃x[P(x)∧Q(x)] 
b. ||some|| = λPλQ∃x[P(x)∧Q(x)] ∧ ¬∀x [P(x) → Q(x)] 
 
Apart from quantifiers, among these scales Horn identified connectives (<or, and>), 
adverbs (<sometimes, often, always>), verbs (<to think, to believe, to know>), modals (<may, 
must>), numerals (<zero, one, two, etc.>), where the use of the weaker term in the scale 
invites the listener to infer that the stronger one does not hold; for example, in (3) we can 
assume (b) from (a), and (d) from (c). 
 
(3) a. I will bring salty or sweet food at the party. 
b. I will not bring both salty and sweet food at the party. 
c. I think I left my mobile at home. 
d. I do not know for sure if my mobile is at home. 
 
How we compute scalar implicatures and whether this process is costly in terms of 
cognitive resources is under debate, with two main approaches making different predictions: 
the default models and the non-default models. According to the default models, such as those 
proposed by Horn (1972) and by Levinson (2000), the pragmatic interpretation is automatic 
and the ‘default’ meaning: “default means that relatively weak terms prompt the inference 
automatically […] Also, a scalar inference can be cancelled. If this happens, it occurs 
subsequent to the production of the scalar term.” (Bott & Noveck, 2004, p. 439). In other 





immediately and always interpret it with its upper-bound interpretation some but not all. In 
Levinson’s (2000) terms, such interpretations is automatically driven by the Q heuristic “what 
isn't said, isn't” and if the more informative all had not been said, it does not hold.  
In contrast, the non-default models, such as those proposed by Carston (1998) and by 
Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995) claim that the logical interpretation sometimes can perfectly 
satisfy the hearer in terms of sentence interpretation and this without particular effort; on the 
other hand, under specific, context-bound situation the hearer might require a more 
informative interpretation: this pragmatic enrichment may be achieved by means of an 
effortful cognitive process. 
Many studies addressing the scalar-implicature debate (among them, Bott & Noveck, 
2004; De Neys & Schaeken, 2007; Guasti, Chierchia, Crain, Foppolo, Gualmini, & Meroni, 
2005; Marty & Chemla, 2013; Noveck, 2001; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003; Pouscoulous, 
Noveck, Politzer, & Bastide, 2007) have investigated whether deriving scalar implicatures is 
cognitively demanding. In particular, the focus has been on looking at reaction times during 
scalar-implicatures computation and considering whether resource-demanding contexts and/or 
a paucity of cognitive resources (e.g., working memory load) prevent or reduce pragmatic 
interpretations. Several studies have investigated these effects using populations for which 
linguistic competence is deemed not fully developed, i.e. children and L2 speakers. 
Studies on young children demonstrated that they, more often than adults, accept the 
logical (weaker) term in a context where the stronger term would be more appropriate, 
supporting the conclusion that the pragmatic interpretation is not automatic (Braine & 
Rumain, 1981; Chierchia, Crain, Guasti, Gualmini, & Meroni, 2001; Huang & Snedeker, 
2009b; Noveck, 2001; Smith, 1980). However, children’s pragmatic interpretations increase 
under particular task conditions and within clearer contexts (Guasti et al., 2005; Papafragou & 





could result from an immature pragmatic competence (Noveck, 2001), from domain-related 
general cognitive limitations (Reinhart, 1999), from limitations in their lexical knowledge, 
preventing the access to relevant lexical scales (Lexical Account: Barner, Brooks, & Bale, 
2011; Chierchia et al., 2001; Foppolo, 2007), and from difficulties in understanding the 
difference between 'appropriate' and 'true' (Miller, Schmitt, Chang, & Munn, 2005; 
Papafragou & Musolino, 2003; Papafragou & Tantalou, 2004).  
Studies on adults’ performance on scalar implicatures focused on the cognitive cost of 
their derivation and on whether scalar-implicatures interpretations are processed in a longer 
time. Many studies found that pragmatic interpretations are indeed associated with increased 
cognitive effort and a longer processing time (Bott & Noveck, 2004; Breheny, Katsos, & 
Williams, 2006; Degen & Tanenhaus, 2011; Dieussaert,Verkerk, Gillard, & Schaeken, 2011; 
Huang & Snedeker, 2009a; Noveck & Posada, 2003; Politzer-Ahles & Gwilliams, 2015; 
Tomlinson, Bailey, & Bott, 2013). In a study of Bott and Noveck (2004), when participants 
were explicitly instructed to interpret some in a pragmatic way they encountered more 
difficulties compared to participants who were told to interpret it in a logical way, with the 
difficulty reflected in slower as well as less successful responses. This latter study also tested 
reaction times, predicting that the manifestation of a cognitive effect (e.g. an implicature) 
depends on the cognitive resources available. They manipulated the resources available to the 
participants (3000 versus 900 milliseconds to respond). The prediction was that there should 
be more pragmatic responses in the long condition compared to the short condition. Data 
confirmed the prediction; an increase of 16% in pragmatic answers was found when more 
time was available. When participants had less cognitive resources available, less scalar 
implicatures were computed. By contrast, responses to the control sentences did not 
significantly vary between conditions. Their results seem to support the idea that pragmatic 





Chemla (2013) and by De Neys and Schaeken (2007), even if conflicting results have been 
found where contextual support led to no differences in terms of reaction times (Grodner, 
Klein, Carbary, & Tanenhaus, 2010). 
Recently, a new stream of research on the cost of scalar-implicatures computation 
focused on the performance of bilinguals. L2 processing might be a useful experimental 
ground for the theoretical debate, for two main reasons: on the one hand, L2 learners might be 
slower when they have to process their L2 and this processing is more effortful if they are not 
balanced bilinguals (Cummins, 1977); on the other hand, balanced bilinguals might show 
cognitive strengthening compared to monolinguals (Bialystok, Craik, Green, & Gollan, 2009). 
While most	of available data from both children and adults show that pragmatic implicatures 
are costly to make, evidence on bilinguals is more mixed. Some recent studies report no 
differences between L1 and L2 processing in pragmatic answers for scalar implicatures 
(Antoniou & Katsos, 2017; Antoniou, Veenstra, Kissine, & Katsos, 2018; Dupuy, Stateva, 
Andreetta, Cheylus, Déprez, Henst, Jayez, Stepanov, & Reboul, 2018; Syrett, Austin, 
Sanchez, Germak, Lingwall, Perez-Cortes, Arias-Amaya, & Baker, 2016; Syrett, Lingwall, 
Perez-Cortes, Austin, Sánchez, Baker, Germak, & Arias-Amaya, 2017).  
On the contrary, other studies found an increase in pragmatic answers by testing scalar 
implicatures in both early bilingual children (Siegal, Matsuo, Pond, & Otsu, 2007) and 
bilingual adults (Slabakova, 2010; Snape & Hosoi, 2018). Puzzlingly, explanations for such 
results were attributed to both increased cognitive skills (i.e., bilinguals give more pragmatic 
answers because to compute implicatures is costly and they have more cognitive resources), 
in line with the non-default models, and to decreased processing resources (i.e., bilinguals 
give less logical answers because implicatures are the default answers and they don’t have 
enough resources to cancel them), in line with the default models.  





Slabakova (2010) asked English monolinguals and Korean-English bilinguals that were living 
in the USA to judge the acceptability of underinformative English sentences that included 
'some'. In addition, a group of native Korean speakers performed the judgment task with 
materials translated into Korean. In the first experiment, participants were presented with 40 
sentences without context (8 true with all, 8 false with all, 8 felicitous with some, 8 
infelicitous with some, and 8 fillers) and were asked to decide whether they agreed or 
disagreed with each sentence. Target sentences were of the form of ‘Some Xs have Ys’, like 
in ‘Some elephants have trunks’. In the second experiment, the author provided participants 
with a context to make their decision. In both experiments, bilinguals chose the pragmatic 
interpretation more often than English monolinguals and more often than the Korean speakers 
performing the task in Korean. According to Slabakova, these findings support the default 
models: since, by hypothesis, bilinguals have less cognitive resources at disposal to perform 
the task, an increase of pragmatic responses suggests they are automatic and easily available. 
However, this explanation may not be viable. On the one hand, the bilingual participants were 
categorized as having intermediate to high English proficiency by their TOEFL scores upon 
admission to a U.S. university, all were living in the U.S., and they used English daily at the 
time of the study. As Bouton (1992) demonstrated, non-native speakers’ computation of 
scalar-implicatures improves, reaching the native-speakers’ competence after 4 ½ years of 
living in the L2 foreign country. On the other hand, Korean has two words that could be 
translations of English ‘some’: etten and ilbu. Slabakova used etten because – according to 
native Korean speakers – it is closer to the English some. Thus, the increase in pragmatic 
responses may have been brought about by the asymmetry between the participants’ native 
language and their L2 with respect to the quantifier. Given this state of affairs, it would be 
useful to investigate whether the Korean-English bilinguals’ results can be replicated with 





Our study employed both an L2 with a quantifier-system similar to L1 and an L2 with a 
different system. Italian language (L1) has two different existential quantifiers used with 
countable nouns: qualche that must be used followed by nouns in the singular form and alcuni 
(masculine form) or alcune (feminine form) that must be followed by plural nouns. In our 
experiment we tested the form alcuni/e, the most commonly used form in Italian experiments 
on scalar implicatures (e.g., Guasti et al., 2005). As L2 we tested either English (Experiments 
1 and 2), a language with only one form corresponding to the Italian qualche and alcuni, i.e. 
some or Spanish (Experiment 2), a language that, like Italian, has two different terms, unos 
and algunos (for a detailed explanation of differences, see Gutiérrez-Rexach, 2001).  
The present study aimed at providing a more stringent test of the competing models 
(i.e., default and non-default) by testing oral processing of scalar implicatures in L2 learners. 
All participants were Italian native speakers, living in Italy and learning either English or 
Spanish as their L2. We decided to test late L2 learners that were living in their mother tongue 
country because this made their L2 processing more effortful than L1 processing (Andreou & 
Karapetsas, 2004; Cummins, 1977; Sampath, 2005). In addition, differently from other 
studies on bilinguals, our procedure imposed a time limit for interpreting sentences, thereby 
adding to the resource demands of the task. We assumed that participants in L2 conditions 
should be under a greater cognitive load, due to their weaker linguistic competence paired 
with time constraints and oral processing, compared to the participants in the L1 condition. 
Therefore, if the pragmatic interpretations are the non-default interpretations of 
underinformative utterances, they should be more frequent in the L1 than in the L2 group.  
 







Participants were 86 Italian university students (69 women, mean age 22.0 years, SD = 
4.35). They were divided into two groups: the L1 group (N = 31, 6 men, mean age 23.4 years, 
SD = 6.78) has been tested in their native language (Italian) and the L2 group (N = 55, 25 
women, mean age 21.1 years, SD = 1.53) has been tested in a non-native language (English). 
Based on an assessment of level of English proficiency by the University Language Centers 
(according to the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages), the L2 group 
was divided into a low proficiency group (N = 8) at the A1-A2 level, an intermediate-low 
group (N = 24) at the B1 level, an intermediate-high group (N = 17) at the B2 level and a high 
group (N = 6) at the C1 level. Participants were not simultaneous bilinguals. 
 
2.1.2. Materials and procedure 
The materials consisted of 32 English sentences and their translated Italian equivalents 
(Appendix 1). Half of the sentences began with the quantifier some and half began with the 
quantifier all. Eight of the sentences with some were true (e.g., Some dogs are Labradors) and 
8 were underinformative (logically true but pragmatically false, e.g., Some children are 
humans). Eight of the sentences with all were universally true (e.g., All snakes are reptiles) 
and 8 were universally false or absurd (e.g., All animals are carnivorous). A proficient 
Italian-English bilingual digitally recorded the English and Italian sentences. 
The recorded sentences were presented in a sentence evaluation task using PowerPoint 
software running on a laptop computer. On each trial, a sentence was played and participants 
indicated whether they agreed or disagreed with it by marking “Yes” or “No”, respectively, 
on the corresponding number on a printed form. The participants had three seconds to 
produce their response before the recording on the next trial would be played. The English 
sentences were presented to the L2 group, and the Italian sentences were presented to the L1 





with an L1 different from Italian were excluded. 
 
2.2. Results and discussion 
"No" responses to underinformative sentences with some indicated a pragmatic 
interpretation whereas "Yes" responses indicated a logical interpretation. Figure 1 shows the 
mean number of pragmatic interpretations of the underinformative sentences. A one-way 
between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of an L2 on the processing of 
scalar implicatures; there was a significant effect of group (L1 vs. L2) on the number of 
pragmatic answers (F(1, 84) = 4.06, p = .05). In the L2 group, proficiency levels are not 
predictors of the number of pragmatic interpretations (low proficiency – medium proficiency: 
U = 133.5, Z = -.83, p = .40; low proficiency– high proficiency: U = 16, Z = -1.04, p = .30; 
medium proficiency – high proficiency: U = 76, Z = -1.82, p = .07). 
Individual participants were classified as consistent pragmatic or logical responders if 
they rejected as false or accepted as true, respectively, 6 or more underinformative sentences 
(out of 8). All other participants were classified as non-consistent responders (L1 = 6.5%; L2 
= 16%). Figure 2 shows the percentage of each group's participants who were classified as 
consistent pragmatic or logical responders. Pragmatic responders were more frequent in the 
L1 (64.5 %) than in L2 group (41%), whereas logical responders were more frequent in the 
L2 group that in the L1 group (43% and 29%, respectively) and this difference approached 
significance: χ2 (1) = 2.93, p = .09, d = .40.  
In true sentences with some or all “Yes” responses were correct, whereas in false 
sentences with all "No" responses were correct. As expected, the L1 group’s accuracy was 
100% for true sentences with some and false sentences with all and was 99.6% for true 
sentences with all.  However, the L2 group’s accuracy was lower for all three types of 






sentences with some and with all was 89.3% and 81.3 %, respectively, and their average 
percentage of correct responses for false sentences with all was 88.2%.	 
	 
Fig 1. Mean number of pragmatic interpretations of the underinformative sentences for the L1 
group and the L2 groups in Experiments 1 (left panel) and 2 (right panel). Error bars are 










































Fig 2. Percentage of participants that responded consistently – pragmatically or logically– in 
the L1 and L2 groups in Experiments 1 and 2. 
3. Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 showed a greater tendency in the L1 group compared to the L2 group to 
choose pragmatic answers in the underinformative items. The aim of Experiment 2 was to 
replicate and extend the results of Experiment 1 by testing not only English as L2, but also 
Spanish – a more similar language to Italian on the quantifiers system. Moreover, the L2 
group participants’ familiarity with some of the nouns in the experimental items was assessed.  
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Participants 
Participants were 393 Italian university students (305 women, mean age 21.9 years, SD 
= 2.52). They consisted of a L1 group (N = 246, 63 men, mean age 20.5 years, SD = 2.67), a 
L2 group tested in English (N = 61, 46 women, mean age 22.5 years, SD = 2.59) and a L2 
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students had participated in Experiment 1. The L2 proficiency was assessed by the University 
Language Centers according to the Common European Framework of Reference for 
Languages. The Italian-English bilinguals consisted of a low-proficiency group (N = 8) with 
an A1-A2 level, a low-intermediate group (N = 29) with a B1 level, a high-intermediate group 
(N =12) with a B2 level, a low-advanced group (N = 9) with a C1 level and a high-advanced 
group (N = 3) with a C2 level. The Italian-Spanish bilinguals consisted of a low-intermediate 
group (N = 31) with a B1 level, a high-intermediate group (N = 50) with a B2 level and a low-
advanced group (N = 5) with a C1 level.  Participants were not simultaneous bilinguals. 
3.1.2. Material and procedure 
The sentences were the same as in Experiment 1 except that they included Spanish 
translation equivalents, which were digitally recorded by a highly proficient Italian-Spanish 
bilingual. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1. In addition, after the task, both 
groups of bilinguals received a list of some of the nouns from the experimental sentences and 
were asked to write their translation equivalents in Italian. Participants had been tested in 
groups at the beginning of language lessons and participants with a L1 different from Italian 
had been excluded.  
 
3.2. Results 
The results of the translation task showed that both bilingual groups were familiar with 
the nouns. The English L2 group correctly translated an average of 16.6 of the 17 nouns (SD 
= 0.71) and the Spanish L2 group correctly translated an average of 14.6 of the 15 nouns (SD 
= 0.67). 
The L1 group and the two L2 groups' mean numbers of pragmatic interpretations of the 





conducted to compare the effect of a L2 on the processing of scalar implicatures; there was a 
significant effect of group (L1 vs. L2Eng vs. L2Spa) on the number of pragmatic answers (F(2, 
390) = 16.69, p < .001). The mean number of pragmatic interpretation was 6.5 for the Italian 
L1 group, 4.8 for the English L2 group, and 5.1 for the Spanish L2 group. Post-hoc 
comparisons using the Tukey HSD test revealed that the number of pragmatic answers in the 
L1 group was significantly higher than in the L2 English group (p < .001) and L2 Spanish 
group (p < .001). There was no significant difference in the pragmatic answers given by the 
two L2 groups (p = .74). We divided L2 participants in three groups based on proficiency 
(i.e., A1-A2 = low proficiency, B1-B2 = medium proficiency, C1-C2 = high proficiency) and 
we compared each group’s mean number of pragmatic answers for the two different L2s: 
there were no differences between the two L2 groups (low proficiencyEng – medium 
proficiencySpa: U = 279.5, Z = -.65, p = .51; medium proficiencyEng – medium proficiencySpa: 
U = 1520.5, Z = -.77, p = .44; high proficiencyEng – high proficiencySpa: U = 22.5, Z = -.80, p 
= .42). Moreover, the differences between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 in the L2 groups’ 
mean numbers of pragmatic interpretations is not significant (χ2 (1) = 2.53, p = .11, d = .23). 
In the L2 groups, proficiency levels did not predict the number of pragmatic interpretations 
(low proficiencyEng – medium proficiencyEng: U = 159, Z = -.14, p = .89; low proficiencyEng – 
high proficiencyEng: U = 40, Z = -.63, p = .53; medium proficiencyEng – high proficiencyEng: U 
= 197.5, Z = -1.04, p = .30; medium proficiencySpa – high proficiencySpa: U = 199, Z = -.07, p 
= .95). 
Individual participants were classified as consistent pragmatic, consistent logical or 
non-consistent responders. There were 27 (11%) non-consistent respondent in L1 and 37 
(25,2%) in L2 (English and Spanish combined). The pragmatic responders were more 
frequent in the L1 group than in L2 group (78% vs. 53%, respectively), whereas logical 





respectively), χ2 (1) = 12.9, p = .0004, d = .40.   
The L1 group exhibited a high level of accuracy in their responses to the other three 
types of sentences, with the average percent correct being 99.1% for the true sentences with 
some, 97.5% for the true sentences with all, and 98.6% for the false sentences with all. The 
L2 groups' accuracy was lower (p < .001). For the true sentences with some, the English L2 
group's average percent correct was 93.6%, and the Spanish L2 group's average percent 
correct was 96.1%.  The average percent correct for the true sentences with all was 87.1% for 
the English L2 group and 91.4% for the Spanish L2 group. The average percent correct for the 
false sentences with all was 95.1% for the English L2 group and 96.2% the Spanish L2 group. 
 
4. General Discussion 
In two experiments, we assessed the oral processing of scalar implicature in L2 
learners, tested either in their L1 (Italian) or in their L2s (English or Spanish). We found that, 
when participants were tested in their L2, they were less likely to derive a pragmatic 
interpretation of underinformative sentences than when they were tested in their L1. On the 
assumption that L2 oral processing, under time constraints, is more resource demanding than 
L1 processing, the decrease in pragmatic interpretations of underinformative sentences can be 
taken as evidence that deriving such pragmatic interpretations is not automatic. 
The current pattern of results is consistent with the non-default models' view of scalar 
implicatures and runs against the alternative default models. According to the non-default 
models, in order to compute a scalar implicature, the listener should execute several steps. 
When interpreting a sentence like “Some Xs are Ys”, first we consider the literal meaning of 
the sentence; then, we generate the more informative-alternative sentence “All Xs are Ys”; 
finally, we negate the more informative alternative in order to strengthen the meaning of the 





have enough time and cognitive resources to go through all those steps, we might be limited 
to a semantic interpretation (i.e. “Some and possibly all Xs are Ys”).  
Some empirical evidence relevant to the evaluation of this computational analysis can 
be found in Marty and Chemla (2013). They compared the number of pragmatic answers in 
underinformative sentences like ‘Some snakes are reptiles’ and in sentences with only, like 
‘Only some snakes are reptiles’. In the case with only the pragmatic interpretation is 
semantically imposed and should not require the extra pragmatic-enrichment step from the 
semantic interpretation to the pragmatic one. Results showed less pragmatic answers in the 
condition with ‘some’ compared to the one with ‘only some’. According to the authors, these 
results are in line with the idea that the pragmatic interpretation is costly to make and that this 
cognitive cost might be related to the decision of deriving the implicature more than to the 
derivation per se. 
 Whilst our results point to a disadvantage of participants while they were tested in 
their L2 rather than L1, another recent study on bilinguals found no differences between 
bilinguals tested in L1 or in L2 (Dupuy et al., 2018). Considering the rate of pragmatic 
answers by bilinguals tested in the previous studies and in the current one, we see the 
following patterns of results: Slabakova found more pragmatic responses in L2 than in L1 (in 
Korean bilinguals); we found the opposite (in Italian bilinguals) and Dupuy et al’s found 
similar rates in L1 and in L2 (in French bilinguals).  
Dupuy and colleagues tested scalar-implicature processing in French adults learning 
English or Spanish as their L2 in two experiments. Participants performed a Truth-Value 
Judgment Task on control items (true all, false all and felicitous some) and on target items in 
which ‘some’ was used in an infelicitous way. Participants were tested in a within-subject 
design (they saw both the L1 and the L2 sentences) or in a between-subject design and in both 





There are two main reasons that may account for the discrepancy between our results 
and Dupuy et al.’s. First, our task was time constrained whereas their was not. Second, we 
assessed processing of oral rather than written stimuli. Thus, processing oral information 
using L2 under time constraints may have exacerbated the difficulty of the task, requiring 
more resources for performing the yes/no evaluation.  
However, time constraints were absent both in Dupuy et al’s and in Slabakova’s studies, 
that also both used written materials. Therefore, those factors cannot account for the 
discrepancies between those two studies. Furthermore, other studies that did not impose time 
constraints failed to replicate Slabakova’s results, reporting no difference in pragmatic 
interpretation between L1 and L2 speakers (Antoniou & Katsos, 2017; Antoniou et al., 2018; 
Dupuy et al., 2018; Syrett et al., 2016; Syrett et al., 2017). These inconsistencies may derive 
from a third factor.  
In order to explain the higher rates of pragmatic answers in L2 in Slabakova’s work, 
another reason that we might take into consideration concerns the nature of participants: 
Slabakova's bilinguals were immersed in an L2 environment and they daily used their L2 
more often than their L1. Thus, it is likely than the L2 processing in her bilinguals was as 
automatic as L1 processing. Considering our study and the studies that found no differences 
between L1 and L2 processing, we might speculate that immersion probably played a more 
important role than participants’ proficiency (Fortune, 2012). Accordingly, when Bouton 
(1992) tested bilingual students on scalar implicatures immediately after their arrival in the 
USA and then after 4 years and a half, he found a great improvement in their performance. 
Indeed, Cummins’ Threshold Hypothesis (1977; 1978; see also Ardasheva, Tretter, & Kinny, 
2012; Farrell, 2011; Green, 1986; Karapetsas & Andreou, 2004; Ricciardelli, 1992; Sampath, 
2005) shows how only balanced bilinguals display the cognitive advantages firstly theorized 





The fact that Slabakova's bilinguals were more likely to derive a pragmatic 
interpretation in their L2 than in their L1 may reflect such general metacognitive advantage 
that proficient bilingualism bestows (Adesope, Lavin, Thompson, & Ungerleider, 2010; 
Bialystok & Senman, 2004; Bialystok & Shapero, 2005; Kushalnagar, Hannay, & Hernandez, 
2010; Mezzacappa, 2004; Pelham & Abrams, 2014). Following this line, when bilingual 
children – exposed to two languages every day – have been tested on the detection of 
violations of Gricean maxims, they performed better than monolinguals (Siegal, Surian, 
Matsuo, Geraci, Iozzi, Okumura, & Itakura, 2010). Current results are consistent with 
findings showing that bilingual adults give more logical answers when tested in their L2 than 
in L1 (Costa, Foucart, Hayakawa, Aparici, Apesteguia, Heafner, & Keysar 2014, pp. 4-5). In 
other words, we suggest that the metacognitive advantages only show up in the case of high 
proficiency in L2.  
Now, we compare our results with both the Dupuy et al’s ones and with Slabakova’s 
ones, highlighting the inversion in the pattern of results between our study and Slabakova’s, 
whose design we followed quite closely. On the one hand, if just immersion played a role, we 
should have found no differences between L1 and L2 participants, like for Dupuy et al. On 
the other hand, if the use of time constraints and the oral processing were the only factors in 
play, it is hard to explain the differences between Slabakova’s results and the results of other 
studies that found no differences between L1 and L2. Hence, we suggest that the three factors 
that we mentioned (i.e., the immersion in the L2 environment, the use of oral stimuli and the 
presence of time constraints) might help to make sense of the inconsistency among the 
available results. We suggest that highly proficient immersed bilinguals, because of their 
enhanced cognitive resources, show an increase in pragmatic responses to underinformative 
sentences, whereas bilinguals tested in their L1 environment without time constraints show no 





the scalar implicatures. Finally, bilinguals tested in their L1 environment under time 
constraints show a decrease in pragmatic responses to underiformative sentences, because of 
limited resources that can be allocated to the computation of non-automatic responses.5  
The present results do not allow deciding between competing non-default models on the 
computation of scalar implicatures, such as the Relevance Theory account, discussed in the 
introduction, and the Lexical account (Barner et al., 2011; Foppolo, Guasti, & Chierchia, 
2012). This latter account had been proposed in order to explain children’s difficulties with 
scalar implicatures in spite of preserved pragmatic abilities in other contexts (e.g., numerals, 
non generalized ad-hoc implicatures, e.g., Surian & Job, 1987). In this framework, the 
problems with scales - such as quantifiers – are a consequence of limitations in representing 
lexical items as members of a psychological scale. Thus, one may propose that the logical 
interpretation of underinformative sentences results from difficulty with accessing the <some, 
all> scale. Applying this account to our results, one needs to assume either (or, possibly, both) 
of two viewpoints. For the majority of our participants fluency in L2 was not very high and 
we may thus assume that their mastering of the <some, all> scale was not optimal: non-
ceiling performances in control sentences point to this possibility. Thus, access to the <some, 
all> scale might have been affected by limitations on the representations of the comprising 
items. The second interpretation rests on the time-constraints factor. So, it might be the case 
that reduced time in our study might have prevented L2 participants from accessing the scale 
in an optimal way, i.e. fully exploiting their knowledge about the scale. If we further assume 
that the items more directly accessible were also the more easily represented and available, 
this may be seen as a special case of the non-default model. Further research is needed to 
adjudicate between different non-default models (e.g. Relevance Theory and Lexical 
accounts); a main focus should be on oral processing of scalar implicatures with participants 
																																																								
5 We are greatful to Prof. Remo Job for helping us improving the paper with the proposal of this account to 





immersed in a L2 environment, with or without time constraints.  
In conclusion, our experiment brings new data to the study of scalar implicature 
computation in bilinguals by comparing L1 and L2 oral processing with time constraints. In 
both experiments, we found that pragmatic responses were more frequent in L1 than in L2 
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Appendix 1 - Statements presented in the Sentence Evaluation Task 
 
All true 
English (L2) Spanish (L2) Italian (L1) 
All snakes are reptiles Todas las serpientes son 
reptiles 
Tutti i serpenti sono rettili 
1. All cats are animals Todos los gatos son animales Tutti i gatti sono animali 
2. All men are humans Todos los hombres son 
personas 
Tutti gli uomini sono persone 
3. All birds are animals Todos los pájaros son 
animales 
Tutti gli uccelli sono animali 
All cobras are snakes Todas las cobras son 
serpientes 
Tutti i cobra sono serpenti 
All dogs are animals Todos los perros son 
animales 
Tutti i cani sono animali 
All horses are mammals Todos los caballos son 
mamíferos 
Tutti i cavalli sono 
mammiferi 








English (L2) Spanish (L2) Italian (L1) 
All animals are carnivorous Todos los animales son 
carnívoros 
Tutti gli animali sono 
carnivori 
4. All cats are dogs Todos los gatos son perros Tutti i gatti sono cani 
All stones are singers Todas las piedras son 
cantantes 
Tutte le pietre sono cantanti 
All flowers are professors Todas las flores son 
profesoras 
Tutti i fiori sono professori 
All pens are animals Todos los lápices son 
animales 
Tutte le matite sono animali 
All children are 
grandmothers 
Todas las niñas son abuelas Tutte le bambine sono nonne 
All televisions are cars Todos los televisores son 
coches 
Tutte le televisioni sono 
automobili 













English (L2) Spanish (L2) Italian (L1) 
1. Some dogs are Labrador Algunos perros son Labrador Alcuni cani sono Labrador 
Some children are blonde Algunos niños son rubios Alcuni bambini sono biondi 
Some flowers are red Algunas flores son rojas Alcuni fiori sono rossi 
Some cats are Persians Algunos gatos son Siameses Alcuni gatti sono Persiani 
Some houses are rented Algunas casas son altas Alcune case sono affittate 
Some mobiles are iPhones Algunos teléfonos son 
iPhones 
Alcuni cellulari sono iPhone 
Some dresses are blue Algunos vestidos son azules 1. Alcun  Alcuni vestiti sono blu 








English (L2) Spanish (L2) Italian (L1) 
Some children are humans Algunos niños son personas Alcuni bambini sono persone 
5. Some salmons are fish Algunos salmones son peces Alcuni salmoni sono pesci 
Some horses are animals Algunos caballos son 
animales 
Alcuni cavalli sono animali 
Some tulips are flowers Algunos tulipanes son flores Alcuni tulipani sono fiori 
Some dogs are animals Algunos perros son animales Alcuni cani sono animali 
Some women are humans Algunas mujeres son 
personas 
Alcune donne sono persone 
Some giraffes are animals Algunas jirafas son animales Alcune giraffe sono animali 












Chapter 5.  
 
The cost of scalar implicature: inference or infelicity?  














This chapter is based on the following original article:  
Mazzaggio, G., Reboul, A., Caretta, C., Darblade, M., Van der Henst, J., 
Cheylus, A., & Stateva, P. (2018). The cost of scalar implicature: inference or 
infelicity? 












Whether there is a cost in deriving scalar implicatures (e.g., to interpret some as some but not 
all, instead of the logical interpretation some and possibly all) is still under a heated debate, 
with two principal accounts: the neo-Gricean accounts do not predict a cost for the pragmatic 
interpretation, while the post-Gricean accounts do. Since Bott & Noveck (2004), the debate 
has turned to the experimental field with a majority of works that seem to support the post-
Gricean view. The present study addressed the topic of the cost of scalar-implicatures 
computation through three experiments. Experiment 1 (N = 57) had the goal of replicating 
Bott and Noveck’s Sentence Evaluation Task in Experiment 3; we replicated their results, 
finding longer reaction times when participants interpreted pragmatically (i.e., disagree) 
underinformative sentences like ‘Some elephants are mammals’. In Experiment 2 (N = 58), 
we obtained similar results, with the use of pictures and sentences containing pseudo-words 
(e.g., Some blicks are mammals), in order to have identical sentences in felicitous and 
infelicitous some conditions. With this experiment we excluded the possibility that a greater 
cost is due to greater difficulty in moving up in conceptual hierarchies, compared to moving 
down. Experiment 3 (N = 54) was a Sentence Evaluation task with a context; we used 
recorded self-paced reading, RTs, and eye-tracking techniques to look into the process of 
computation more in depth. Results showed that when there is support from the context, the 
cost of computation disappears. Overall, our results seem to support a post-gricean view of 















Grice (1975; 1989) introduced the notion of an implicature from examples such as the 
following:  
 
(1) The pianist played some Mozart sonatas.  
 
Grice noted that some can either be interpreted semantically (i.e., logically), in which case it 
means some and possibly all, or pragmatically, in which case it means some but not all. This 
provides (1) with two different interpretations:  
 
(2) The pianist played some and possibly all Mozart sonatas. [semantic interpretation] 
(3) The pianist played some but not all Mozart sonatas. [pragmatic interpretation] 
 
Implicatures like (1) (interpreted as in (3)) are called scalar implicatures. One of the most 
central debates in semantics and pragmatics for the past thirty to forty years has concerned 
how one goes from (1) to (3). There are two main families of theories, those that see the 
process as essentially linguistic (with two versions: lexical (see Levinson 2000) and 
grammatical (see Chierchia 2013)) and those that see it as essentially pragmatic and context-
based (see Sperber & Wilson, 1995; Carston, 2002). The first type of theories is called neo-
Gricean, while the second is called post-Gricean. Beyond the theoretical debate, since the 
beginning of the twenty-first century and spurted by pioneering work by Noveck (2001) and 
Bott and Noveck (2004), the debate has shifted to the experimental field and centered on the 
notion of cost. Very roughly, the neo-Gricean accounts predict that the semantic interpretation 
should be costlier than the pragmatic interpretation, while the post-Gricean accounts predict 





 The present study tries to address the problem of the cost of scalar implicatures. The 
cost of scalar implicatures was first evidenced in a paper by Bott and Noveck (2004) where 
they carried out four experiments to test the cognitive cost of deriving the implicature. In all 
four experiments, they used categorical sentences, targeting all (true, false, absurd) and some 
(infelicitous, felicitous, absurd). The main measures were made on the infelicitous some 
condition, of which an example is “Some elephants are mammals”. Participants were given 
the choice between two responses, true and false. The true response corresponds to the 
semantic interpretation of the sentence (Some and maybe all elephants are mammals), while 
the false response corresponds to the pragmatic interpretation of the sentence (Some but not 
all elephants are mammals). The two measures were the rate of pragmatic versus semantic 
responses and the reaction times (RTs) between the presentation of the sentence and the 
response.  
We would like to outline that one of the main problem when using a sentence 
evaluation task regarding scalar implicatures is that, short of giving participants instructions 
on how to interpret some, there is no “correct” answer in the infelicitous some condition. The 
pragmatic and the semantic answers are both correct. This is why experimentalists have 
ignored the felicitous some condition. There, while the majority of participants evaluate the 
sentence positively, there is no way of knowing whether the participants choose the pragmatic 
interpretation (Some but not all mammals are elephants) or the semantic interpretation (Some 
and possibly all mammals are elephants). Both are indeed true. It is only in the infelicitous 
some condition that, while both true and false answers are correct, the pragmatic 
interpretation clearly corresponds to false while the semantic interpretation clearly 
corresponds to true.  
In the first experiment, participants completed two different experimental sessions. In 





semantic interpretation), and in the other to interpret some as some but not all (i.e., to go for 
the pragmatic interpretation). The results were interpreted relative to the instructions, i.e, 
relative to whether the participants had followed the instruction for the given experimental 
session: correct responses for the pragmatic-interpretation experimental session were false, 
while correct responses for the semantic-interpretation experimental session were true. The 
authors compared the rate of correct answers in the pragmatic condition (60%) and in the 
semantic condition (90%), and the difference was significant. There was also a difference in 
RTs: to answer correctly in the pragmatic condition took significantly longer than to answer 
correctly in the semantic condition. Additionally, in both conditions, the rate of correct 
answers and the RTs for the control conditions (felicitous some, absurd some, true all, false 
all, absurd all) were similar to the correct answers to infelicitous some in the semantic 
condition and significantly different from those in the pragmatic condition. This first result 
seems to support the notion that deriving scalar implicatures is a costly cognitive process as, 
even when instructed to do so, participants have more difficulty sticking to the instructions 
and take longer than when instructed to interpret some semantically. In the second 
experiment, Bott and Noveck addressed whether the results of Experiment 1 could be 
explained by a response bias toward true and were able to show that this was not the case.  
Experiment 3 is the experiment we are especially interested in here. Participants were 
presented with the same sentences as before and again had to say whether the sentences were 
true or false, but they received no instruction as to how to interpret some. As before, the 
measures were rates of pragmatic vs. semantic answers and RTs. The comparison was made 
between false (pragmatic) and true (semantic) answers in the infelicitous some condition for 
participants who gave both types of responses (9 participants who responded exclusively 
pragmatically or semantically were excluded). Pragmatic answers in the infelicitous some 





significantly longer than all control conditions excepting the true all condition. By contrast, 
RTs for the semantic answer were not significantly different from those for the control 
conditions. Finally, the rate of pragmatic answers in the infelicitous some condition was 60%.  
The fourth Experiment was intended to support the notion that deriving scalar 
implicatures is costly by making participants give their responses under time constraints. 
Participants were divided into two groups, one of which was instructed (and trained) to 
answer in short time lag (900 ms; Short condition) and the other of which was instructed and 
trained to answer in a long time lag (3s; Long condition). The comparison was between the 
rates of semantic vs. pragmatic answers in the Short and in the Long conditions. Participants 
in the Short condition gave 72% of semantic answers, significantly more than they did in the 
Long condition (57%). Again, this result, showing that time constraints directly impact the 
rate of semantic vs. pragmatic answers, argues for a specific cost in deriving scalar 
implicatures. 
  Bott and Noveck’s paper was extremely influential in the debate between neo- and 
post-Gricean accounts of scalar implicatures and was interpreted as supporting the post-
Gricean accounts. It was nevertheless the object of intense controversies, which are still active 
today. Part of the controversies lies in alternative ways to test cost, which have given partially 
contradictory results. To begin with those that argue for cost, De Neys and Schaeken (2007), 
using an interference paradigm where the same task as in Bott and Noveck’s third Experiment 
was performed under a visual memory load, were able to show that in the load condition, the 
rate of pragmatic answers was significantly lower than in the control condition. De Neys and 
Schaeken also compared RTs for pragmatic answers between the load and the control 
conditions and found that they were significantly longer in the load than in the control 
condition. There was no such impact on the RTs for semantic answers. Both of these results 





semantic interpretation. Another alternative test for cost used the visual world paradigm. 
Participants had to choose, among four candidate pictures (one corresponding to the 
pragmatic interpretation, one to the semantic interpretation, two distractors), which best 
corresponded to the sentence. The measures were both the rates of pragmatic interpretations 
and RTs. Here, the results are mixed, with some studies showing no significant differences 
between the pragmatic and the semantic interpretations (Grodner, Klein, Carbary, & 
Tanenhaus, 2010; Breheny, Ferguson, & Katsos, 2013a; 2013b; Foppolo & Marelli, 2017) 
and some showing significantly longer RTs for pragmatic interpretations (Huang & 
Snedecker, 2009a). But the main questions have come from queries as to how to interpret Bott 
and Noveck’s results. Indeed alternative interpretations have been proposed.  
First of all, based not on Bott and Noveck (2004), but on Noveck (2001), Guasti, 
Chierchia, Crain, Foppolo, Gualmini and Meroni (2005) have argued that some positive 
answers in his third experiment might in fact correspond to pragmatic rather than to semantic 
interpretations. In that experiment, which tested both children and adults, Noveck used semi-
categorical sentences, e.g., Some elephants have trunks. As Guasti et al. noted, some 
participants might have constructed a complement set of trunkless elephants, thus verifying 
the sentence with a pragmatic interpretation of some. While it is of course much less clear 
whether participants in Bott and Noveck’s experiments, where categorical sentences were 
used, could have built complement sets of non-mammal elephants, it cannot be excluded, and 
if this is the case, some apparently semantic responses in the infelicitous some conditions of 
their four experiments might turn out to correspond to pragmatic felicitous interpretations.  
Additionally, while Bott and Noveck interpreted their results in terms of a higher 
cognitive cost induced specifically for the derivation of the implicature, other interpretations 
are possible. For instance, participants who give pragmatic answers might first try and fail to 





to longer RTs. It might also be the case that the delay in the production of pragmatic 
sentences is due to the difficulty of understanding upper-bound sentences, leading to a trade-
off between speed and accuracy. The idea is that the pragmatic interpretation would be 
accessed quickly but that ascertaining the truth-value of the sentence would be a time-
consuming procedure. 
These hypotheses have been investigated in two studies, the first one (Bott, Bailey, & 
Grodner, 2012) using a very similar sentence verification task with categorical sentences to 
that used in Bott and Noveck (2004). Bott et al. used a speed accuracy trade-off procedure, 
allowing to separate speed and accuracy (truth value assessment). In their three experiments, 
participants had to respond when they heard an auditory cue at different time lags after the 
presentation of the sentence. In the first experiment, participants were separated into two 
groups following the same procedure as in Bott and Noveck’s first two experiments, thus 
allowing to distinguish correct and incorrect answers to the infelicitous some condition. This 
allowed Bott et al. to compute the intercept (the earliest point at which the rate of correct 
answers in the infelicitous some condition departed from chance). The results showed that the 
intercept occurs earlier in the semantic than in the pragmatic condition, suggesting that the 
longer RTs for pragmatic interpretation are not a speed-accuracy trade-off. In Experiment 2, 
Bott et al. compared infelicitous some with an explicit formulation of the pragmatic 
interpretation (i.e., only some elephants are mammals). Both types of sentences are equally 
complex in terms of meaning, but it is only the some sentences in which the pragmatic 
interpretation is optional. The same procedure as in Experiment 1 was used. Again, the 
intercept for some in the pragmatic condition was delayed relative to the intercept for false 
only some. In the third experiment, Bott et al. compared some in the semantic condition to its 
explicit formulation, i.e. at least some. While the results for this third experiment are less 





between the results of Experiment 3 and those of Experiment 2 shows that the difference in 
Experiment 2 is significantly larger than the difference in Experiment 3. This supports the 
conclusion that the pragmatic interpretation of some is more costly than its semantic 
interpretation.  
Another paper, using a different paradigm, based on the interference task used by De 
Neys and Schaeken (2007), addresses again the accuracy problem, i.e., the possibility that the 
longer RTs for the pragmatic interpretation might be due to checking the truth-value of the 
pragmatic interpretation, rather than accessing the pragmatic interpretation per se. Marty and 
Chemla (2013) compared the rate of false responses for infelicitous some and to false only 
some categorical sentences in two conditions of visual memory interference: high load and 
low load. They found that the rate at which participants produced the false answer for only 
some was not significantly different in the two conditions. By contrast, it was significantly 
different for the infelicitous some sentences. Marty and Chemla, following the alternative-
based account proposed by, e.g., Chierchia (2013), propose a two-step account of the 
derivation of scalar implicatures: the first step is a decision procedure on whether or not to 
derive the implicature; the second step corresponds to the generation of a set of alternatives 
and to the exclusion of those alternatives. While the interpretation of some and the 
interpretation of only some both involve the second step, it is only the interpretation of some 
that also involves the first step. On this basis, Marty and Chemla interpret their results as 
showing that the cost of deriving the implicature lies only in the first, decisional, step, and not 
in the second, interpretative step.  
This, however, suggests that the problem might lie in the infelicity of the crucial 
experimental conditions in all these studies using sentence evaluation tasks, rather than in 
anything else. This, by the way, seems to agree with the results of studies using contexts that 





infelicitous some sentences (see Dupuy et al. 2016). Such a view is also encouraged by Bott 
and Noveck’s (2004) Experiment 3. As explained above, authors generally focus on the 
infelicitous some conditions and ignore felicitous some conditions, that are considered as 
control conditions, on a par with true and false all. However, this is a debatable decision: 
while it is true that it is only in the infelicitous some condition that the pragmatic answers can 
be distinguished from the semantic answers (with the proviso indicated above that some 
positive answers might correspond to pragmatic felicitous interpretations), it might still be 
interesting to look at RTs in the felicitous some condition. So, let us return to the results of 
Bott and Noveck’s third experiment, and more specifically to the RTs for the different 
conditions:  
 
Figure 1: RTs in Bott and Noveck’s Experiment 3 





As can be seen, responses to sentences of type T2, corresponding to felicitous some, are not 
only significantly faster than the pragmatic interpretations for infelicitous some, they are as 
fast (and even slightly faster) than the semantic interpretations in that condition. Remember 
that felicitous some sentences are sentences such as Some mammals are elephants. This 
makes it slightly difficult to suppose that participants would choose not to interpret some as 
some but not all. While it is possible that some participants interpret felicitous some sentences 
semantically, it is unlikely that all participants do.  
But, on the reasonable assumption that some participants at least interpret some 
pragmatically in the felicitous some condition, this leaves us with something of a mystery: 
why are responses to felicitous some so much faster than pragmatic answers in the infelicitous 
some condition? Here, there are two answers, given what we saw above. The first one, 
following Marty and Chemla, is that the decision to draw the implicature is much easier to 
take in the felicitous some condition. A second possibility is that it is indeed, as suggested 
indirectly by Guasti et al. (2005), assessing the truth-value of the pragmatic interpretation in 
the infelicitous some condition that is more costly. After all, constructing a complement set 
(which is what verifying the pragmatic interpretation comes to) in the felicitous some 
condition is very easy while it is difficult, if not impossible, in the infelicitous condition. It 
should be noted that these two explanations are perfectly compatible. Indeed, regarding the 
decision step postulated by Marty and Chemla, it seems again easier to decide to draw the 
implicature in the felicitous than in the infelicitous condition. But then one would have to 
conclude that it is the very infelicity of the condition that explains the longer RTs, rather than 
the decision process, the derivation of the implicature, or its verification. If this is the case, it 
might be a good idea to abandon sentence evaluation task for experiments on scalar 
implicatures. An additional indication that this might be a good idea is that in most of the 





Schaeken), the rate of pragmatic vs. semantic answers in the infelicitous some condition is not 
significantly different from chance, hovering between 40 and 60%.  
 
2. The present study 
In the present study, we will present three experiments that aim at clarifying the question of 
the cost of implicatures. The first experiment is basically a replication of Bott and Noveck’s 
(2004) Experiment 3. To our knowledge it has never been replicated before. We aim at 
replicating it, thus showing that there is a cost to the pragmatic answer in the infelicitous some 
condition, while no such cost arises in the felicitous condition. We made a few minor changes 
that are detailed in the Material and Procedure sections in Section 3 below. 
The second experiment aims at avoiding two problems with Bott and Noveck’s 
experimental material. First, as noted by Bott et al. (2012), the infelicitous some sentences all 
had subjects combining some with a noun for a basic category (e.g., some elephants). Equally 
the felicitous some sentences all had subjects combining some with a noun for a super-
ordinate category (e.g., some mammals). This would facilitate the adoption of a systematic 
semantic or pragmatic strategy in the infelicitous condition by allowing participants to 
identify the condition from the start of the sentence. To avoid this problem, Bott et al. added 
another type of sentence, using subjects referring to basic categories with predicates referring 
to subordinate categories, e.g., Some elephants are African. However, there is an additional 
worry with Bott and Noveck’s experimental material that this addition does not solve. It 
might be the case that it is easier to go down in a conceptual hierarchy (from superordinate 
categories such as mammals to basic categories such as elephants) rather than to go up in a 
conceptual hierarchy (from basic to super-ordinate category). This worry receives some 
tentative support from the fact that in Bott and Noveck’s third experiment, the only control 





infelicitous some condition was the true all condition, which corresponds to sentences such as 
All elephants are mammals, going in the same upward direction. Experiment 2 is designed to 
eschew these difficulties, using pseudo-words referring to artificial categories and allowing us 
to use identical sentences in felicitous and infelicitous some conditions.  
Experiment 3 aims at looking more acutely into the process through which participants 
give pragmatic answers in the infelicitous some condition. It uses a sentence-evaluation task, 
but the sentences are not categorical sentences. Participants are presented with a picture and a 
sentence, where the picture verifies or falsifies the sentence. In the infelicitous some 
condition, the picture verifies the semantic interpretation and falsifies the pragmatic 
interpretation. Participants are asked to say whether they think that the sentence is a good 
description of the picture by pressing one of two keys (corresponding respectively to agree 
and disagree). Experiment 3 recorded self-paced reading, RTs, and used eye tracking.  
 
3. Experiment 1 
 
3.1. Participants 
Fifty-seven participants (34 females, mean age = 23.16, sd = 3.23) took part to our 
experiment6. All participants were native French speakers. 
 
3.2. Material 
While this experiment is intended as a replication of Bott and Noveck’s (2004) third 
experiment, and while we mainly used the same materials of the original paper, i.e. we used 
categorical sentences of the type in Table 1 and asked participants to provide Agree/Disagree 
																																																								
6 This study was carried out in accordance with the recommendations of the Comité de 
Protection des Personnes Sud Est II, who gave it its agreement (IRB number: 11263). All 





judgments, there are nevertheless a few important modifications that we describe below. As in 
the original experiment, participants could be presented with sentences that were blatantly 
true (All-True, Some-True and Only-Some true conditions), blatantly false (All-False 
condition) or underinformative (Some-Underinformative condition). We decided not to assess 
participants in the Some-False and in the absurd condition because we believed that those 
categories were not useful for our purpose. Furthermore, we added the Only-Some True 
condition that we considered interesting in light of Marty and Chemla (2013).  
Sentences were of the form “Only some/Some/All Xs are Ys”, where Xs and Ys are 
superordinate/subordinate elements of a natural category: for example, considering the 
“mammal” category (superordinate) we had 9 subordinate exemplars, like the elephants’ one. 
All categories and members of each category are described in Appendix 1. We also decided 
not to use the “Shellfish” category, originally present in Bott and Noveck, and to previously 
test all the exemplars of the other categories to check whether they were easy recognizable as 
part of the corresponding superordinate category. We changed some of the items that had not 
been easily recognized with others more common. Moreover, in the original paper, Bott and 
Noveck asked whether the sentence was True/False but since the underinformative sentence is 
neither “true” nor “false” per se, it is preferable to use a Sentence Evaluation Task than a 
Truth Value Judgement Task. Thus, participants had to choose between Agree and Disagree. 
  
 
Condition Example Sentence Expected Answer 
All-True All elephants are mammals Agree 
All-False All mammals are elephants Disagree 
Some-True 
 








Only Some-True Only some mammals are 
elephants 
Agree 





Table 1. Typologies, examples and expected answers of the sentences used in Experiments 1. 
 
3.3. Procedure 
As in Bott and Noveck, participants were presented with 9 examples of 5 kinds of sentences 
so each participant saw 45 experimental items. The stimuli were randomly generated in the 
same way as the original paper, i.e. from a base of 5 categories and 9 exemplars from each of 
these categories and with each category-exemplar used just once during the experiment. 16 
training sentences (4 for each category: All-true, All-false, Some-True and Some-
Underinformative) and 5 dummy sentences were presented at the beginning of the 
experimental session to train participants.  
Participants sat in front of a computer in a quiet room. At the beginning instructions 
and the training part were presented: each participant then could decide when to start the 
experimental session by pressing the space bar on the keyboard. Before the presentation of 
each sentence participants saw a fixation point on the screen. Words then appeared 
consecutively onto the screen with a gap of 240 ms between each word; then the sentence 
remained on the screen until participants gave their response using the computer keyboard. 








As in Bott and Noveck, we analyze results of choice proportions and RTs. Table 2 shows the 
mean of correct answers for the control items and the mean of logical answers in the 
underinformative condition. Percentages of correct answers for the All true, All false, Some 
true and Only some true conditions are all above 91%. In the underinformative some 
condition, participants gave more pragmatic answers (66.7%) than logical answers (33.3%) 
(Wilcoxon signed rank: V = 402, p = 0.002). 
 
 
Condition Example Sentence Mean sd 
All true All elephants are mammals. 91.6 11.6 
All false All mammals are elephants. 96.1 6.5 
Some true Some mammals are elephants. 94.9 9.6 
Only some true Only some mammals are elephants. 92 11.1 
Underinformative some Some elephants are mammals. 33.3 34.8 
 
Table 2. Mean and standard deviation (sd) of correct answers; for the underinformative 
sentences we considered logical correctness (i.e., agree).  
 
To look for the difference in RTs between the logical answer and the pragmatic answer, we 
analyzed data of participants that had both logical and pragmatic answers in the 
underinformative condition (N = 32 subjects). Figure 2 shows overall results for RTs in all 
conditions.  As in Bott and Noveck, we divided participant’s answers to underinformative 
sentences into logical answer or pragmatic answer, in order to assess whether one kind of 
answer is faster than the other. Particularly, in the original paper the logical answers were 





considered just correct responses for which RTs were > 0.5 s and < 10 s) with items and 
participants as random variables and the combination of condition and answer as fixed factor 
confirmed the significant difference in terms of RTs between the faster logical answer and the 
pragmatic answer (z = 2.74, p = .006). There is no difference in terms of RTs between the 
logical answer in the underinformative condition and the Only some condition (z = -1.41, p = 
.16). There are also no differences in terms of RTs between the logical answer in the 
underinformative condition and the Some true condition (z = -.86, p = .39) and the All true 
condition (z = 1.77, p = .08). The All false condition is slightly faster than the logical answer 
in the underinformative condition (z = 2.02, p = .04). The pragmatic answer in the 
underinformative condition takes longer compared to the Some true (z = 2.70, p = .007), Only 





























































Figure 2. Response time as a function of condition and answer. Values were estimated with a 
log-linear mixed model analysis on 54 participants, correct responses for which RTs were > 
0.5 s and < 10 s, items and participants as random variables and the combination of condition 
and answer as fixed factor. Conditions were abbreviated as follows: AF: all false; AT: all 
true; OS: only some; ST: some true; UN: underinformative. UN agree is compatible with a 
logical interpretation while UN disagree is compatible with a pragmatic interpretation. Error 
bars stand for 95% confidence intervals. 
 
3.5. Discussion  
This study was intended as a replication of Bott and Noveck’s (2004) third experiment, with a 
few modifications (see above, section Materials). Results replicate those of the original work. 
Considering the critical underinformative condition (e.g., Some elephants are mammals), 
participants gave significantly more pragmatic (disagree) than logical answers (agree). 
Moreover, to answer pragmatically required significantly more time (longer RTs) than to 
answer logically, and more time than to answer other control conditions (Some true, Only 
some true, All false, All true). By contrast, when participants answered logically we recorded 
similar RTs compared to the control conditions (Some true, Only some true, All true). In 
conclusion, with this first experiment we confirmed that to derive a scalar implicature is 
costly, as Bott and Noveck did. 
 
4. Experiment 2 





Fifty-eight participants (22 males, mean age = 23.14, sd = 3.20) took part to our experiment.7 
All participants were native French speakers. 
 
4.2. Material 
It was decided to compare two groups who would see the same categorical sentences, but 
relative to two different sets of images. This allowed the introduction of artificial categories 
and of using the same sentences in the some conditions, one of which would be true in the 
pragmatic interpretation (in, e.g., Group 1), while the other would be false in the pragmatic 
interpretation (in, e.g., Group 2). Images introduced the artificial categories by presenting 10 
silhouettes of animals and/or plants (six belonging to a given basic category, four to another 
basic category), which would or not fall under the same superordinate category. All 
silhouettes were tested to check that they were recognizable. The image was accompanied by 
a sentence of the form “Look! Here are Xs” (where Xs was a pseudo-word in French, 
supposed to correspond to the composite artificial category represented on the picture). This 
was followed by the test sentence.  
Here is an example of an image that would verify the pragmatic interpretation for the sentence 
“Some Xs are mammals”:  
																																																								
7 This study was carried out in accordance with the recommendations of the Comité de 
Protection des Personnes Sud Est II, who gave it its agreement (IRB number: 11263). All 






Figure 3: Picture verifying the pragmatic interpretation 
If the picture above was presented to Group 1, Group 2 would see the picture below that 
falsifies the pragmatic interpretation:  
 
Figure 4: Image falsifying the pragmatic interpretation 
Each group saw one version of the picture, which was presented five different times, coupled 
with the following types of sentences:  
 
Some blicks are mammals. (test/control) 





Some mammals are blicks. (filler) 
All blicks are mammals. (control) 
All mammals are blicks. (filler) 
 
There were eight different sets of picture-sentences. Each participant saw 40 such picture-
sentence items and each group saw an equal number of true/false items (respectively of 
infelicitous/felicitous some items).  
 
4.3. Procedure 
Participants sat in front of a computer in a quiet room. At the beginning instructions and the 
training part were presented. Participants saw 8 training sentences with both some and all in 
which the used categories (furniture, vehicles) and pseudo-words were different from the 
experimental session’s ones. Each participant then could decide when to start the 
experimental session by pressing the space bar on the keyboard. The task was a sentence 
evaluation task. At the beginning the image appeared on the screen for 1 second and then a 
sentence introducing the new category was presented (e.g., Look, here are Xs) for 1 second. 
After that, the target sentence appeared progressively (word by word) on the screen, with 
every new word appearing after 240ms and remaining on the screen. After the last word 
appeared participants read the question that stayed until they gave their response using the 
computer keyboard. They didn’t receive any feedback. Response times were measured from 
the appearance of the first word of the target sentence. 
 
4.4. Results 
We decided to exclude from the analysis 16 participants: 1 because the participant asked a 





true and All False control conditions and 4 more to restore an equal number of 21 participants 
in each group. As in Experiment 1, we analyzed results of choice proportions and RTs. In 
Table 3 we present the mean of correct answers for the control items and the mean of logical 
answers in the underinformative condition. It seems that some difficulties had been 
experienced with the Only some false condition (70.8%). In the underinformative condition 
participants gave more logical answers (62.5%) than pragmatic answers (37.5%) (Wilcoxon 
signed rank V = 358.5, p = .025). 
 
 
Condition Example Sentence Mean sd 
All true All blicks are mammals. 91.1 13.3 
All false All blicks are mammals. 92.3 12.9 
All reverse false 
Some true 
Some reverse true 
All mammals are blicks. 
Some blicks are mammals. 







Only some true 
Only some false 
Only some blicks are mammals. 





Underinformative some Some blicks are mammals. 62.5 35 
 
Table 3. Mean and standard deviation (sd) of correct answers; for the underinformative 
sentences we considered logical correctness (i.e., agree).  
 
Further analyses focused on the difference in RTs between answers. To look at differences in 
RTs between the logical and the pragmatic answers in underinfomative sentences, we ran a 





which RTs were > 0.5 and < 10) with items and participants as random variables and the 
combination of condition and answer as fixed factor (Figure 5). The analysis revealed a 
significant difference in terms of RTs between the logical answer and the pragmatic answer (z 
= 3.61, p = .002), with longer RTs for participants that answered pragmatically. Indeed, RTs 
for pragmatic answers are also significantly longer than RTs for all the other conditions, that 
are the All true (z = 4.49, p < .001), All false (z = 5.80, p < .001), All reverse false (z = 4.07, p 
< .001), Some true (z = 4.82, p < .001), Only some true (z = 3.27, p = .004) and Some reverse 
true (z = 4.01, p < .001) conditions, except for the Only some false condition (z = 1.84, p 
=.13). Differently, RTs for logical answers in the underinformative condition do not differ 
from RTs for the other All true (z = .89, p =.46), All reverse false (z = .29, p =.79), Only some 
true (z = -.51, p = .68), Only some false (z = -2.01, p =.09), Some true (z = -1.27, p =.30) and 
Some reverse true (z = -.05, p =.95) conditions, except for the All false condition which is 







Figure 5. Response time as a function of condition and answer. Values were estimated with a 
log-linear mixed model analysis on 42 participants, with correct responses for which RTs 
were > 0.5 s and < 10 s, with items and participants as random variables and the combination 
of condition and answer as fixed factor. Conditions were abbreviated as follows: AF: all false; 
ARF: all reverse false; AT: all true; OSF: only some false; OST: only some true; SI: some 
infelicitous; SRT: some reverse true; ST: some true. SI agree is compatible with a logical 
interpretation while SI disagree is compatible with a pragmatic interpretation. Error bars stand 
for 95% confidence intervals. 
 
4.5. Discussion  
Considering the longer RTs when participants answer sentences like “Some elephants are 
mammals” compared to “Some mammals are elephants”, with this second experiment we had 




















































implicatures may be due to a greater difficulty in moving up in conceptual hierarchies (e.g., 
elephants > mammals), than in moving down (mammals > elephants). Thanks to the use of 
pseudo-words we created a Sentence Evaluation Task in which the Some-sentences were the 
same in the true and underinformative conditions (e.g. Some blicks are mammals). Again, 
results show a cost when computing pragmatic interpretations in underinformative sentences, 
compared to both semantic interpretation in underinformative sentences and some-true 
sentences; thus, we excluded the possibility that such cost is due to discrepancy in conceptual 
hierarchy’s movement. Interestingly, and differently from Bott & Noveck’s and from the first 
experiment’s results, we found more logical answers than pragmatic answers in the 
underinformative sentences. This might be related with the difficulty of our task, a cognitively 
effortful one that probably led to a decrease of pragmatic answers.  
 
 
5. Experiment 3 
5.1. Introduction 
In the first two experiments, we have found results similar to those found by Bott and Noveck 
(2004) in their third experiment. In other words, the RT is significantly longer for the 
pragmatic answer (agree) than for the semantic answer (disagree) in the infelicitous some 
condition. This argues for the notion that there is indeed a specific cost for the pragmatic 
interpretation in the infelicitous some condition. However, it has nothing to say about why 
this should be the case. Thus far, hypotheses relative to the cost of the pragmatic 
interpretation of some in the infelicitous condition can be divided depending on whether they 
take into account the infelicity itself or ignore it.  
The only hypothesis on the side that ignores the infelicity is the post-Gricean 





according to which the cost is due to the inferential process necessary to draw the 
interpretation. All other hypotheses factor in the infelicity itself as the major reason for the 
cost. According to Guasti et al. (2005), the cost of the pragmatic answer does not lie in 
accessing the pragmatic interpretation, but in verifying it: this entails constructing a 
complement set, which, in the infelicitous condition (but not in the felicitous one) is difficult, 
if not impossible. The next suggestion comes from Marty and Chemla (2013). They suggest 
that, in the infelicitous condition, it is not the interpretative process of deriving the pragmatic 
interpretation that is costly, but the decision to choose the pragmatic interpretation. While in 
the felicitous some condition, the decision is easy (as the pragmatic interpretation is obviously 
verified), it is much more difficult to make the decision in the infelicitous some condition 
(where it is not). Finally, and this is more or less a variant of Marty and Chemla’s position, 
one could argue that interlocutors operate according to a Principle of Charity (see Davidson 
1974;1984), which enjoins them to choose an interpretation that maximizes speaker’s 
rationality8. Clearly, such a Principle of Charity would be difficult to reconcile with the 
pragmatic interpretation in the infelicitous some condition, while it is compatible with the 
logical interpretation.  
 We decided to test these hypotheses, using a sentence evaluation task, but with a 
different paradigm relative to that used in Bott and Noveck’s (2004) third experiment. We did 
not use categorical sentences, but sentences referring to one of two characters and to a set of 
objects (see below), which had to be verified relative to an image. And, in keeping with Marty 
and Chemla (2013), we had two only some conditions (one true and one false). The measures 
were self-paced reading, RTs and eye-tracking, differentiating on the screen between three 
areas of interest (AOIs), one corresponding to the sentence, one corresponding to the vertical 
half of the image where the protagonist (referred to in the subject of the sentence) appears and 
																																																								
8 There is an obvious relationship between Davidson’s Principle of Charity and Grice’s 





one corresponding to the vertical half of the image where the antagonist (not mentioned in the 
sentence) appeared.  
The predictions are as follows:  
1. On the hypothesis that the cost is due to the inferential process incurred in deriving the 
pragmatic interpretation (Bott & Noveck 2004, Noveck & Sperber 2007), one would 
predict either a longer reading time for some or for the complement noun in the 
infelicitous condition if the reader gives the pragmatic interpretation than if she gives 
the logical interpretation, providing that the quantifier is interpreted locally. If it is 
interpreted globally, the prediction is that the RT will be longer for the pragmatic 
(disagree) than for the logical (agree) answer. Regarding the eye-tracking, one would 
expect participants giving the pragmatic interpretation to concentrate on the text AOI.  
2. On the hypothesis that the cost of the pragmatic answer in the infelicitous condition is 
to the verification of the pragmatic interpretation (Guasti et al. 2005), one would not 
expect a longer reading time for the quantifier and/or the complement noun, as the 
cost occurs after the pragmatic interpretation is accessed (and it is accessed locally in 
that hypothesis). On the other hand, one would expect a longer RT for the pragmatic 
interpretation as the verification process occurs after the interpretation itself. Finally, 
given that the verification process amounts to the verification of the existence of a 
complement set, one would expect participants giving the pragmatic answer to look 
more at the antagonist AOI than those that give the semantic answer. 
3. Under the hypothesis that the cost of the pragmatic answer in the infelicitous condition 
is due to a decision to draw or not to draw the pragmatic interpretation (Marty & 
Chemla 2013), one would expect the reading time for the quantifier and/or for the 
complement noun to be longer for participants giving the pragmatic answer than for 





RT to be longer for the pragmatic answer than for the logical answer in the infelicitous 
some condition, as well as for the false only some condition. Regarding the eye 
tracking, there are no specific predictions.  
4. On the hypothesis that the cost is due to a conflict between the pragmatic 
interpretation and the Principle of Charity in the infelicitous some condition, one 
would expect a longer reading time for the quantifier and/or the complement noun for 
the pragmatic answer than for the logical answer, and a longer RT for the pragmatic 
answer than for the logical answer (because the logical interpretation is compatible 
with the Principle of Charity) as well as for answers to false only some. Regarding the 
eye-tracking, one would again predict that the participants that give the pragmatic 
answer will look at the antagonist AOI more than those that give the logical answer, to 




Fifty-four participants (21 males, mean age = 23.25, sd = 3.26) took part to our experiment.9 
All participants were native French speakers. 
 
5.3. Material 
Experiment 3 was again a sentence evaluation task, but it did not use categorical sentences. 
Rather, participants were asked to evaluate the sentence relative to an image which presented 
two easily distinguishable characters (e.g., a boy and a girl) and a set of six objects which 
were distributed among the characters or in the exclusive possession of one of them. In the 
																																																								
9 This study was carried out in accordance with the recommendations of the Comité de 
Protection des Personnes Sud Est II, who gave it its agreement (IRB number: 11263). All 





felicitous some condition, the character mentioned in the sentence (e.g., The girl has some 
cars) had two of the objects mentioned in the sentence, while the other character had four:  
 
 
Figure 6: Felicitous some 
In the infelicitous some condition, the character mentioned in the sentence has all of the 
objects as shown below:  
 
 





There was one control condition, all (four true and four false items) and two test conditions, 
only some (four true and four false items), and some (four felicitous and four infelicitous 
items). There were also three filler conditions: exactly one (two true and two false items), 
exactly two (two true and two false items), and exactly three (two true and two false items).  
As in Experiment 2, participants were divided into two groups who saw the same 
sentences, but different pictures. Each group saw exactly the same number of items and the 
same number of true/false, felicitous/ infelicitous items. When one saw the felicitous (or true) 
picture, the other saw the corresponding (infelicitous or false) picture with the same 
characters, background and set of objects, but with a different distribution of the objects. And 
vice versa.  
 
5.4. Procedure 
Participants were first presented with an image with two characters for a duration of one 
second. Then the objects came into the picture with different distributions in the different 
conditions (see above). The resulting picture was observed for one second before the first 
group of words appeared. The first group of words corresponded to the subject NP (e.g., The 
girl) and participants had to push on the space key to see the next word (e.g., has), etc., for, 
successively, the quantifier (e.g., some) and the complement word (e.g., cars). On the 
appearance of each new word or group of words, the previous one disappeared. This was to 
avoid the participants pressing on the space key to access the whole sentence. Thus, reading 
was self-paced. When the participants had read the whole sentence, they were asked to 
indicate whether they agreed or disagreed by pressing one of two keys. Both their answers 
and their RTs were recorded. The whole process was done while the participants were facing 
an eyetracker, allowing to record their gaze direction. Figure 8 is an example of trial 






Keyboard interaction RTs and data selection 
 
Figure 8: trial composition and RTs definitions 
Several RTs related to keyboard interactions were computed. The overall response time (RT) 
includes both the reading time and the time to answer the question. It is measured between 
when the first group of words appears on the screen, and when the subject presses a key on 
the keyboard to answer the question. Trials with RT > 10s or RT < 0.5s or incorrect answers 
were discarded. The time to read quantifier (RT3) corresponds to the third group of words, 
which can be “all”, “some”, or “only some” and is measured between when the word appears 
on the screen and when the subject presses the spacebar on the keyboard. The time to read 
complement corresponds to the fourth group of words. The time to answer the question is 
measured between when the question appears on the screen, and when the subject presses one 
of the two answer keys on the keyboard. 
 
5.5. Eyetracking data processing 
The eyetracking data was collected at a rate of 60Hz with a Tobii® X120 eyetracker. Prior to 
the experiment, the subjects underwent a 5-point calibration phase with the Tobii Studio 
Software that allowed matching gaze direction to pixels on the screen. Eyetracking data was 
The	girl has some cars Agree or	Disagree?
x x x x x User	interaction
Screen









collected with Presentation® software. It was the average of right and left eye gaze direction, 
expressed in pixels. The calibration was checked every 6 trials.  
 
5.6. Computation of fixation data 
Missing data for durations less than 400ms were interpolated with a nearest neighbor 
algorithm. Fixations were isolated from saccades by computing a moving average of order 10, 
and considering as saccades the time samples for which the distance in pixels between two 
successive averages was greater than 35 pixels. When multiple saccades were detected in 
segments of 6 consecutive time samples, only the largest saccade was kept. Segments of more 
than 6 consecutive time samples between saccades where considered as fixations.  
 
5.7. Areas of Interest 
Three Areas of interest (AOI) were defined for fixation positions, as in Figure 9. The image 
displayed on the screen was separated in two rectangular AOIs with a width 400 pixels and a 
height 600 pixels, one being the part of the picture where the protagonist of the sentence 
appears (“Protagonist AOI”) and the other side displayed the other character (“Antagonist 
AOI”). A “Text AOI” was also defined around the words displayed on the screen. It was 1200 







Figure 9: Areas of interest (AOI) definitions 
 
5.8. Fixation data statistics 
For each AOI, we computed a fixation count that corresponds to the number of fixations on 
this area between when the quantifier words appear and the end of trial. We also computed a 
fixation duration, which is the sum of the duration of each of these individual fixations.  
 
5.9. Results 
First of all, we analyzed results of choice proportions. In Table 5 we present the mean of 
correct answers, considering the mean of logical correctness in the underinformative 
condition. Participants did the experiment with ease and the mean of correct answers is high 
(> 95%). Considering the underinfomative condition (Some semantic), participants gave 
much more pragmatic answers (72.2%) than logical answers (27.8%) (Wilcoxon signed rank: 










Condition Example Sentence Mean sd 
All true The boy has all the apples. 98.6 5.8 
All false The boy has all the apples. 100 0 
Only some true The girl has only some cats. 97.7 7.3 
Only some false The girl has only some cats. 95.4 14.6 
Some pragmatic The girl has some cars. 98.6 5.8 
Some semantic The girl has some cars. 27.8 37.2 
 
Table 5. Mean and standard deviation (sd) of correct answers; for the underinformative 
sentences we considered logical correctness (i.e., agree).  
 
We decided then to focus on the time participants spent to read the quantifier in the conditions 
in which some was used felicitously or infelicitously (Figure 10). We run a log-linear mixed 
model analysis with items and participants as random variables and the combination of 
condition and answer as fixed factor. The analysis showed no significant differences in terms 
of RT between the conditions (felicitous - pragmatic infelicitous: z = .89, p = .71; felicitous - 









Figure 10: Time to read quantifier 
Time to read quantifier as a function of condition and answer in the felicitous and infelicitous 
some conditions. Values were estimated with a log-linear mixed model analysis on 54 
participants and 8 items, with correct responses for which overall RTs were > 0.5 s and < 
10 s.  
 
 A log-linear mixed model analysis with items and participants as random variables and the 
combination of condition and answer as fixed factor had also been run to analyze the time 
participants need to read the complement as a function of condition and answer in the 
felicitous and infelicitous some conditions (Figure 11). No significant differences were found 
in terms of RT between the conditions (felicitous - pragmatic infelicitous: z = 1.27, p = .31; 
felicitous - logical infelicitous z = .99, p = .32; pragmatic infelicitous - logical infelicitous: z = 





































Figure 11: Time to read complement 
Time to read complement as a function of condition and answer in the felicitous and 
infelicitous some conditions. Values were estimated with a log-linear mixed model analysis 
on 54 participants and 8 items, with correct responses for which overall RTs were > 0.5 s and 
< 10 s.  
 
Finally, we analyzed the time participants took to answer the question as a function of 
condition and answer in the control and test conditions. We run a log-linear mixed model 
analysis with items and participants as random variables and the combination of condition and 
answer as fixed factor (Figure 12). No significant differences were found in terms of RT 
between the infelicitous some conditions (pragmatic infelicitous - logical infelicitous: z = 





































compared to all other conditions (see Table 6). No significant differences were found in terms 
of RT between the only some conditions (z = .23, p = .86) 
  
 
Figure 12: Time to answer the question 
Time to answer the question as a function of condition and answer in the control and test 
conditions. Values were estimated with a log-linear mixed model analysis on 54 participants 
and 24 items, with correct responses for which overall RTs were > 0.5 s and < 10 s.  
 
Table 6 – Comparisons on the time participants took to answer the questions in the different 
conditions. 
Contrasts z value Pr(>|z|) 
All Disagree - All Agree -2.53 .022 

















































Contrasts z value Pr(>|z|) 
Infelicitous_some Agree - All Agree 3.43 .003 
Infelicitous_some Disagree - All Agree 3.21 .004 
Only_some Agree - All Agree .11 .91 
Only_some Disagree - All Agree .32 .86 
Felicitous_some Agree - All Disagree 1.88 .09 
Infelicitous_some Agree - All Disagree 4.61 < .001 
Infelicitous_some Disagree - All Disagree 4.87 < .001 
Only_some Agree - All Disagree 2.22 .043 
Only_some Disagree - All Disagree 2.36 .032 
Infelicitous_some Agree - Felicitous_some Agree 3.80 .001 
Infelicitous_some Disagree - Felicitous_some Agree 3.52 .002 
Only_some Agree - Felicitous_some Agree .41 .84 
Only_some Disagree - Felicitous_some Agree .57 .74 
Infelicitous_some Disagree - Infelicitous_some Agree -1.22 .31 
Only_some Agree - Infelicitous_some Agree -3.29 .004 
Only_some Disagree - Infelicitous_some Agree -3.20 .004 
Only_some Agree - Infelicitous_some Disagree -2.95 .007 
Only_some Disagree - Infelicitous_some Disagree -3.10 .005 
Only_some Disagree - Only_some Agree .23 .86 
 
We analyzed also fixation counts (i.e., the number of fixations on a specific area between 
when the quantifier words appear and the end of trial): specifically, we analyzed the 
proportion of items for which the subject looked more often to the antagonist rather than on 





been run, with correct responses and looks on the image, with items and participants as 
random variables and the combination of condition and answer as fixed factor. As we can see 
in Figure 13, we found no significant differences between the felicitous some condition and 
the infelicitous some condition (infelicitous some agree – felicitous some: z = -.68, p = .50; 
infelicitous some disagree – felicitous some: z = .98, p = .49; infelicitous some disagree – 
infelicitous some agree: z = 1.26, p = .49;). 
 
 
Figure 13. Proportion of items for which the subject looked more often to the antagonist 
rather than on the protagonist, as a function of condition and answer. Values were estimated 
with a logistic mixed model analysis on 51 participants, with correct responses and looks on 
the image, with items and participants as random variables and the combination of condition 

























































To conclude we analyzed fixation durations (i.e., the sum of the duration of each of the 
individual fixations). Specifically, we looked at proportion of items for which subjects looked 
longer to the antagonist rather than on the protagonist, as a function of condition and answer. 
We ran a logistic mixed model analysis with correct responses and looks on the image, with 
items and participants as random variables and the combination of condition and answer as 
fixed factor. As we can see in Figure 14, again no significant differences had been found 
between the felicitous some condition and the infelicitous some condition (infelicitous some 
agree – felicitous some: z = -.79, p = .43; infelicitous some disagree – felicitous some: z = 
1.02, p = .43; infelicitous some disagree – infelicitous some agree: z = 1.40, p = .43;). 
 
Figure 14. Proportion of items for which the subject looked longer to the antagonist rather 
than on the protagonist, as a function of condition and answer. Values were estimated with a 























































image, with items and participants as random variables and the combination of condition and 
answer as fixed factor. Error bars stand for 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
5.10. Discussion  
After confirming that there is a cost in deriving scalar-implicatures (Experiment 1 and 2) and 
that this cost is unrelated to differences in moving upward or downward the conceptual 
hierarchy (Experiment 2), Experiment 3 had the goal to address such cost in scalar 
implicature computation with self-paced reading, RTs and eye-tracking measurements. We 
had specific predictions regarding the outcomes and they are based on four main hypotheses.  
According to the first approach, the cost of deriving the pragmatic computation lies in 
the inferential process necessary to draw the interpretation (Bott & Noveck 2004, Noveck & 
Sperber 2007); under such a view, we might predict a) longer reading times for the quantifier 
and/or for the complement noun for participants that answered pragmatically in the 
underinformative condition (if the quantifier is interpreted locally) or b) longer RTs to answer 
pragmatically in the underinformative condition (if the quantifier is interpreted globally) and 
c) more fixation counts/longer fixation times  at the text AOI for pragmatic interpretations in 
the underinformative condition.  
According to the second approach, the cost of deriving the pragmatic computation lies 
in the verification of the pragmatic interpretation (Guasti et al., 2005); under such a view, we 
might predict a) no longer reading times for the quantifier and/or for the complement noun for 
participants that answered pragmatically in the underinformative condition, b) longer RTs to 
answer pragmatically in the underinformative condition and c) more fixation counts/longer 






According to the third approach, the cost of deriving the pragmatic computation lies in 
the decision to draw the implicature (Marty & Chemla 2013); under such a view, we might 
predict a) longer reading times for the quantifier and/or for the complement noun for 
participants that answered pragmatically in the underinformative condition and b) no longer 
RTs to answer pragmatically in the underinformative condition. There are no specific 
predictions regarding the eye-tracker results.  
Finally, according to the fourth approach, the cost of deriving the pragmatic 
computation lies in the conflict between adhering to the Principle of Charity and to the 
pragmatic interpretation; under such a view, we might predict a) longer reading times for the 
quantifier and/or for the complement noun for participants that answered pragmatically in the 
underinformative condition, b) longer RTs to answer pragmatically in the underinformative 
condition and c) more fixation counts/longer fixation times at the antagonist AOI for 
pragmatic interpretations in the underinformative condition. 
 Looking at reading time results, we did not find any differences either between 
infelicitous and felicitous conditions, or between pragmatic and logical answers in the 
infelicitous condition. These results seem to go against localist approaches of the quantifier’s 
interpretation. Indeed, if the quantifier some is interpreted locally in the sentence (instead of 
globally), we might have expected longer reading times in the infelicitous condition compared 
to the felicitous conditions. However, we should also consider alternative explanations for 
such results, for example participants might adopt a strategy in the self-paced reading in 
which they press keys systematically until the end of the sentence. Thus, our arguments 
should not be considered as decisive because our goal was not precisely to test the localist 
interpretation.  
 Moving to results based on RTs, it took longer to answer the question in the 





replicate results of Experiment 2 and 3, since there is no RTs difference between the logical 
answer and the pragmatic answer. What differs in this third experiment, compared to 
Experiments 1 and 2, is the context. 
 Finally, data based on the eye-tracker again showed no significant pattern of results. 
Independently of condition, we saw more and longer fixations at the protagonist AOI, in line 
with the idea that the protagonist is the most salient in the context because it is the one that is 
mentioned in the sentence. Looking at graphs, we can see that there is a trend for longer 
fixation times and more fixation counts on the antagonist AOI in participants that interpreted 
the underinformative sentence pragmatically instead of semantically. One possibility is that 
this trend is not significant due to the great variance and/or issues of statistical power or due 
to an experimental artifact.  
In conclusion, our study is the first of several steps that aim to better address the 
debate on the cost of deriving scalar implicatures with the use of eye-tracking techniques. We 
found longer RTs when answering at underinformative sentences compared to control 
sentences but no longer reading times for the quantifier or the complement noun. Overall, 
these results seem to go against localist approaches of the quantifier’s interpretation, but we 
need to conduct other studies to better understand where the cost lies.  
 
6. General Discussion 
In this paper we mainly addressed the debate regarding the cost of deriving scalar 
implicatures, using different experimental techniques (i.e., RTs, reading times and eye-
tracking). There are two competing accounts on the computation of scalar inferences. On the 
one hand, there are the neo-Gricean approaches (Levinson, 2000; Chierchia, 2013) according 
to which the computational process is linguistically driven, with the semantic interpretation 





are the post-Gricean approaches (Sperber & Wilson, 1995; Carston, 2002) according to which 
the computational process is pragmatic and context-based, with the pragmatic interpretation 
that requires cognitive effort to be computed.  
Since Bott and Noveck (2004), many studies tried to experimentally assess whether or not 
there is a cost when we compute an inference and if a cost exists.  
Findings seem to support the post-Gricean approaches because when considering RTs, 
pragmatic answers require more time than logical answers and cognitive loads have an impact 
for both the rate and RTs of implicature computations (Bott, Bailey, & Grodner, 2012; Bott & 
Noveck, 2004; De Neys & Schaeken, 2007; Huang & Snedeker, 2009a; Noveck & Posada, 
2003; Tomlinson, Bailey, & Bott, 2013). Considering a sentence that contains an 
underinformative element in a scale, the context in which it is uttered seems to play a role 
(Breheny, Katsos, & Williams, 2006; Degen & Tanenhaus, 2015). Regarding the nature of the 
cost, there is further debate: some theories claim that the cost is simply related to the 
inferential process that is necessary to pragmatically enrich the literal meaning of the sentence 
(Bott & Noveck, 2004), other theories found the inner cause of the cost in different processes, 
for example that of verification of the pragmatic interpretation (Guasti et al., 2005), or in the 
decisional process of drawing the implicature (Marty & Chemla, 2013) or in the resolution of 
the conflict between the Principle of Charity and the pragmatic interpretation. Our study 
aimed to better understand the predictions of each approach and to find supportive data.  
With Experiment 1, we replicated the third experiment of Bott & Noveck (2004) in 
which, through a Sentence Evaluation Task with categorical sentences, they demonstrated that 
more time is needed to answer underinformative sentences pragmatically than logically. 
Similarly, we found that when participants had to evaluate sentences such as “Some elephants 
are mammals”, they answer pragmatically (i.e., false) more often than logically (i.e., true) but 





cognitive effort in deriving the implicature and it is visible in longer RTs (compared to both 
the logical interpretation of underinformative sentences and of control sentences).  
The second experiment might be considered as a follow-up of Bott & Noveck’s (2004) 
study. Indeed, our goal was to exclude the possibility that the cost of the implicature 
derivation is related to an experimental artifact, specifically that it is easier for participants to 
move down in the conceptual hierarchy (eg. Some mammals are elephants) than to move up 
(e.g., Some elephants are mammals). Through a similar Sentence Evaluation Task, we 
compared two groups of people who saw the same categorical sentences: for each sentence, 
there were two different sets of images, one validating and one not validating the sentence, 
with one group seeing the validating one, and one group seeing the other one. In this way, the 
same some-sentence was true in the pragmatic interpretation of one group, while it was false 
in the pragmatic interpretation of the other group. This was possible thanks to the creation of 
artificial categories named with a pseudo-word. The task demands were high (participants that 
failed in more than 2 control sentences were eliminated from the analysis) and this led to a 
higher number of logical answers. However, RTs remained longer when participants gave 
pragmatic answers compared to logical answers, confirming again the cost of drawing an 
implicature.  
Once confirmed that there is actually a cost, our third experiment aimed to look more 
in depth at the source of the cost, considering not only RTs but also reading times and eye-
movements. We created a variety of images with two characters (and three distinct areas of 
interest in the screen) and objects with different distributions in the different conditions. Then 
participants, through self-paced reading, read a sentence that could be either true or false (in 
the control conditions) or pragmatically true or pragmatically false (in the underinformative 
condition). They were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with the presented 





Results have been quite surprising, since we did not find statistically significant data overall. 
There were no differences in reading times either between infelicitous and felicitous 
conditions, or between pragmatic and logical answers in the infelicitous condition. 
Participants took longer to answer questions in the infelicitous some condition compared to 
all other conditions, but no differences have been detected between the logical answer and the 
pragmatic answer, contrary to Experiments 1 and 2. It might be the case that having a visual 
context (offered by images) helped. It should be worth creating a new within-subject 
experiment in which participants are tested both with a classic Sentence Evaluation Task 
without context (like the one in Experiment 1) and then with a Picture Selection Task with 
context. If our predictions are right, we expect to find the majority of participants who 
answered logically in the without-context experiment, to move to pragmatic answers in the 
with-context experiment, and this is consistent with the idea that they are not more willing to 
answer logically regardless but they do so simply because of an experimental artifact.  
Finally, eye-tracker data showed more fixations at the protagonist for a longer time in 
the infelicitous some condition but no significant results have been found about fixations at 
the antagonist; we expected to find more/longer fixations at the antagonist when participants 
answered pragmatically but, even though a trend in this direction exists, it is not statistically 
relevant. The future direction of the study is to create a new eye-tracking experiment in which 
we manipulate how the sentence is presented: by presenting the image after the entire 
sentence has been read, we can better focus on the participants’ fixations. Indeed, in the 
present experiment we analyzed fixations between the quantifier words’ appearance and the 
end of trial but participants could look at the entire picture before being presented with the 
sentence. This might be a limit of the study and a possible explanation for the not-significant 





In conclusion, further studies must be done to adjudicate between the different theories 
regarding the cost; our data, however, seem to support a post-gricean view of scalar-
implicature computation, a view according to which there is a cost in deriving scalar 
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General Discussion and Perspectives 
 
1. Main Findings 
 
 The present dissertation mainly addresses the debate around the computation of 
specific type of implicatures, namely generalized (in this thesis scalar implicatures: Chapters 
1, 2, 3, 4 and 5) and particularized implicatures (or ad-hoc implicatures: Chapters 1 and 2). As 
argued in the General Introduction part, those two types of implicatures have differences 
based on how alternatives are set. The former are inferences that are lexically-determined; by 
contrast, the latter are context-determined. Unlike other implicatures, such as the 
Conventional ones, they are both cancellable. As we have seen herein this thesis, in the 
Pragmatics’ experimental turn different theories and aspects related to the computation of 
implicatures are considered based on the population under investigation, particularly children 
or adults. For this reason, the General Discussion part will be divided in sub-topics. 
 
1.1. The Scalar/Ad-hoc Implicatures Debate  
As previously suggested, there are divergent views on implicatures: on the one side 
there are views according to which the distinction between scalar and ad-hoc implicatures 
exists (Chierchia, 2004; Grice, 1975; Levinson, 2000), on the other side there are views 
according to which there is a unique mechanism of inferences (Carston, 1998; Degen & 
Tanenhaus, 2015; Geurts, 2010; Sperber & Wilson, 1986; 1995).  
In Chapter 1 (Experiment 2), with a Picture Selection Task that reduced task demands, 
we demonstrated that younger children can successfully compute ad-hoc implicatures but they 
have difficulties with scalar implicatures. Similar results have been found also in Horowitz, 





schoolers, we could also discuss the developmental trajectory of the two types of 
implicatures. In our study, preschoolers easily computed ad-hoc but not scalar implicatures; 
on the latter, they reach an optimal performance at school age.  
In Chapter 2, with the same Picture Selection Task of Chapter 1, we demonstrated 
that, contrary to expectations, children in the autistic spectrum were also computing more ad-
hoc than scalar implicatures, even if they don’t reach the level of their typically developing 
peers for both type of implicatures. Typically developing children behave like children in 
Chapter 1, replicating the same pattern of results (preschoolers compute more ad-hoc than 
scalar implicatures, while at school-age their performance is at ceiling for both types of 
implicatures).  
The overall picture seems to lead us to consider scalar and ad-hoc implicatures as two 
distinct phenomena.  
 
1.2 The Debate around the Acqusition of Scalar Implicatures in Typically Developing 
Children  
 In Chapter 1 we didn’t just focus our attention on the scalar-ad-hoc implicatures 
debate, but also on the one concerning the acquisition of scalar implicatures in typically 
developing children (Experiment 1). As we have seen, acquisition studies found that children 
before the age of seven (or five) might present difficulties in computing scalar implicatures, 
i.e. they often accept underinformative sentences (for a review, Chemla & Singh, 2014b: 2.3). 
Different theories tried to explain children’s behaviour. On the one side, there are ‘pragmatic 
accounts’ that interpret children’s failure with scalar implicatures by considering their 
pragmatic system as not fully developed. Specifically, children have been considered as 
unable to recognize that scalar terms constitute relevant alternatives in certain contexts 





to adults (Katsos & Bishop, 2011). On the other side, there are ‘lexicalist accounts’ according 
to which children’s failure can be explained in terms of difficulties in retrieving the lexical 
scale (Barner, Brooks, & Bale, 2011; Foppolo, Guasti & Chierchia, 2012). There is also a 
‘processing account’ based on a Relevance-Theoretic framework (Pouscoulous, Noveck, 
Politzer, & Bastide, 2007): children difficulties arise from the labour related to the implicature 
processing and thus, task complexities might lead to greater cognitive efforts and less 
computations.  
In our first experiment (Chapter 1) we decided to run a within-subject design testing 
the same children with both a classic Truth Value Judgment Task and with a new Picture 
Selection Task, in which we provided children with visual and linguistic cues to derive scalar 
alternatives. The two tasks led to similar results (children had a performance around 55% of 
pragmatic answers) and thus visual alternatives didn’t help children with scalar implicature 
derivation. Our results are difficult to explain in terms of pragmatic accounts, since:  
i) If contextual relevance matters we should have expected a worse performance in the 
Truth Value Judgment Task compared to the Picture Selection Task, where the ‘all’ 
alternative to ‘some’ is made salient visually and verbally,  
ii) Children can be more tolerant but this can account for a Truth Value Judgment 
Task, not for a Picture Selection Task where they have to select between a pragmatic and a 
logical answer. Again, we should have expected a worse performance in the Truth Value 
Judgment Task.  
Our results are difficult to explain also in terms of a processing account, since the 
Picture Selection Task has the relevant alternatives visually presented and it is less complex 
than a Truth Value Judgment Task in which a metalinguistic judgment must be provided, so it 





since children’s difficulty is considered to be related with the lexical scales (the scale is not 
yet lexicalized or there are difficulties with the retrieval of alternatives).  
Results of Experiment 2 (Chapter 1) have also been analyzed considering the ‘lexical 
accounts’: the observed difference in the acquisition of scalar and ad-hoc implicatures can be 
explained considering that scalar implicatures require the lexicalization of relevant scales, a 
step that is not involved in ad-hoc implicatures (typically context-dependent). 
 
1.3 The Default-Non-Default Debate of Scalar-Implicatures Computation 
 As presented in the Introduction, one of the liveliest debates on scalar implicature is 
related to the processing time that is needed to integrate semantic and pragmatic information 
to successfully infer the speaker’s meaning, with two main theoretical proposals (Chemla & 
Singh, 2014a,b, for a review). According to what we can define ‘Strong Default approach’, 
we compute implicatures without additional processing costs and context plays no role in the 
computation; the cancelation of the implicature involves a cognitive cost. The main proponent 
of this view is Levinson (2000). According to ‘Non-Default approaches’, with recent new 
elaboration into a ‘Literal-First/Two Stage models’ (Huang & Snedeker, 2009a), the literal 
interpretation is accessed first and implicatures are computed, as a second step, with 
additional time and cognitive effort. Recently, a third account known as ‘Constraint-Based 
approach’ (Degen & Tanenhaus, 2015) has been developed. In this new processing theory of 
implicatures computation, concepts like ‘naturalness’, ‘availability of alternatives’ and 
‘context’ are paramount in order to evaluate whether an implicature will be interpreted with 
an extra cost or not. Indeed, Degen and Tanenhaus asserted:  
 
“When we embed the issue of when, and how quickly, upper- and lower-bound some 
are interpreted within a Constraint-Based approach with expectations and adaptation, 





that scalar implicatures are computed by default and the claim that they are only 
computed after an initial stage of semantic processing. When there is more probabilistic 
support from multiple cues, listeners will compute scalar inferences more quickly and 
more robustly. Conversely, when there is less support, listeners will take longer to arrive 
at the inference, and the inference will be weaker” (2015, p. 672). 
 
It can be of interest to consider whether our results can be analyzed accordingly to their 
proposals, even if the essays proposed in this thesis had not the scope of assessing these 
theories (clear-cut predictions based on Degen and Tanenhaus’ proposal are not easyly 
conceivable).  
In Chapter 4, we decided to assess the cost of deriving implicatures without contextual 
support but within a population that might present a cognitive disadvantage (i.e., cognitive 
load) for our purposes. We assessed non-balanced bilinguals of two different second 
languages (i.e., English and Spanish) with a Sentence Evaluation Task, in which they had to 
judge whether they agree or disagree with underinformative categorical sentences of the type 
‘Some Xs are Ys’, when actually all the Xs are Ys. Furthermore, we assessed oral processing 
under time constraints for the answer. In two between-subject experiments, we found that 
bilingual participants tested in their second language computed significantly less pragmatic 
answers compared to bilinguals tested in their first language. Our results have been evaluated 
considering both the cognitive load of interpreting a sentence in a second language – when 
participants are non-balanced and non-immersed bilinguals – and the cognitive load of oral 
processing under time constraints. Our proposal is that both factors contributed to load the 
cognitive resources available to participants tested in their second language, causing a 
decrease of pragmatic answers. Although offering new data against the Default approach, this 
experiment does not permit to adjudicate between different Non-Default models. 
 In Chapter 5, we again focused on the processing-cost debate with three experiments 





with sentences interpreted without context (Experiments 1 and 2) and one with contextual 
(visual) support (Experiment 3). Since Bott and Noveck (2004) was the first experimental 
study testing the cost of scalar implicatures, we decided to replicate their third experiment in 
our first one. This is, to our knowledge, the first time that a study aims to systematically 
replicate their results and this can be a good starting point, due to the replication crisis in 
Psychology. Using the same Sentence Evaluation Task (with little modifications), we 
replicated their results that showed how answering pragmatically requires more time than 
answering logically to underinformative sentences like “Some elephants are mammals”.  
Our second experiment in Chapter 5 moves from Bott and Noveck (2004) and had the 
goal of excluding the possibility that the proved cost is related to an experimental artifact (i.e., 
that it is easier to move down in the conceptual hierarchy than to move up). Again we used a 
Sentence Evaluation Task with the use of pseudo-words. The first interesting result was that 
we obtained a high number of logical answers, due to our task’s high demands. Moreover, we 
again found loger RTs when participants gave pragmatic answers compared to logical 
answers, excluding the possibility that this is due to an experimental artifact. Once more, our 
results seem to counter the idea that pragmatic inferences are accessed by default.  
The third experiment of Chapter 5 is a Sentence Evaluation Task but we introduced 
contextual supports. Being an eye-tracking experiment, we did not consider just RTs but also 
reading times and eye-movements. Surprisingly, we did not find differences in RTs, reading 
times or gaze directions (related to Areas of Interests in the screen) between pragmatic and 
logical answers in the infelicitous condition. Results are thus different from the ones 
described before. It might be the case that having a visual context (offered by images) helped, 
suggesting that it might be more of interest to analyze the cost related with the context, more 





We are planning two new experiments to better address the core and limits of our 
study. We will run both a within-subject experiment in which participants will be tested with 
a Sentence Evaluation Task both with and without context. In line with Context-based 
approaches (e.g., Constraint-Based approach), we expect to find an increase of pragmatic 
answers in the with-context experiment. Furthermore, we are creating a new eye-tracking 
experiment in which we will present the image after the entire sentence has been read, 
contrary to what we did in Experiment 3 (Chapter 5).  
We can conclude saying that our studies’ results do not support ‘Strong defaultism’ 
views but future studies in the field should identify “the cues that listeners use in computing 
scalar implicatures”, in order “to provide a unified account of why in many situations this 
computation appears to be delayed and to come at a cost, whereas in other situations, it is 
more rapid, and less resource-intensive” (Degen & Tanenhaus, 2015, p. 704). Indeed, when 
we speak about ‘context’ it is not always easy to establish which aspects of the context we 
should refer for. Foppolo and Marelli wrote:  
 
“From the point of view of Constraint-Based Models, the role of context in the generation 
of scalar inferencing is founded on three basic considerations about what listeners do 
during sentence processing: they rapidly integrate multiple sources of information; they 
generate expectations of multiple types (phonological, syntactic, semantics, etc.) about 
‘what is coming next’ in the sentence and they can adapt their expectations to different 
interlocutors and situations. In general, the notion of context might involve probabilistic 
constraints about the type of sentence uttered (including phonetic–acoustic properties and 
syntactic–semantic expectations); speakers’ meaning and intentions; considerations about 
the situation and the goals of the conversations; integration of different sources of 
informa- tion, like acoustic and visual cues (Degen & Tanenhaus 2015). Theoretically, 
one first very broad distinction is between pragmatic and default approaches: according to 
strong defaultism, as we said, context bears no role in the process, as SIs are recursively 
factored in the computation whenever a scalar term is encountered, independently of 
contextual features. According to pragmatic approaches, instead, context might intervene 





alternatives by means of different ‘linguistic’ factors like word order, questions under 
discussion and focus (Geurts 2010). More specifically, ‘context’ might also refer to the 
syntactic traits of the sentence in which the scalar term appears, and to the semantic 
properties of the structure in which the scalar term is embedded that are known to affect 
SI computation [cf. Chierchia (2013) for a discussion].” (2017, p. 662). 
 
All those contextual aspects have to be considered in future studies. 
 
1.4 The Role of Theory of Mind in the Computation 
Whether or not Theory of Mind has a role in pragmatic computation, and particularly 
in implicature computation, is still under debate. Results in the literature are mixed, some 
arguing for a role of ToM (Nieuwland, Ditman, & Kuperberg, 2010; Surian, Baron-Cohen, & 
Van der Lely, 1996) and others for none (Andrés-Roqueta, & Katsos, 2017; Antoniou, 
Cummins, & Katsos, 2016). Andrés-Roqueta and Katsos (2017), based on conflicting results 
in the literature on ToM skills and pragmatic phenomena, proposed a distinction between a 
“linguistic-pragmatics” where “structural language and competence with pragmatic norms are 
enough to perform successfully in the task” and a “social-pragmatics” where “in addition to 
structural language and pragmatics, the child needs competence with ToM, and specifically 
the ability to represent other people’s intentions, desires and beliefs”. The difference, 
however, has nothing to do “with pragmatic phenomena per se, but with the communicative 
situation” (Andrés-Roqueta & Katsos, 2017, pp. 2-3). In their proposal, sensitivity to 
informativeness is included in “linguistic-pragmatics”: to compute an implicature, people 
mainly rely on linguistic knowledge (e.g., semantics of quantifiers) and the role of ToM is 
minimal. 
Moving to our results, in Chapter 1 and 2 in both typically developing children and 
children with Autism Spectrum Disorders we found a role of ToM in scalar implicature 





ToM skills have been found for ad-hoc implicatures. This lack of correlation between ToM 
and ad-hoc implicatures – together with a positive correlation with scalars – may look 
surprising at first sight. We analyzed those results considering the fact that both scalar 
implicatures and ToM skills are at maturational stage in children of the age we tested, while 
ad-hoc implicatures are computed also at a younger age. It might be that those children that 
are in a stage in which ToM skills are more developed are also able to compute scalar 
implicatures. Vice versa, children that have less mature ToM skills, have also problems with 
such derivation. As a consequence, it might be that ToM is not a prerequisite for implicature 
computation; otherwise it should be the same for ad-hoc implicatures. Another aspect to take 
into account is that ASD children did not reach the same level of TD children with both types 
of implicatures: this might be related with ToM skills as well as linguistic skills (our 
participants where not matched for syntactic abilities). Since individuals in the autistic 
spectrum pass first- and second-order ToM with a significant delay (Happé, 1994), it might be 
that implicatures are also succesfully computed with a delay. This would explain also the 
inconsistency between our results and results with adults in the spectrum. 
In Chapter 3, we tried to address the debate on ToM and implicatures computation 
assessing the inference-ability in people in in the broader phenotype but with a risk of 
presenting higher autistic traits. As previously demonstrated in a series of works discussed in 
detail in Chapter 3, students of scientific disciplines were good candidates for having higher 
autistic traits compared to students of humanities. We found that students enrolled in 
scientific curricula were less likely to compute scalar implicatures than students enrolled in 
humanities curricula and that AQ measures (and particularly ToM measures) correlate with 
pragmatic answers. If these results seem to be in contrast with Andrés-Roqueta and Katsos’s 
(2017) proposal, we must also consider that in our experiment the correlation between autistic 





group. This fact leaves open the possibility that students of scientific disciplines are simply 
trained to focus on the task’s logical aspects. Still, a correlation between ToM scores and 
pragmatic answers has been found in the humanities group, though there is a limitation in our 
study: the ToM items used to assess the correlation were not originally described as ToM-
related by the authors of the AQ test (indeed, they never delimited a specific category for 
ToM). We selected the items that, in our opinion, targeted ToM skills. In the future it would 
be useful to assess whether those items are recognized as ToM-related also from other experts 
in the fields or from other people instructed on the definition of ToM.10 
To sum up, even if some role of ToM has been detected in our experiments, our results 
cannot be conclusive for the debate. It is worth considering that when researchers try to 
correlate performances in ToM tasks with other pragmatic skills, it is not clear whether they 
employed ToM tasks target the specific abilities required when considering the interlocutor’s 
perspective in pragmatic inferences (Andrés-Roqueta & Katsos, 2017, p. 2). Longitudinal 
studies might be of interest for the debate here described but they should consider ToM skills 
more related to the particular pragmatic aspect under investigation. However, another possible 
interesting consideration takes again the context into account. In Degen and Tanenhaus’s 
view (2015), one of the contextual cues that have to be considered is related to the fact that 
the listener generates expectations on the speakers’meaning and intentions. We can suggest 
that in a Constraint-Based framework, ToM skills’ role might be more or less involved based 
on how much the speakers’ intentions are clear in the specific context: if, for example, the 
speaker is supposed to be ignorant about something, implicatures might not arise. Even if we 
have presented some studies related to this view (e.g., Hochstein, Bale, & Barner, 2018), 
future developments might consider this possibility more in depth with different experimental 
techniques and populations.   
																																																								
10	We would like to thank Prof. Ira Noveck and participants of his brown bag at CNRS Institute for Cognitive 






 This dissertation collected a series of studies that had the goal of disentangling – 
without any claim of exhaustiveness – some open issues on the topic of implicatures 
computation. We used a variety of experimental techniques (Sentence Evaluation Tasks, 
Picture Selection Tasks, RTs, reading times, gaze detection) and different tested population 
(typically developing children, children with Autism Developmental Disorders, adults in the 
broader phenotype with higher autistic traits, bilinguals and typical adults). We detected a 
distinction between the computation of generalized and particularized implicatures (using the 
same task to assess both), with the latter being computed more easily than the former. We 
proposed that a lexical account might explain the difference, considering that generalized 
implicatures, differently from particularized implicatures, require the lexicalization of 
relevant scales. We also showed that children with ASD compute less implicatures (both 
generalized and particularized) compared to their typically developing peers and that this 
might be related to ToM and morphosyntactic difficulties. We also proposed that general 
abilities might help ASD children in compensating with their difficulties.   
All in all, our data seem to oppose a ‘Strong defaultism’ view of implicature 
computations, demonstrating that a certain role of the speaker’s epistemic reasoning is needed 
(Chapters 1, 2 and 3) and that less scalar implicatures are computed under a cognitive load 
and in tasks without contextual support (Chapters 4 and 5). However, with particular 
contextual support, no differences have been detected between logical and pragmatic answers 
in terms of RTs and reading times (Chapter 5). Those latter results seem to go more in the 
direction of Constraint-Based approaches, even if the difference that we found between 
generalized and particularized implicatures seems not find support in this theory. 
Grammatical-approaches, instead, support both the distinction between generalized and 





certain role of the ‘context’ is expected too since, as previously suggested, with context we 
might also refer to the syntactic traits of the sentence in which the scalar term appears, and to 
the semantic properties of the structure in which the scalar term is embedded that affects the 
computation of scalar implicatures (Foppolo & Marelli, 2017, p. 662). 
To conclude, it is not always easy to neatly reconcile theoretical and empirical 
perspectives. As Chemla & Singh (2014b, p. 395) suggested, “the relations between theory 
and experiment in the domain of scalar implicature are in their infancy”. For this reason a 
joint approach is the only one that we must consider to move forward in the comprehension of 
the diverse range of issues addressed in this thesis. It is hoped that the new field of 
Experimental Pragmatics might take advantage of the always more sophisticated experimental 
techniques (e.g., eye-traking techinques, EEG, ERP etc) and will apply them to the more 
theoretical field of Pragmatics. We will “benefit from joint experimental and theoretical 
scrutiny” (Chemla & Singh, 2014b, p. 395). Future directions in this field should focus more 
on defining contextual features and reconcile results of different population (children vs. 
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 “I have not always chosen the safest path.  
I've made my mistakes, plenty of them.  
I sometimes jump too soon and fail to appreciate the consequences.  
But I've learned something important along the way:  
I've learned to heed the call of my heart.  
I've learned that the safest path is not always the best path  





This is the end of a long and complicated path: there are so many people I want to thank that I 
find it hard to begin. It is difficult to overstate my gratitude for my PhD tutor Prof. Luca 
Surian: he met me three years ago when I was a naïve dreamer and worked a lot to make me a 
more pragmatic (no pun intended) researcher. He taught the unsophisticated linguist in me 
how to reason scientifically and how to write scientific papers. There is still a lot to learn but I 
would not have reached this point without his patience: I will always be thankful. I must also 
thank my co-advisor Prof. Remo Job for giving me the opportunity to have the scholarship 
and to work with him in these three years. I am proud to have had my work supported by the 
Fondazione ONLUS Marica De Vincenzi, joining this large group of researchers.  
I want also to thank another person who believed in me and gave me the strength not to give 
up three years ago: Prof. Maria Teresa Guasti, who introduced me to the vibrant research 
environment of Miano-Bicocca. There, I met my “unofficial” tutors that worked as well with 
me in the past three years and to whom I’m very indebted: Prof.ssa Francesca Foppolo and 
Prof.ssa Francesca Panzeri. Francesca & Francesca (as I always referred to them) are scholars 
with amazing personalities have been a panacea during my research journey: I have learnt a 






Along that journey, I spent 6 months abroad, at the University of Notre Dame (Indiana) and at 
the CNRS Institut des Sciences Cognitives “Marc Jeannerod”, Lyon, where I was lucky 
enough to meet two mentors who proved very influential: Prof. Kathleen Eberhard and Prof. 
Anne Reboul. Those figures of strong women and researchers have been a steady source of 
inspiration. There are no words to express how much I’m glad to have had the opportunity to 
meet them. Their consistent encouragements had been a beacon in the night. 
 
There are many other people that I met at Università degli Studi di Trento and that cheered 
me up during my journey. First of all, I won’t forget Gisella, Federica & Carlotta with whom 
I laughed, I cried, I screamed, I panicked, I traveled, I talked: we shared unforgettable 
moments. I will also remember Salvatore and Edoardo: I could always count on them for a 
smile even in the darkest day. 
  
Outside the academic environment, I want to thank other people that supported me all the 
way. First of all, I must thank my husband Michelangelo. He has been my first supporter and 
without him I would have not reach this “finish line”. He always complained about my little 
self-esteem and he tried to push me every single day. However, Michelangelo didn’t help me 
just with words but he also “worked” with me, giving advice, listening my talks, reading my 
papers, traveling with me, and so on. He is my soul mate and now a great expert in scalar 
implicatures and Pragmatics.   
 
I warmly thank my family for being next to me not just in this path but also in my entire life.  
I learned a lot from every single member of my huge and lovely family: my mum Giusy 
taught me to be an independent woman, my dad Corrado taught me to be patient in pursuing 





teaching me unconditional love, my nephew Alessandro. My family is my strength, including 
those that did not live under my same roof but that I love nonetheless: my grandparents Lina 
and Aldo, my uncles and cousins that I cannot name because we are too many! During those 
years we lost some of them in the terrestrial form but they are inside my heart. 
 
I also thank my friends of a lifetime for being there even after my long stays abroad: Lisa, 
Sara, Paola, Melissa, Giulia, Ilaria, Bob, Mary have always shared my happy moments. We 
are growing up: life sometime creates distance in space that our memories will always bridge. 
 
I want to conclude thanking a very special person in my life, to which I dedicate my 
dissertation, my grandmother Teresa. Your passing away earlier this year has been something 
that changed me in depth and is still hard to accept. When my heart is full of sadness, I think 
about the gift that God gave me in having you in my life for twenty-eight years. It is from you 
that I learned something that you cannot read on a book, even with a PhD: how good a person 









 “Non sempre ho scelto il cammino più sicuro.  
Ho commesso i miei errori, molti errori.  
Spesso mi lancio troppo presto e non analizzo le conseguenze. 
Lungo la strada, però, ho imparato qualcosa di importante:  
Ho imparato ad ascoltare la chiamata del mio cuore.  
Ho imparato che il percorso più sicuro non è sempre il percorso migliore  
e ho imparato che non bisogna sempre fidarsi della voce della paura”. 
Steve Goodier 
 
Questa è la fine di un percorso lungo e complicato: ci sono così tante persone che voglio 
ringrazire che quasi non so da dove iniziare. Non è facile esprimere a parole la mia gratitudine 
per il mio tutor accademico, il Prof. Luca Surian: mi ha conosciuta tre anni fa quando ero 
un’ingenua sognatrice e ha lavorato molto per rendermi una ricercatrice più pragmatica (in 
tutti i sensi). Lui ha insegnato alla linguista “grezza”  che era in me come ragionare e lavorare 
in modo scientifico. C’è ancora molto da imparare ma non avrei raggiunto questo traguardo e 
questa consapevolezza senza la sua pazienza: gli sarò sempre grata. Devo anche ringraziare il 
mio co-tutor, il Prof. Remo Job per la fiducia datami nell’assegnarmi la borsa di studio e per 
avermi dato la possibilità di lavorare con lui in questi anni. Sono orgogliosa di aver lavorato  
grazie al supporto della Fondazione ONLUS Marica De Vincenzi, inserendomi in questa 
grande famiglia di ricercatori che ha lavorato negli anni in suo nome.   
Non posso poi non ringraziare un’altra persona che ha creduto in me e che mi ha sempre dato 
la forza di non mollare, cosnigliandomi per il meglio: la Prof.ssa Maria Teresa Guasti, la 
quale mi ha anche introdotto al fervente gruppo di ricerca dell’Università Milano-Bicocca. In 
questo gruppo ho avuto la fortuna di incontrare le mie tutor “ufficiose”, le quali hanno 
lavorato con me in tutti questi anni e cui sono davvero grata: la Prof.ssa Francesca Foppolo e 
la Prof.ssa Francesca Panzeri. Francesca & Francesca (come amo riferirmi a loro) sono 





nel mio percorso accademico: ho potuto sempre contare sul loro aiuto e ho imparato un sacco 
di cose. Mi mancheranno i nostri meeting nell’ufficio P03 in Bicocca.  
Nel mio cammino, ho trascorso sei mesi all’estero, alla University of Notre Dame (Indiana) e 
al CNRS Institut des Sciences Cognitives “Marc Jeannerod” a Lione dove ho avuto l’onore di 
incontrare due mentori che si sono rivelate davvero importanti per me: la Prof.ssa Kathleen 
Eberhard e la Prof.ssa Anne Reboul. Queste due figure di donne e ricercatrici dal carattere 
forte ma al contempo premuroso sono state fonte di ispirazione. Non ho parole per esprimere 
quanto sono grata di aver avuto la possibilità di incontrarle. Le loro parole di incoraggiamento 
sono state un faro nella notte.  
Ci sono molte altre persone che ho incontrato all’ Università degli Studi di Trento e che mi 
hanno rallegrato in questi anni. Prima di tutto, non scorderò Gisella, Federica e Carlotta con le 
quali ho riso, pianto, ‘sclerato’, viaggiato e parlato: abbiamo condiviso momenti 
indimenticabili. Ricorderò anche Salvatore ed Edoardo: ho sempre potuto contare su di loro 
per un sorriso anche nelle giornate più difficili. 
  
Al di fuori dell’ambiente lavorativo, devo ringrazire molte altre persone che mi hanno 
supportato e sopportato lungo la via. Prima di tutto, devo ringraziare mio marito 
Michelangelo. Lui è stato il mio primo sostenitore e senza di lui non avrei mai raggiunto 
questo traguardo. Michelangelo si è sempre lamentato della mia poca autostima e ha provato a 
spingermi ogni giorno a fare meglio e a credere in me stessa. Per di più, non mi è stato vicino 
solo moralmente ma ha anche lavorato al mio fianco, dandomi consigli, ascoltando infinite 
volte le mie presentazioni, leggendo i miei articoli, viaggiando insieme a me e molto altro. 
Come dice il libro che abbiamo comprato a gennaio 2016 ad Indianapolis, Michelangelo è la 
mia anima gemella, il mio ‘Once in a lifetime’ … e ora un grande esperto in implicature 






Per continuare, ringrazio con eterno amore la mia famiglia per essermi stata accanto non solo 
in questo percorso ma per tutta la vita. Ho imparato da ognuno di voi qualcosa che mi è stato 
utile nella mia avventura di dottoranda: mamma Giusy mi ha insegnato ad essere una donna 
forte ed indipendente, papà Corrado mi ha insegnato ad essere paziente e perseverante nella 
strada verso un obiettivo, mia sorella Teresa mi ha insegnato a non prendermi troppo sul 
serio. Ora, un nuovo membro, mi sta insegnando l’amore incondizionato: mio nipote 
Alessandro. La mia famiglia è la mia forza, inclusi coloro che non hanno vissuto sotto il mio 
stesso tetto ma che amo allo stesso modo: i miei nonni Lina e Aldo, i miei zii e cugini che non 
posso nominare uno ad uno perché sono veramente troppi! In questi anni abbiamo perso 
alcuni dei nostri amati nella loro forma terrestre ma li conservo tutti nel mio cuore.  
 
Ci tengo anche a ringraziare i miei amici di una vita per esserci nonostante i miei numerosi 
periodi di lontananza: Lisa, Sara, Paola, Melissa, Giulia, Ilaria, Bob, Mary hanno sempre 
condiviso i miei momenti felici. Stiamo crescendo: la vita a volte crea distanza fisica ma i 
nostri ricordi sono un ponte tra di noi.   
 
Voglio concludere ringraziando una persona molto speciale nella mia vita, la persona a cui 
dedico la mia tesi: mia nonna Teresa. Il tuo lasciarci quest’anno è stato qualcosa che mi ha 
segnato nel profondo e che ancora fatico ad accettare. Quando il mio cuore è colmo di 
tristezza, penso al regalo che Dio mi ha fatto donandomi ventotto anni di vita insieme a te. È 
grazie a te se ho imparato qualcosa che non puoi leggere in un libro, nemmeno con un 
Dottorato di Ricerca: quanto una persona possa essere buona nell’animo. Tu sei la mia vita e 
questo lavoro è dedicato a te. So che mi stai guardando. Grazie.  
 
